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Zusammenfassung
Benutzbarkeit ist kritisch fu¨r das Funktionieren von Sicherheitsmechanis-
men. Dies gilt im Besonderen fu¨r Verfahren basierend auf Public-Key-
Infrastrukturen (PKI). Gerade letztere besitzen eine hohe Komplexita¨t und
erwiesen sich daher in der Praxis als Quelle von Bedienfehlern, die schnell
zu Sicherheitslu¨cken fu¨hren ko¨nnen. Umgekehrt bremsen aber auch Be-
nutzbarkeitsprobleme die Nutzung und Verbreitung von PKI-fa¨higen An-
wendungen und Diensten.
Gegenstand der vorliegenden Arbeit ist die Darstellung der spezifischen
Herausforderungen von PKI-Technologie in Bezug auf Benutzbarkeit sowie
das Aufzeigen von Lo¨sungsansa¨tzen. Dazu wird ein allgemeines Schichten-
modell zur Verbesserung der Benutzbarkeit von Sicherheitsanwendungen
sowie ein generisches Werkzeug zur Analyse beliebiger PKI-fa¨higer Soft-
ware eingefu¨hrt. Die Arbeit zeigt sodann beispielhaft mehrere Anwendungen
dieser Konzepte auf:
Neben technischen Maßnahmen der IT-Sicherheit kommt gerade der Sen-
sibilisierung und Schulung von Anwendern eine große Bedeutung zu, denn
viele Sicherheitsprobleme lassen sich auf menschliche Irrtu¨mer oder Nach-
la¨ssigkeit zuru¨ckfu¨hren. Wir entwickeln daher ein neues Konzept fu¨r Secu-
rity Awareness-Kampagnen, die durch gezieltes Einbeziehen der Benutzer
langfristige und nachhaltige Verhaltensa¨nderungen bewirken sollen.
Das Delegieren von sicherheitskritischen Aufgaben ist eine Mo¨glichkeit,
Benutzbarkeitsproblemen zu begegnen. Hier wird speziell PKI Outsourcing,
d.h. der Betrieb eines Trustcenters durch einen Dienstleister, untersucht.
In diesem Fall ist besonders die Sicherheit beim Certificate Enrolment zu
gewa¨hrleisten. Wir zeigen eine Sicherheitslu¨cke des Standardprotokolls auf
und beheben diese mit Hilfe von verteilten digitalen Signaturen, die ein
Vieraugenprinzip kryptografisch umsetzen. Unser Protokoll beno¨tigt eine
verteilte Schlu¨sselerzeugung zwischen zwei Parteien. Wir stellen dazu einen
neuen, effizienten und beweisbar sicheren Algorithmus fu¨r RSA vor.
Die meisten Emailprogramme unterstu¨tzen bereits Verschlu¨sselung und
digitale Signaturen, doch diese Funktionen werden kaum genutzt. Grund
dafu¨r ist die ungu¨nstige Kosten-Nutzen-Relation fu¨r den Anwender. Wir
zeigen, wie sich diese verbessern la¨sst. Dies geschieht durch den Einsatz op-
portunistischer Sicherheit, welche Public-Key-Kryptografie ohne Zertifikate
und den damit verbundenen Aufwand realisiert.
Ein Problem von PKI-basierten Authentifikationsverfahren ist, dass aus
Sicherheitsgru¨nden kryptografische Schlu¨ssel nicht tempora¨r an einen Stell-
vertreter, etwa wa¨hrend eines Urlaubs, weitergegeben werden ko¨nnen. Wir
beschreiben eine, fu¨r den Benutzer transparente, einheitliche Lo¨sungsplatt-
form fu¨r den Anwendungsfall World Wide Web, die alle gebra¨uchlichen Au-
thentifikationsverfahren unterstu¨tzt.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
First things first, but not necessarily in that order.
– Dr. Who
This section starts with a short preface to motivate the subject and to
state the research problems and the research agenda. Our contributions are
summarized in Section 1.2, an outline of this thesis is given in Section 1.3.
1.1 Preface
The term cryptography, as we use it today, stems from the Greek word
κρυπτoγραϕι·α and its literal meaning of “secret writing”. Originally being
a technology for governmental or military purposes, the spreading of com-
puters brought cryptography to the desktops of enterprise or home users.
The invention of public key cryptography and the idea of digital certificates
in the mid-1970’s paved the road for the development of cryptographic tech-
niques going beyond encryption. The early concepts emerged to public key
infrastructure technology (PKI) which provides the basis for a multitude of
security services and applications. In the early 1990’s public key crypto-
graphy hit the mass market with the software package PGP (Pretty Good
Privacy), which allowed end users to sign and encrypt their email and data
with the strongest algorithms. Today a lot of commercial off-the-shelf ap-
plications – like email clients, web browsers, file encryption software, group-
ware, VPN clients – have some form of built-in PKI support. PKI has also
quietly seeped into consumer devices, which are now equipped with powerful
1
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processors and network capabilities, for example fourth generation mobile
phones.
Internet users regularly get into contact with public key cryptography in
the form of SSL (Secure Socket Layer), which provides server authentication
and secure communication channels. Most of them are not aware of this
until warning or error messages pop up. However, a significant part of
users does not react correctly in such a situation or is able to tell apart
secure connections from insecure ones [88, 238, 119]. Usability issues are
neither a new, nor a specific problem of cryptography. Consider the use
of cryptography during the Second World War as an example: It is known
that Russian soldiers abandoned the official army ciphers because they were
too difficult to use and switched to a simpler system, which proved easy
to break [135]. On the other hand, users perceive computer security in
general as a barrier that gets into their way when pursuing primary tasks
(see e.g. [4]). Consequently, they pay little attention to security measures
or even deliberately try to short-cut them. In fact, a majority of today’s
security breaches can be traced back to human error [206, 245, 142].
Interestingly, the demand for usability in security applications dates back
quite a long time. Usability was an explicit requirement stated by Saltzer
and Schroeder [199] as one of their eight design principles for secure systems
thirty years ago. But people still have difficulties in applying security mech-
anisms correctly as numerous user studies show [253, 4, 204, 88, 98, 251]. A
significant amount of work on usable security was done in the last decade.
For instance, problems related to password usage were studied intensively as
passwords are the most common authentication method (see e.g. [202] for a
survey). Research on usable security also covers topics ranging from group
collaboration and file sharing [71, 18, 110], identity and privacy manage-
ment [133, 132, 38] to email security with PGP [253] or S/MIME [94, 92],
and the protection of wireless networks [17]. All these application are related
to PKI since they use cryptography to achieve their security goals. However,
previous research has only concentrated on studying partial problems.
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Problem Statement There has been no systematic approach yet to study
usability issues of PKI-enabled applications explicitly. By PKI-enabled we
mean software that implements security mechanisms with public key meth-
ods. We believe that a dedicated analysis is worthwhile for three reasons.
• In the first place, PKI-enabled applications have the same security
primitives and technical mechanisms in common. They all have to
deal with recurrent tasks like key and certificate management or trust
decisions and especially the question of how to design the correspond-
ing user interfaces and interaction mechanisms.
• PKI is inherently complex – too complex in fact for users of current
PKI-enabled software, who have very little technical background [88,
60]. Left alone with the usability challenges of PKI, they may quickly
open security breaches [253, 238]. This is critical against the back-
ground that the number of users, e.g. of digital signature SmartCards,
will grow in the near future [144].
• Finally, public key cryptography itself offers a wealth of technologies
that can help to address usability problems. Up to now, these technolo-
gies have mostly been looked at from a security perspective. Crypto-
graphy is a young science, so common practices for application design
should be scrutinized and not be regarded as given.
Research Agenda Our analysis implied the following research agenda:
• Describe what usability problems in secure software in general are and
where they originate from,
• point out the particularities of PKI-enabled applications,
• analyse generic strategies to improve the usability of secure software,
• and show by means of examples how these techniques can be success-
fully applied to PKI-enabled applications.
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1.2 Contributions
This dissertation is based on the thesis that the usability of PKI-enabled
applications has to be looked at from different angles. On the one hand,
PKI is a security technology and as such inherits usability challenges that
are characteristic for secure applications. On the other hand, PKI brings
in additional complexity. We show how to cope with these challenges. The
contributions of our research include the following:
Concepts and Techniques
• A multi-layer model of methods to promote usable security and a clas-
sification of previous work according to this scheme.
• A generic and flexible tool to evaluate the usability and usefulness of
PKI-enabled applications of any kind.
• A new approach for information security awareness campaigns called
Awareness by Doing.
Experimental Results and Artefacts
• A tool for the quantitative analysis of users’ mailboxes suggesting the
feasibility of opportunistic security with manual key verification.
• A paper-based user test showing the understandability of a new metaphor
for secure email.
• TLS Authentication Proxy, a platform to handle delegation of WWW
credentials seamlessly and securely.
Cryptographic Results
• A modular protocol for certificate enrolment in an (outsourced) PKI
enforcing a four-eyes principle with cryptography.
• A distributed RSA key generation algorithm for the two-party case
with only linear asymptotic complexity.
Parts of this dissertation were developed in parallel and published inde-
pendently. References to the corresponding publications of the author are
given below.
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1.3 Outline of this Thesis
This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first one concerns itself
with usability challenges for security software in general and PKI-enabled
applications in particular. In the second part a number of technical solutions
are presented that intend to simplify the users’ task. A detailed overview of
the remaining chapters is given in the following.
Part I
Chapter 2 provides examples and an introduction into the topic and identi-
fies reasons for usability-related weaknesses of security software. We present
a multi-layer model of methods to improve usability. This model guides us
throughout the whole thesis as our solutions are examples for one or more
of those layers (see Figure 1.1). We review previous work and classify it
according to our scheme.
Figure 1.1: Thesis outline.
At the beginning of the third chapter we explain the main concepts of
PKI for non-specialist readers. We identify and explain a number of chal-
lenges that may make PKI difficult to use. The essential part of Chapter 3
is our evaluation framework for measuring the usability and usefulness of
PKI-enabled applications. Parts of this work were published in [233]. The
framework was applied to a variety of end user applications and trustcenter
software [44, 151].
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Part II
A couple of solutions to the manifold usability challenges are the subject of
the second half of this dissertation. User education and awareness training
is an important axis to lower security-critical user errors. In Chapter 4 we
propose a new method for information security awareness training towards
more efficient and sustained changes in users’ minds and actions. Awareness
by Doing was first presented in [16].
The delegation of critical tasks to skilled personnel or a service provider
may form a way out of usability problems as well. But this must not happen
at the price of lower security, especially when talking about PKI outsourcing.
For this purpose, we propose a new certificate enrolment scheme [227] in
Chapter 5 that avoids a critical weakness in the standard scheme. The
cryptographic ingredients to our recipe are shared digital signatures and
distributed key generation. We present a new algorithm for distributed RSA
key generation [226] which is more efficient than previous ones. Finally, we
show how our software library for threshold cryptography can be applied to
the use case of secure email [234].
Email is a key application on the net today. Although most clients are
PKI-enabled, only a vanishing portion of current email is sent encrypted
and/or digitally signed. This is due to the unfavourable cost-benefit ratio
for users. Making key verification optional we apply the idea of opportunis-
tic security to improve this ratio. Empirical data we gathered during the
work on this subject [193] provides strong evidence that this should indeed
be feasible for most users. A generalisation of the opportunistic security
concept is conceivable, e.g. to SSL [228].
An increasing number of web sites uses certificate-based client authen-
tication. An important drawback of such credentials is the fact that they
cannot be easily delegated without an appropriate infrastructure. Practical
needs, however, demand that people can temporarily share credentials, e.g.
when going on holiday. In Chapter 7 we present TLS Authentication Proxy
as a unified platform to support the delegation of credentials. It supports
the common authentication methods found on the Internet today. TLS Au-
thentication Proxy has been the subject of two publications [104, 235].
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the conclusions of the thesis and provides
an outlook towards further directions of research.
Part I
Analysis
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Chapter 2
Usability vs. Security?
Secure systems have a particular rich tradition of indifference
to the user, whether the user is a security administrator, a pro-
grammer, or an end-user.
– Mary E. Zurko
Going on 9 full years after I generated my first PGP key, my
mom still cannot use the stuff.
– Adam Shostack
System designers and users often regard security and usability as being
two conflicting goals as security software has traditionally been difficult to
use [260]. There is a significant difference between civil environments and
the military, where cryptography originates from. In the latter case a well-
trained personnel is highly motivated (at least by the threat of punishment)
to adhere to security policies and to take great pains over the software. As
in the early years of computer security, the military use cases were predom-
inant, only little incentives existed for software makers to produce usable
applications. Even worse, this led to a very formalized view (e.g. in the Bell-
LaPadula model [22]) towards system security omitting the user as a main
“component” [260, 39]. Actually security and usability, however, can be
seen as aspects of a common goal, namely fulfilling user expectations [259].
From the perspective of a software engineer usability requirements add
additional challenges to the development process of security software. From
the viewpoint of an end user security measures come into her or his way when
trying to accomplish productive tasks. In a broader view, software features
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and development costs are another two design goals that are at odds both
with security and usability. The situation is depicted in Figure 2.1 where
corners of the tetrahedron symbolize conflicting design goals. This drawing
Figure 2.1: Divergent design goals for secure software.
suggests that one cannot “be at all corners at the same time”. Of course
we mainly confine ourselves to the perceived antagonism between usability
and security in the following, so we only say a few words about the other
relations. Without doubt, economic aspects are an interesting subject as
well, because the lack of proper business cases was and still is a hurdle to PKI
adoption, too [7]. However, a thorough treatment is out of the scope of this
thesis. Readers interested in this area are referred to [11, 122, 241, 130, 217]
as starting points for further reading.
The tension between usability or security on the one hand and features
on the other hand is more implicit, but seems easier to tackle. For instance,
common HCI (human-computer interface) methods can be applied to allow
a system to be rich in features (both “productive” as well as cryptographic
ones) and simultaneously usable. Standard techniques like hiding complex-
ity, different user levels, or multiple modes of control can be applied (see
e.g. [19] for an overview). Trade-offs between security and features are typ-
ically made at the outset of the design process, e.g. by the statement of
security policies [70].
In this chapter we first describe the big picture of the communication
model and the security goals in an abstract fashion. We assume a basic
familiarness of the reader with the topic of PKI and cryptography in this
introduction. In case it is necessary, the reader is referred to additional tech-
nical information that can be found at the beginning of Chapter 3. A num-
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ber of examples of security incidents are included in Section 2.2 to motivate
the subject. These examples led us to the typification of usability-related
weaknesses of secure applications. The last section extends the presentation
of Section 2.2 and sets forth a multi-layer model of methods to improve
usability. Related work in the area of usable security software is classified
according to this scheme.
2.1 Security in Open Networks
In this section, we introduce the standard network model which is typi-
cally used for the description, analysis, and design of secure systems. For
the purpose of discussing usability issues, an intuitive, non-formal notion is
mostly sufficient. We will take on a more formal and technical view where
applicable (Chapters 5 to 7).
The main characteristic of the network model is the property of openness,
which is a common assumption [8, 70, 219, 215]. Here, openness means that
communication relationships are not predetermined from the outset and may
change quickly over time. As we have stated before, secure communication
is now a key requirement of ordinary people’s Internet transactions, mobile
phone connections etc. as it has left the military environment. The latter
one is the archetype of a “closed network”, i.e. it has a restricted user base
and/or spatial extension, and possibly its own standards and protocols [70].
2.1.1 Network Model
Throughout this dissertation we consider threats and countermeasures to
IT (information technology) systems that consist of computers in an open
network. When talking about PKI one often has Internet-based, electronic
commerce applications in mind where users buy goods from previously un-
known web sites or get into contact with people they never meet in person
etc. (Adams and Lloyd [8] call this “security between strangers”.) Here
openness refers to the idea that communication relations are variable and
not known a priori. We somehow abstract from this idea and regard an open
network as a set of computers which may be connected pairwise by zero or
more information channels. We use the term message to denote the data
that can be transferred over a channel, for instance emails, instant messages,
or files of an arbitrary type.
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The notion of “computer” may in practice cover a broad spectrum from
a powerful high-end server in a computing Grid, a network router to a PDA
(personal digital assistant), a mobile phone or a device like an embedded
system with very limited resources [213]. Where a distinction between com-
puters and their owners is not made, the term network entity or simply
entity is used instead. Often we assign names (Alice, Bob, Carol etc.) to
these entities. “Channels” may take on the form of wired Internet connec-
tions, a wireless local area network (WLAN) connection, a telephone line,
a short-range (e.g. Bluetooth, IrDA) or out-of-band (e.g. a human being
carrying storage media from one machine to another) connection – to name
some examples. Channels can be temporary or permanent in nature, they
may correspond to a physical (e.g. cross-link Ethernet cable) or logical (e.g.
virtual private network, VPN) link. Messages are transferred along channels
and encoded in an appropriate protocol which the entities at both ends have
to understand and follow.
To have an example, one can think of a number of different types of
entities – personal users, a university, an enterprise, an Internet service
provider (ISP), an Internet shop, and a trustcenter – and some selected
communication channels between them – say Internet, WLAN, LAN (local
area network), VPN, Bluetooth, IrDA. We deliberately do not distinguish
between physical and logical channels here. When drawing network graphs,
they are usually simplified by using a “meta vertex” called “Internet” which
hides the fact that there are numerous machines in between two systems
connected via the Internet. Other intermediaries are also removed to reduce
complexity. Obviously, in order to analyse the security of a particular use
case, the respective part has to be refined accordingly. This is done in Chap-
ter 5 and 6 for the internal network of a trustcenter and Internet connections
for email respectively.
2.1.2 Security Threats
Security threats and attacks are typically described using the setting of
two or more network entities connected by channels [219]. A distinction
can be made between threats and attacks in the following sense. A threat
is a potential danger whereas an attack is a concrete assault on system
security [212]. An attack is mounted by an attacker. This notion expresses
the difference between safety and security: Safety means protection against
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accidental events while security means protection against intentional actions
(cf. Section 2.3.1).
Consider two entities, say Alice and Bob, that are connected by a single
common channel. There are four threats to this channel and the two parties:
An attacker might . . .
(1) eavesdrop on the channel to learn the messages that are exchanged
by Alice and Bob,
(2) block the channel such that Alice and Bob cannot exchange messages
with each other,
(3) generate a message on her own and trick one of the two parties into
believing that the message comes from the other party,
(4) modify messages from Alice to Bob (or vice versa) before passing
them on to the intended entity.
There is another “attack” or form of misconduct, which only involves
the two parties themselves. Alice or Bob may
(5) repudiate having send (or received) a certain message to the other
party.
An attacker (or adversary) can be understood as a party that temporar-
ily or permanently affects one or more edges of the network graph and takes
on the actions above. The attacker is characterized depending on her power.
She is called passive if the only thing she does is eavesdropping and active
otherwise. An active attacker is also called a man-in-the-middle (MITM),
because of his power to control the whole communication between Alice and
Bob. Attackers are often given meaningful names such as Eve (“eavesdrop-
per”), Trudy (“intruder”), or Mallory (“malicious”) to point out their role
in the game.
2.1.3 Security Goals
The threats of the previous section can be abstracted from in order to
formulate a handful of generic goals for IT security. A historical defini-
tion [246] captures the three goals of confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability. Nowadays integrity is subdivided in authenticity, non-repudiation,
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and integrity in a narrower sense (also called data integrity) in the litera-
ture [42, 70, 219, 212]. We use the following, standard terminology of pro-
tection goals (see Table 2.1). These goals correspond to the threats listed
above (in the same order). When speaking of public key cryptography and
public key infrastructures, these are the protection goals one usually has in
mind. We now give a formal definition of what is a PKI-enabled application
(an introduction in public key cryptography is given at the beginning of
Chapter 3).
Definition 1 (PKI-enabled application) An application is called PKI-
enabled if it implements security mechanisms with methods from the domain
of public key cryptography.
Note that our definition does not mean that the application has to con-
form to certain standards in this area (like X.509 [52] or PKCS1), nor does
it necessarily imply that certain security goals are pursued, nor does it pre-
scribe that the application processes certificates at all. In this sense, SSH
(Secure Shell) clients are considered PKI-enabled as well as servers that use
an anonymous Diffie-Hellman key exchange or SmartCard-based applica-
tions for the creation of digital signatures.
Goal Description
Confidentiality Protect data from being disclosed or made avail-
able to unauthorized entities.
Availability Ensure that authorized users get systems ser-
vices they demand for.
Authenticity Ensure the genuineness of a message (authentic-
ity of data origin) or verify the identity of a peer
(entity authentication).
Integrity Assure that data cannot be modified in any way
without being detected.
Non-Repudiation Prevent that parties can deny having sent (or
received) a certain message.
Table 2.1: Common protection goals in information security.
Please note that this list of protection goals is neither complete, nor
are all of those goals considered of the same importance. Things strongly
1http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2124
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depend on the concrete use case. For instance in the context of contract
signing and the like, non-repudiation is a vital goal, whereas in secure web
browsing it is not. Additional or even conflicting protection goals are also
involved.
Confidentiality extends to privacy, i.e. the need of an entity to act in
a way such that she is unobservable by others and controls the amount of
information that is shared with others. Data confidentiality usually refers
to the protection of payload, while privacy also covers traffic flow informa-
tion. Non-repudiation is also called accountability or content commitment
(according to X.509 PKIX terminology [128]). Accountability in a broader
sense may be understood as a system property which allows tracing all ac-
tions back to an entity [212]. Obviously, accountability and privacy are at
odds with each other. The cryptographic technique of so-called ring signa-
tures [190] and their application, e.g. for secure email may be an interesting
area of further research.2 A ring signature can be used to authenticate a
message, but with the property of repudiability. That means that the recip-
ient cannot prove the authorship of the sender to a third party, a feature
comparable to using a message authentication code (MAC, see page 62) in-
stead of a digital signature (which however requires more than one round of
communication).
Often authorization is added as another main security goal, although
not being a property of the channel. Authorization refers to the demand
of ensuring that subjects (entities) only perform actions on certain objects
(computing resources, files etc.) at certain circumstances (time, location
etc.) they are allowed to. Authorization requires prior subject authentica-
tion.
The fact that users do not necessarily know and trust each other, es-
pecially in open and complex environments was emphasized in [188]. This
approach is called multilateral security. A refinement of the security goals
listed above is made in [133] for the use case of identity management, i.e. the
protection of one’s personal data in an online world. A distinction is made
with respect to the possible attacker, by separating the protection against all
others and the protection against third parties while considering communi-
cation partners as trusted. Dependencies and implications among goals like
2The author thanks Volker Roth for discussions on this aspect.
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unobservability and anonymity (which are both a facet of confidentiality)
can be proved [99].
2.1.4 Usable Security: Why and How
In this section and the next one, we explain the role of usability in the
context of security-related applications.
As a general taxonomy we use the one due to Nielsen [173]: Usability
and utility are considered common sub-categories of the category usefulness.
Usefulness and characteristics like costs or reliability are aspects of a sys-
tem’s practical acceptance. The question whether a system, in principle, has
the functionality necessary for a certain task is a matter of utility, whereas
usability refers to how this functionality can be used in practice.
We use the definition of usable security which is due to Gerd tomMarkot-
ten [97]. It is derived from general usability guidelines like those given in
ISO 9241 [131]. “Usability of security” typically covers “usability of security-
related applications”, but is not be restricted to that [215]. It is also im-
portant to have in mind new approaches for the integration of security into
applications as well as new security technologies that enhance usability.
Definition 2 (Usable Security) Usable security is the degree how effi-
ciently, effectively, and satisfyingly an end user can protect himself and his
IT system in a certain context.
Usability Evaluation A rich arsenal of usability evaluation techniques is
known, testing (laboratory testing, discount usability testing) and inspec-
tion methods (heuristic evaluation, cognitive walkthrough) being the most
prominent (see e.g. [173, 176] for an in-depth treatment). There is a certain
controversy about whether security needs its own, different usability stan-
dard. Both, established usability methods [260, 204, 136, 127] as well as
methods adopted to the security setting [97, 253] have been advocated and
successfully applied. Usability in general can be measured e.g. by means of
user performance (i.e. referring to the time necessary for a certain task or the
error rate) or user satisfaction (figures usually provided by surveys or inter-
views). However, in a security setting, these metrics have to be taken with
a grain of salt since they are tailored for standard end user applications.
To overcome this problem, several methods have been proposed. Among
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those are data logs that run in the background of the application and mon-
itor which pieces of data were protected by the user and how. Some care
has to be taken with user tests and interviews for the usability of security
applications (see [215] for details).
Taking the Human Factor Seriously Just as computer security mech-
anisms are more than pure cryptography, system security is more than pure
technology. Security has a number of facets ranging from the lower layers
like cryptography and network protocols, security models to implementa-
tion aspects and the human-computer interface, security policies and social
engineering. A holistic approach is necessary as an attacker may try to com-
promise any of the components of the security layers. There is the famous
proverb “security is like a chain” in that the weakest link determines the
overall security of the system.
Strong evidence from the field [206] indicates that the human factor is in
fact this weakest link or that at least designers of secure applications should
assume this as a working hypothesis. It has been proposed to always assume
a priori that the user is the weakest link when analysing and designing
security mechanisms or tools [100]. Very often system security is undermined
because of human error or misconduct as studies show (see e.g. [75, 245,
142]. Some interesting quantitative findings of these studies are cited at the
beginning of Chapter 4.
In Section 2.2, we give a handful of examples where secure applications
(or security mechanisms of other applications) fail. Examples include pass-
words and Internet security as well as the handling of secure email or online
privacy. We do not aim to present a comprehensive list of current threats
here and cover only those which are related to cryptography and PKI. PKI-
enabled applications have to cope with common challenges as they are based
on the same conceptual and technological foundation. We list the most ur-
gent ones of those challenges in Section 3.2.
Reasons for Usability-Related Security Weaknesses In the follow-
ing we identify and categorize usability-related weaknesses of applications.
A first coarse distinction can be made with respect to the question whether
users compromise security intentionally or unintentionally, a canonical cri-
terion [98].
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Who is Responsible? We speak of “user-caused violations” and “appli-
cation-caused vulnerabilities” and distinguish four reasons in each group.
The terms “violations” and “vulnerabilities” merely refer to the same thing.
Here we use different words to express the user’s role as a subject and the
application’s role as an object. Detailed descriptions can be found in Fig-
ures 2.2 and 2.3. User-caused violations can be ordered according to growing
intent. Violations which are due to a lack of vigilance are the most uninten-
tional ones whereas actions of a malicious attacker are on the other end of
the scale. Very similar, application-caused vulnerabilities are ordered from
relative to absolute impossibility. Here we have “sloppiness” on the one
extreme and “left as an exercise” on the other.
Security-Inherent Properties Affecting Usability Having categorized
a number of reasons for usability-related security problems, we now go one
step further and look at inherent properties that make “security” conceptu-
ally difficult. Whitten and Tygar [253] name five characteristic properties
which are shown and explained in detail in Figure 2.4. These properties
have to be addressed both by software engineers and user interface designers.
First of all, security is typically a secondary goal, so users are unmotivated
to pay too much attention to it and tend to use the method of “trial and
error” [133, 99]. Besides, cryptography and PKI are abstract and complex
matters, therefore designing applications that give appropriate feedback is
challenging. This can also be called the “hidden failure property”. Security
applications often have the characteristic that mistakes decrease the level of
security in a way one cannot completely recover from. Whitten and Tygar
use the term barn door property for this aspect. As a consequence, irrevo-
cable security mistakes must be ruled out. We have already mentioned the
common sense that security is like a chain, in that the weakest link deter-
mines the overall quality of the system. Special attention is thus paid to the
weakest link property.
Blame Designers, Not Users We conclude that users are not the (only)
ones to point the finger at in the security game. Security in general and PKI
in particular bears a lot of technical challenges. Some of those are in fact
hard to solve properly and elegantly. We have referred to these issues in
Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. One might argue that training and education
can help to defuse the risk of user-caused violations. This assumption is
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Users violate an explicit security policy rule because they . . .
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(slips) are careless or even curious when they are in a situation
where they should (and do) know better. Mostly these are fa-
miliar and routine tasks, like opening an email attachment or
installing software downloaded from the Internet. These ac-
tions fall into the category of slips, a particular kind of human
error. The book of Norman [179] provides a finer classification
of slips as well as design guidelines to avoid them.
(perception) underestimate their personal behaviour’s impact on
the overall security of their PC, business processes, or their
organization etc. This originates from the perception that se-
curity standards in the organization are low anyway or from
underrating security threats [204]. Information security aware-
ness is addressed in more detail in Chapter 4.
(work-around) consider the existing policy obtrusive. Reasons for
this are the cost-benefit ratio which is perceived as being poor
or the fact that the policy does not match the way they actually
work with the system (e.g. co-workers that share a password in
order to have access to common project files). In order to get
their tasks done, they feel the need to work around security
mechanisms (see e.g. [204]).
(malicious intent) want to weaken the system in order to cause
damage. A fired employee taking revenge is a typical example.
This category though is not of interest from a usability point
of view. We do not consider it any further.
Figure 2.2: User-caused violations.
valid for the professional or organizational context, but does surely not hold
for home users. A major obstacle is the fact that security is not a primary
goal, particularly not for such users. This suggests that other solutions are
necessary. In Section 2.2 we present and discuss several approaches from the
current body of research. These approaches are high-level design proposals
and as such apply to general security mechanisms. Particular attention to
PKI-enabled applications is paid from Chapter 3 onward.
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The application makes it hard to operate it properly because it . . .
ab
so
lu
te
im
p
os
si
b
il
it
y
re
la
ti
v
e
im
p
os
si
b
il
it
y
(sloppiness) is implemented in a sloppy way. As a consequence,
particular tasks cannot be carried out suitably due to general
usability flaws. A poor implementation of the user interface
decreases confidence in the underlying security mechanisms,
too [98]. Albeit sloppiness is not per se a security-related flaw,
it plays an important role in this context as the perceived
trustworthiness directly relates to the willingness to use the
system [137].
(expertise gap) requires a deeper understanding of the underlying
security principles. The intended security goals cannot be ac-
complished correctly or efficiently in practice because users lack
previous knowledge, which the application takes for granted.
PGP 5.0 was a negative example in this respect, being symp-
tomatic for PKI-enabled applications [253, 60]. Another issue
which a lot products suffer from is the use of “slang”, i.e. very
technical or even inaccurate terms.
(no fail-safe defaults) permits users to change the configuration
without warning them of insecure settings or even comes with
a default configuration that is prone to vulnerabilities. This
could be clearly seen in the KaZaa application [110]. Fail-
safe defaults have already been postulated as an important
design guideline long ago [199] and emphasized for usability
reasons [100]. However this aspect of error prevention is often
neglected.
(left as an exercise) leaves the user alone in ticklish situations
which can be dangerous. On the one hand, applications of-
ten force the user to make an immediate choice or decision,
but do not provide appropriate guidance or the alternative to
postpone the action. On the other hand, the majority of ap-
plications shirks addressing (or even making clear) PKI tasks
that are hard or to be solved “out-of-band” (e.g. certificate
lookup and path construction or key fingerprint verification).
Figure 2.3: Application-caused vulnerabilities.
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(P1) Unmotivated user property Since security is hardly ever a user’s
primary goal, she cannot be expected to pay too much attention to
it or, for instance, go through voluminous manuals before using the
software.
(P2) Abstraction property Especially in the field of public-key crypto-
graphy and PKI, it is a difficult task to find intelligible yet precise (real
world) metaphors for abstract mathematical objects like key pairs or
certificates.
(P3) Lack of feedback property Applications should above all enforce
security in a seamless way. In cases where interaction is required,
the user should be provided with the necessary feedback to allow for
an appropriate decision. Presenting a complicated matter in a short
dialogue is challenging.
(P4) Barn door property Dangerous and irrevocable mistakes must be
ruled out from the start. If a secret has been revealed at a certain
point of time, say during an insecure network connection, one cannot
say whether an attacker might already know it.
(P5) Weakest link property Security is considered to be a chain the
weakest link of which determines the strength of the whole system.
As a consequence, users need to systematically and comprehensively
take care of an application’s security settings.
Figure 2.4: Security-inherent properties (identified by Whitten and Ty-
gar [253]).
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2.2 Examples and Previous Work
As not to distract the expert reader from the analysis in the previous and
the next section we chose to treat examples in a separate section.
2.2.1 Passwords
A lot of research has been done on the usage of passwords since they are a
widespread security mechanism. A significant part of this work [5, 4, 250,
204, 203, 202, 39] was done by Angela Sasse’s group at University College
London. Empirical data about usability problems with password usage is
found, for instance, in [79, 187, 204, 257].
Typically, a password is used for user authentication in combination with
a user (alias) name which serves as identifier. User names are typically not
kept secret, the security of the mechanism relies solely on the strength of
the secret shared between user and the system. Passwords may seem an old-
fashioned method in the light of biometrics and PKI, but passwords are to
stay here for several reasons. On the one hand, passwords are often sufficient
for low-risk environments or low-valued transactions where PKI and biomet-
rics would surely be oversized solutions (cf. the discussion in Section 2.3.2).
Biometric authentication is not ubiquitous as special hardware (fingerprint
readers, iris scanners etc.) is required, a drawback that also applies to PKI
when SmartCards are used.
On the other hand, passwords still play an important role even in a
PKI. Passwords are a common mechanism for the protection of certificate
stores (integrity) or private keys (confidentiality or authorization, see be-
low). Consider the case where a person wants to use her private key to
decrypt a ciphertext or sign a message. If the private key is stored in hard-
ware, e.g. on a SmartCard, the user has to enter a PIN3 and provide it to
the device. The device requires the correct PIN as an authorization. It then
carries out the requested operation with the private key and returns the
result. In case the private key is stored in a softtoken a bitstring is derived
from the password. This bitstring serves as a symmetric key to temporar-
ily decrypt the private key in memory (an example for a password-based
encryption mechanism is PKCS#5). Another example is the use of pass-
3A personal identification number which is basically a password with a fixed length
(e.g. 4 or 6 characters) and a small, numeric alphabet.
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words – or “passphrases” as they are called in that context – in the PGP
community. Here the term “phrase” instead of “word” suggests that longer
character sequence are (or should be) used as PGP users often emphasize
an individual’s privacy protection.
Several problems with passwords were reported repeatedly over the past
decades [79, 4, 187]. Looking at security considerations first, it can be no-
ticed that a significant portion of passwords used in the field is weak either
because words from a dictionary are used or because of the passwords’ in-
sufficient complexity (with respect to length, alphabet and/or randomness).
Password cracking tools like “John the Ripper” apply a combination of dic-
tionary attack (checking a large set of words found in a dictionary and
variations thereof) and a brute-force attack (probing all possible passwords
up to a certain length) techniques [16]. The survey [187] revealed that 40%
of the user population have shared passwords with co-workers once or mul-
tiple times and that the majority of users (55%) tends to write passwords
down, a “radical” fraction (9%) even writes down every password they have
to use. These figures are confirmed by a recent Meetbiz Research survey.
Half of the users have at least once shared a password with a colleague, 15%
even multiple times [2]. Obviously, such tendencies make password policies
very vulnerable to “social engineering” attacks. Passwords are also in the
focus of the new IT security awareness approach outlined in Chapter 4.
There are numerous reasons why the password security mechanism does
not work as intended in practice. A crucial constraint is human memory.
The policy that different passwords should be used for different accounts
increases the number of passwords in use significantly. People in general
have difficulties in exactly recalling a large number of passwords possibly
consisting of meaningless strings. For instance, employees were found to use
16 passwords on average in the study conducted by Sasse et al. [204]. Diffi-
culties are increased by policies that dictate periodical changes and enforce
complexity rules – both may vary from one account to another. As accounts
are used infrequently, passwords can only be recalled partly or are confused
with a previous password of the same machine or that from another account.
Various “graphical password” schemes have been proposed and evaluated
in the last few years (see [65] for a survey). These schemes rely on human’s
ability to recall series of images which is superior to that of recalling se-
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quences of random characters. Plus, some of the schemes are fault-tolerant
in that they accept user answers that are sufficiently “close” to the secret.
The story of passwords illustrates an important problem of security
mechanisms in general, namely the fact that they do not match the way
people actually work with the system. For instance, users that work to-
gether on a project typically have to share their data. If their system does
not permit to share files easily (or does not tell users how to configure or
access the appropriate functionality), these users are likely to share their
accounts, too [202]. (We consider related problems in a PKI, namely cre-
dential delegation in Section 5.5.1 and Chapter 7.) Plus, their motivation
to adhere to security policies they do not understand is low in the light of a
lax overall security culture at their company [4].
2.2.2 Internet Security
In this section we describe how phishing, faked information, and users’ lack
of knowledge concerning SSL negatively affect Internet Security. These three
issues are closely related as attackers often combine several of them.
2.2.2.1 Phishing
Identity theft on the Internet has become a very prominent attack those
days as neither technology nor users are prepared to fight it accordingly.
It is estimated that two million users in the U.S. have been the victim of
identity theft in 2004 [239]. This attack comes in the form of so-called
phishing in the online world. The term phishing stems from the conjunction
“password fishing” and is reminiscent of the slang word “phreak” (phone
freak). Phishing typically works as follows. At first, a large list of target
email addresses is assembled. This task is quite simple and cheap as 100.000
valid email addresses cost only a few Euros on the SPAM black market [184].
The investment quickly pays if there is only one victim in this set. It is
estimated that an astonishing 5% of recipients respond to scam email [12].
About 2% of people surveyed by Gartner Group reported that they had lost
money after being “phished” [239].
In the second step, email is sent to the target addresses which purports
to come from a well-known company, service etc. the addressee already has
a business relation with. The email asks the recipient to update his or
her profile stored by the service or to take a similar action that requires
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prior user authentication. Figure 2.5 shows an email, which was received
by a friend of the author and fooled him at first sight. The hyperlinks
Figure 2.5: Phishing email purportedly coming from eBay.
contained in the email are all referring to genuine eBay web pages except
the one that reads “Go to eBay Billing Center”. This link leads to a web
site which was set up to steal the personal data of incautious users. The
site perfectly adheres to eBay’s look & feel and is therefore pretty hard to
identify as a fake. What may make people suspicious is the fact that it
requests plenty much of personal data. Among others, name and address,
eBay user ID, bank account number, debit card number (including the 3-
digit security code on the back), social security number (SSN), and even the
debit card PIN used in ATMs are asked for. Obviously, this is enough to
rob the victims’ bank account by cloning ATM cards [156], mess with their
eBay accounts, or abuse their SSN (which is often used as a secret, e.g. for
password-recovery at other web sites).
Phishers typically use compromised web servers in order to stay untrace-
able in cyberspace. The attackers’ web pages are online only for a short time
(a week or so on average) until the hijacked brand gets to know about it and
forces the respective ISP to close it down. However, this time frame is often
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Figure 2.6: Phishing statistics October 2004–May 2005 (source: [112]).
long enough to mount successful attacks and gather customers’ data. In De-
cember 2004 attackers exploited a server misconfiguration and set up spoofed
PayPal web pages at the author’s web site. With over 50 million customers,
eBay-owned company PayPal is the leading provider for electronic payments
on the Net. As such, PayPal has constantly been the target of phishing at-
tacks [216]. In the concrete case, users were referenced to the spoofed web
page and were asked to enter personal and account information. A script
was loaded on the server to sent out the information to an email account.
After PayPal had learnt about the fraudulent web site it urged the author’s
ISP by email to shut down the web site.
Phishing has become a major plague for the companies that are affected.
This is the reason why the method of sending out information to customers
by email is completely discredited. A recent MailFrontier4 survey on phish-
ing has revealed that 28% of test subjects were duped by phishing email.
Plus, 20% of the participants regarded genuine email confirming a purchase
as fake. This provides strong evidence that commercial email is getting a
more and more unrealiable medium with respect to authenticity. Interest-
ingly, the vast majority of companies or individuals does not use a technology
suitable to provide authenticity – digitally signed email. We come back to
this point in Chapter 6.
2.2.2.2 Faked Information
Another kind of attack is the dissemination of incorrect information, e.g.
in order to influence stock markets. The following example and screenshot
are drawn from [44]. On April 4th, 2003 Asian stock markets went into a
4http://www.mailfrontier.com
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spin due to the announcement that Bill Gates allegedly was killed in Los
Angeles. However, this spectacular news item was in fact forged. According
to the announcement the founder of Microsoft Corporation and richest man
in the world died in the aftermath of an assault at a Los Angeles charity
event.
Figure 2.7: Faked web site purportedly coming from CNN.
Stock brokers were the first to circulate an email referring to a web
site which appeared to come from the news broadcasting station CNN. The
fraudulent page (see Figure 2.7) imitated CNN’s design which made people
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believe that it was authentic. Even some TV stations fell for it. As the
page address is http://www.cnn.com@cgrom.com/news/law/gatesmurder/
index.shtml people are likely to think it is in fact a page located at www.
cnn.com. They walked into the attacker’s trap since the true location of
the page is cgrom.com/news/law/gatesmurder/index.shtml. The trick
consists of abusing a standard-compliant, but rarely applied mechanism to
convey a user name and password to a web site that requires HTTP Basic
or Digest Authentication (see Section 7.2.1). The URL (uniform resource
locator) syntax user:passwd@host or user@host is a shortcut to login using
the credential (user, passwd) to the page at host. The information shown
on the page was deemed authentic since not only the visual design was a
good imitation of CNN’s, but also the URL seemed to point to CNN. Since
a lot of people around the world regard CNN as the source of trustworthy
information, the attack succeeded – which would probably not have been the
case if the URL was simply http://cgrom.com/news/law/gatesmurder/
index.shtml.
The attack vector used in this example was an exploit on humans’ per-
ception and capability to make an informed security decision. Only few of
the average Internet users know about the particular syntax for an URL, so
they need the support of their web browser to see what is going on when
accessing such a page. URLs often involve a list of &-separated parame-
ters for scripts run on the web server or long numeric session identifiers etc.
Therefore an unreadable URL containing special characters like the colon,
the at, or a percent sign and a long string of encoded data will not surprise
users. As Table 2.2 shows, browser manufacturers have, unfortunately, not
yet agreed on a uniform reaction of web browsers to this threat.
Clients like Opera or Firefox display warning messages when opening
the page. However Opera’s address bar afterwards shows the URL as it was
entered except that a “password” parameter is substituted with “*****” if
present. It is surprising that, albeit the trick has been known for a con-
siderable time, Internet Explorer (IE) or Mozilla do not inform the user or
support her in another way (e.g. by ignoring the syntax completely). At
least IE changes the URL to the actual site (the screenshot in Figure 2.7
was taken while the page was loading). Firefox displays an alert (see Fig-
ure 2.8), but does not unescape special characters which may confuse the
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Browser Warning Address Bar
Internet
Explorer 6.0
– user:password@ prefix stripped off
and true domain shown
Opera 7.54
√
password hidden if present, remaining
URL unchanged
Mozilla 1.6 – URL unchanged, shown with complete
user:password@ prefix
Firefox 1.0
√
user:password@ prefix stripped off
and true domain shown
Table 2.2: Web browsers’ reaction on URLs containing the @ sign.
Figure 2.8: Alert shown by Firefox for @ URL.
user. Anyway phishers can easily avoid such an alert by setting up web
pages that do in fact require authentication.
Countermeasures against faked web sites as well as phishing attacks have
been proposed. Netcraft for instance offers a free anti-phishing toolbar that
integrates itself into Internet Explorer or Firefox (see Figure 2.9). The tool-
bar shows how long the current web site has been online, its rank based
on Netcraft’s web server statistics, and the country where it is located. An
overall “risk rating” is computed out of these parameters. Our examples
shows the web page located at www.paypai.de – a URL which is easily con-
fused with www.paypal.de as in some fonts the upper case “I” resembles the
lower case “L”. The eBay Toolbar5 also protects eBay or PayPal customers
from inadvertent password disclosure. Herzberg and Gbara’s TrustBar is a
similar browser extension that uses logos to tag known and trustworthy web
sites (see [123] and trustbar.mozdev.org). In cases where SSL is used, a
logo of the certification authority which has issued the site certificate is also
5http://pages.ebay.com/ebay toolbar/index.html
30 2.2. EXAMPLES AND PREVIOUS WORK
shown. However, we argue in Section 3.2.3 that knowing the issuing CA
does not say much about the security level of the certificate.
Figure 2.9: Web page www.paypai.de viewed with Netcraft Toolbar.
2.2.2.3 SSL
In the last subsection on Internet Security we look at SSL as the preva-
lent security mechanism on the World Wide Web (WWW). This protocol
is typically used to establish a secure channel between the client and the
server that is encrypted, integrity-protected, and (unilaterally) authenti-
cated at the same time. Albeit SSL offers strong authentication (i.e. using
public key cryptography), client-side authentication is mostly done by user
name/password credentials.
A very typical scenario is where customers provide credit card and bank
account numbers or other sensitive private data to a commercial web site.
The first important requirement is to ensure that the browser is talking to
a genuine server which belongs to the company. The second requirement is
that the data is kept secret from third parties while in transit (maybe on a
local network, the ISP’s network, or intermediate machines on the Internet
etc.).
Friedman et al. [88] studied users’ capabilities and knowledge towards
web security. Users were asked to explain their mental model of a “secure
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connection” and how in practice they distinguish secure (i.e. SSL) connec-
tions from insecure ones. During the test the subjects were shown actual
browser screenshots. The participants were more successful in correctly iden-
tifying non-secure than secure connections, but still one third of them was
not able to recognize non-secure pages. Participants based their decision on
different pieces of evidence. Most of them looked for a key symbol or an
icon of a closed padlock as most browsers use these metaphors to indicate
a secure connection (cf. Section 6.5.3 for the results of our own user study
for secure email). However, the error rate was quite high. Web sites are free
to include pictures of padlocks, seals6, and labels that appear trustworthy
where in fact they are not. Therefore, just looking for such an icon “some-
where on the screen” does not help. Interestingly, the metaphor of a padlock
was often found to conceptually mislead users as a padlock may suggest that
one’s data is stored at a protected place instead of being transferred in a
secure way.
The second most important evidence was the content of the web site.
This indicator, however, has proven to be very error-prone as we also saw
before. Only a minority (20%) of test participants correctly used the proto-
col name at the beginning of the URL as an indicator for secure connections
(https:// instead of http://).
Cutting a long story short, a significant portion of users has difficulties
in applying standard web security mechanisms properly. As a consequence
they resort to their own “ad-hoc” or “rule of thumb” security rules. And
note that the user test did not even take into consideration the confusion
(i.e. warning messages) users are faced when connecting to an SSL web site
with a certificate that the system cannot validate because of an unknown
issuer or a subject name/domain name mismatch. As average users only
have a vague understanding of “security” [88, 83], they cannot precisely
name and enforce the protection goals of confidentiality and authenticity.
Web browsers do not present comprehensive information to fulfil the task of
“manual” certificate validation reliably either [228].
6For instance, the certification authority Thawte (http://www.thawte.com) uses so-
called site-seals which indicate the validity of SSL server certificates. Thawte customers
may include such seals on their web page to increase their trustworthiness and provide
a shortcut to a certificate validation page on Thawte’s site. However, Gutmann [118]
remarked that the mechanism does not work reliably. And what is even worse: web site
visitors do not seem to care much about an invalid seal.
32 2.2. EXAMPLES AND PREVIOUS WORK
Figure 2.10: SSL warning dialogue in Internet Explorer.
An inadvertent case study confirmed the thesis that users are likely to
dismiss and ignore SSL warnings [119]. The responsible persons of a New
Zealand-based bank forgot to renew an SSL certificate for their web server
before it expired. As a consequence, the bank’s customers were temporarily
exposed to the corresponding alert windows of their web browser. The
astonishing fact is that during this unintentional usability test, 299 out of 300
(!) candidates ignored the warning on the first page and continued to login
in [23]. It is very likely that a large part of them would have also continued
when presented a certificate with an unknown issuer as Internet Explorer’s
UI does not make a big visual distinction between the different types of
errors (which could have very different security meanings). A screenshot of
the dialogue that appears in case one of the three conditions fails is shown
in Figure 2.10.
According to the 2004 Netcraft survey on SSL usage [171], there are
about 1.7 million pages on the Internet that use SSL (see Figure 2.11).
But only 15 % of them present a certificate that the user’s browser suc-
cessfully validates (i.e. with no alert windows coming up). About one in
eight certificates were found to have expired or to be not yet valid. Another
35% were found to not match the domain name, e.g. when connecting to
www.ba.com, a certificate for www.britishairways.com is presented. For
Internet Explorer users this yields the same alert window with a slightly
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different message (the third of the conditions shown in Figure 2.10 fails and
gets marked with a triangle instead of a hook). Such negligence, which yields
to “false positive” error messages, is critical as the binding between domain
name and certificate subject name is the mechanism to parry MITM attacks
(the recently published [121] attacks on the TAN system applied by online
banks would succeed if users ignore such a warning). The remaining 38%
of certificates are self-signed or issued by an authority whose certificate is
not a pre-configured trust anchor in common browsers. In the light of the
results of the user studies mentioned above one may wonder how users react
in such situations. Evaluating and measuring user behaviour would be an
interesting task for further user studies.
Figure 2.11: Netcraft 2004 SSL survey (see [171], 1,745,795 web sites exam-
ined in total).
2.2.3 Cryptographically Secured Email
As we mentioned before, standard email is insecure by design. Security
was not an explicit criterion in the RFC 822 specification [58] written in
1982. But today, email is exposed to a bunch of threats: messages can
be intercepted or modified rather easily while en route, e.g. at occasions
where people use public WLAN hotspots, which is becoming more and more
popular. Email that cannot be delivered to the intended recipient (e.g.
because of a typo in the address or an overfull mail box) usually bounces
back or gets forwarded to a system managers account. Travelling two or
more times through the net, the message is again exposed to the risk of
eavesdropping.
Apart from phishing, the numerous ongoing virus attacks are another
important issue. Computer viruses and worms try to access the user’s ad-
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dress book on an infected machine in order to spread further. Worms like
Sober reproduce themselves by sending out copies with their own SMTP
engine. The nasty thing they can do is to forge the From: argument of the
email. Either by inserting an arbitrary address or an address found in the
affected user’s address book as a sender. They disguise the true location
of the infection, making it hard to inform the right user to run antiviral
software. Plus, recipients of infected emails are less sceptical if the sender
address is familiar to them and are therefore more likely to click on the at-
tachment. For the time being, people with a non-English mother tongue are
protected to a certain extent as an English email from a friend makes them
suspicious. However, it is very likely that viruses will soon evolve further
and become context-aware, e.g. by adjusting their language according to the
top level domain of the email address. This development can currently be
seen with phishing emails.
Public key cryptography could do a great job in fighting these threats
as it provides sender authentication and message confidentiality. However,
secure (i.e. encrypted and/or signed) email is rarely found on the Internet
today albeit the technology is widely available. The first version of the soft-
ware package PGP was written nearly 15 years ago. It (or an open-source
derivate) is available for free on every major platform (Linux, Mac OS, Unix,
Windows etc.) at least in the form of an external crypto application working
via the clipboard or as a plug-in for mail user agents (MUA). On the other
hand, virtually all popular contemporary MUAs such as Microsoft’s Out-
look/Outlook Express, Netscape Mail, Mozilla Mail, Thunderbird, Pegasus
Mail, or The Bat! have built-in support for S/MIME7 [44]. Still the relative
user population both for PGP and S/MIME is infinitely small [117].
One might argue that user interest is low due to the current business
model for certificates that calculates costs on the potential benefit instead
of their real practical value [7]. For S/MIME to be useful, an end user
has to get a certificate from a well-known CA (Certification Authority).
Otherwise, recipients of signed email will not have the root certificate pre-
configured as a trust anchor in their MUA. This makes it hard for them to
verify the signature and – even worse – they are “punished” by the additional
costs to read through security messages and act accordingly. For instance,
the window shown by Outlook Express when faced with a signature that
7S/MIME stands for secure MIME, i.e. Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension.
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cannot be validated is a powerful deterrent [44, 94]. As a consequence an
end user has to pay an annual fee which typically exceeds the benefits of
the certificate. (Cf. [155] for a thorough discussion of business models for
CAs.) Business issues, however, should not serve as an excuse since more
experienced users might find out that there are zero-cost email certificates
for S/MIME issued by CAs whose root certificate is widely deployed (e.g.
Thawte). PGP certificates are for free anyway due to the PGP trust model.
Nevertheless, there remains a significant cognitive overhead of certificate
management which is in the focus of Chapter 3 and Chapter 6.
Usability issues in the context of secure email were first studied by Whit-
ten and Tygar in their seminal paper [253]. They conducted a user test
where participants were asked to process standard tasks with PGP 5.0. For
instance encryption and digital signing, key retrieval from a communicant
or from a key server. The PGP version under test had a visually appealing
graphical user interface (GUI) and ran on the Apple Macintosh platform
which is usually considered a shining example for a user-friendly interface.
Yet test results were disappointing as two thirds of the participants did not
manage to sign and encrypt messages properly with PGP. A majority of
users did not grasp the concept of public key cryptography as it was pre-
sented to them by the PGP user interface. As a consequence, they used
their own or a third persons public key to encrypt outgoing messages by
mistake. Plus, the participants showed a poor understanding of the idea
of certification (or “key signing” in PGP jargon). Only some users realized
that they should care about key authenticity. None of the test participants
used PGP’s complex key and trust management facilities to establish trust
in a public key they retrieved from the key server or got unauthenticated by
email.
In another email security-related usability evaluation Gerd tom Markot-
ten [98] assessed a plug-in for Microsoft Outlook. This plug-in was certified
for the usage with qualified digital signatures, which should provide a high
level of security (see e.g. [15] and page 62 for details). The test of the plug-in
of the German Signtrust CA revealed an astonishing number of 90 security-
critical usability problems. A significant amount of the problems found is
due to unintelligible and technical language which makes it very difficult for
security novices to use the Signtrust Mail plug-in properly and comfortably.
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2.2.4 Online Privacy
Gerd tom Markotten [98] also uncovered a number of usability problems
with JAP8 (Java Anonymity and Privacy). JAP is an HTTP proxy that
allows users to surf the Web anonymously. JAP supports cascades of inde-
pendent “mixes” – an idea originally due to Chaum [53]. The system also
protects against eavesdropping on the user’s local network as the commu-
nication channel is encrypted from the client machine to the last mix in
the cascade. An early version of JAP was criticized for its lack of appro-
priate user feedback and the difficulties to configure it properly. Tor9 is a
similar approach to JAP, but in stark contrast, Tor does not have a user
interface at all, making it – as its developer argues [68] – very usable. Such
a radical design choice is surely reasonable in situations where users might
mis-configure the tool and open up security holes. However, an application
that works completely transparent and does not offer any feedback about
the security state violates the design principle of self-descriptiveness (see
Table 2.3). As a consequence, users might become uncertain as they cannot
easily and reliably tell whether the tool works or not and they might all the
more breach security.
Similar observations were made in an evaluation of the filesharing ap-
plication KaZaa [110]. Filesharing is very popular these days as people can
exchange music, videos, and software with others for free. KaZaa operates
in peer-to-peer mode, i.e. all computers in the KaZaa network are by and
large equal in that they operate both a server (offering information) and
client (downloading it). Peers can offer files on their local hard disk for
“sharing” with others. Local information of a peer is automatically indexed
and made available on the whole network such that others can download it
comfortably. It has turned out that a majority of test users have difficulties
in configuring their local shares properly, i.e. to restrict sharing to certain
directories and not inadvertently grant access to the complete hard disk.
KaZaa users were also found to not understand that sharing is a priori not
restricted to multi-media files only.
8http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/∼hf2/anon/
9http://tor.eff.org
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2.3 Multi-Layer Classification of Methodologies
The contribution of this section is a novel systematics of previous work and
existing methodologies in the field of usable security. We identify a total
number of six aspects, which we can arrange in a multi-layered model (see
Figure 2.12). Along the vertical axis, a distinction is made between general,
abstract proposals and more concrete and practical ones. It is possible to
interpret the “lower” layers of our model as those farer away from the user
and the “upper” layers as those closer to her. From Chapter 3 of this thesis
onward, we present a number of new approaches. We have depicted their
logical position in the figure.
Figure 2.12: Multi-layer classification of usable security.
Which Layer is the Right One? All of those layers have their justifica-
tion for a secure systems designer, but – depending on the actual use case –
usable security may be realized more effectively on a particular layer than on
the others. It is therefore crucial to identify the right layer for a given prob-
lem. As they affect the user interface or interaction mechanisms, changes on
the upper layers are more likely to be technically easier to realize. However,
innovations on the lower levels are more likely to have a fundamental im-
pact – making applications more usable. As a simple example consider how
secure email was realized. In order to let users encrypt email, the metaphor
of a sealed letter came up, materializing as a graphical icon in most MUAs
while the corresponding cryptographic functionality was retrofitted. What
the designers had in mind was the idea of end-to-end security, which is laud-
able yet pointless. As we all know, only a very small portion of email is
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encrypted or signed, secure email did not succeed on a larger scale. Now, let
us make some mental acrobatics and imagine that email and Internet service
providers would have set up an infrastructure allowing them to secure all
mail travelling between them. Suddenly, the fraction of secure email would
be near 100 %, simply by changing the threat model (“all others are evil”)
and a cultural leap of faith (“I rely on my ISP to care for me”).
Structure For each layer, we discuss current approaches or projects illus-
trating the respective ideas. We start our analysis with the most general
issue, namely the layer “security culture” which describes the way we think
about security (Section 2.3.1). A natural point to continue is the discussion
of threat models which affect the design of security mechanisms. The lack of
usable security software is widely acknowledged. To improve this situation,
engineering frameworks and interface and interaction design guidelines have
been proposed (Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4). Frameworks and design guidelines
are drawn in a way which expresses a certain entanglement. Consider for
instance the approach of user-centred security engineering (see below) where
both areas go hand in hand. The topmost layer is formed by metaphors and
the mental images users have when working with secure applications. As
the user’s conceptual model is not part of the design, but results from the
system images, this layer is a bit smaller in the drawing. Adjoined to it, we
can find education as it can directly influence these images. Education is
drawn vertically as it affects all of the layers (think of the training of sys-
tem developers). Awareness and motivation is a precondition for successful
training. Therefore awareness and education are summarized in a vertical
layer (Section 2.3.6).
2.3.1 Security Culture
Some authors have analysed the relation between security and safety in order
to see what concepts could be transferred from one area into the other, we
summarize their findings here. The role of security outsourcing has not yet
been discussed from a usability perspective. Delegating complicated tasks
to a server or an organization is an appealing solution to solve (or rather:
shift) usability problems. However, the question is justified if outsourcing
does not conflict with protection goals. A whole chapter of this thesis is
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dedicated to the outsourcing of trustcenter capabilities, so we do not treat
this subject further here.
Security and Safety In everyday language, the terms “security” and
“safety” are often used synonymously, for instance the German translation
for both words is “Sicherheit”. In a technical sense, they have different
meanings, albeit both areas are linked together. “Security” is typically
defined by referring to defence measures that ensure a state of inviolability
from hostile acts or influences while “safety” focusses on the protection
against accidents and (mechanical or human) failure which may cause harm
to the system. Several authors have pointed out that it could be beneficial for
the IT security community to look at how safety techniques are successfully
applied in practice [39, 200].
There are obvious reasons to do so: Both safety and security are sec-
ondary goals which exist “to protect an organization and its staff while
they are engaged in the primary task – production” (Brostoff et al. [39]).
There are a number of other similarities between the domains of security
and safety: An economic tension between these requirements and the pro-
duction tasks exists as both sides are competing for resources (cf. discussion
at the beginning of this chapter). Compared to the production tasks, the
outcome of safety and security measures cannot be predicted due to the
stochastic nature of incidents. Plus, the feedback associated with those
measures is largely negative and compelling only after an incident (cf. the
discussion about awareness in Chapter 4). The domains also resemble in
the way problems are handled. Such problems are often attributed to the
carelessness or incompetence of employees and are being followed by puni-
tive management actions. The domains, however, differ in society’s attitude
towards breaches. While violations of safety rules are mostly considered
negative, this is not the case for security mechanisms. For instance, hacking
is idealized or working around security mechanisms is seen as a “badge of
seniority” [4]. Awareness campaigns are an important way to change this
view.
Fail-Safe Systems The aerospace sector was cited as a shining example
for its high safety standards including the rigorous software development
process and maintenance regime, the oversight by regulatory bodies, the de-
manding training for pilots, and the intense investigation of failures [200].
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This community has done its homework in refraining from the general atti-
tude to blame accidents solely on human error. However, this opinion was
prevalent two decades ago and significantly hindered the development of
safety-critical systems [39]. Immediate adoption of aerospace standards to
IT systems is not likely to happen on a broader scale. It is a lame compar-
ison as avionics software is no general consumer software and one cannot
expect that only skilled and trained personnel will operate security-critical
systems. A more realistic role model might be that of the automobile indus-
try as Sandhu [200] suggests. Cars are in fact a consumer product deployed
in large numbers and driving a car requires a “small, but non-zero amount”
of previous training.
The security community none the less has already taken up the idea of a
“fail-safe” system. Such systems are designed to not cause harm when they
fail (and crash “gracefully” so to say). An example is Maseberg’s fail-safe
concept for PKIs [161]. Here the possible “failure” means cryptographic
algorithms that may be broken or become weak over time. This is currently
the case with cryptographic hash functions (see e.g. [247, 248]). A fail-
safe system design anticipates the potential incident from the outset and
provides appropriate countermeasures (for instance in Maseberg’s scenario
for fail-safe signatures, data is signed multiply with independent algorithm
suites). Some ideas of the safety community have found their way into
secure applications, e.g. in the form of the “path of least resistance” design
guideline recommending fail-safe default settings (see below).
2.3.2 Threat Model
A very general yet important distinction, system designers should always
bear in mind is the difference between the theoretical (or ideal) and the
effective security level of a system [69]. In the following we have a close look
at this phenomenon. We believe that an appropriate threat model is crucial
for the usability of secure applications. Often enough, security mechanisms
are deployed with only a vague understanding or schematic idea of what the
security threats are. (On the other hand it may be necessary to sometimes
regard a system’s regular users as potential attackers – this is covered by
the concept of multilateral security, an example of mobile commerce can be
found in [237].) This results in over-sized solutions that are too hard to
handle. We give some examples below.
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Theoretically Secure is Not Effectively Secure Secure systems are
typically designed according to a specific threat model that is formulated
in terms of security goals similar to those described in Section 2.1.3. For
instance, during the design process some pieces of data are classified as
confidential which implies that they should leave the system only with an
appropriate level of protection (i.e. encrypted under the recipients’s public
key using one of a set of certain symmetric ciphers with prescribed minimal
key lengths etc.). The design process assures that the theoretical level of
security is very high, even against sophisticated cryptographic attacks.
Now compare this to the effective level of security which is achieved when
the human factor comes into play: Assume that the user in question does
not manage to import the recipient’s public key into the system properly
(because she is incapable of finding the right menu, determining the correct
certificate directory settings, or understanding the trust model etc. to name
only a few possible hurdles). Furthermore, we assume that she still wants to
send the document. Then it is not unlikely that she will find a way to do so
without encryption. With regard to the design objective “confidentiality”,
the effective level of security in this small example is non-existent, although
the system may offer cutting-edge, military-strength encryption in the ideal
case.
To give a more concrete example we consider the use of S/MIME to en-
crypt emails. It is a common, yet incomprehensible dogma that an outgoing
email can only be encrypted when the sender also has her own key pair. The
technical reason for this constraint is the idea to store the message encrypted
in the “sent” folder on the hard disk. There are several flaws in this concept:
Firstly, the threat model does apparently not only take into account attack-
ers that eavesdropped messages while en route, the mechanism also restricts
access to the victim’s messages on the hard disk. However, file encryption is
not what S/MIME is originally for. Secondly, the previous statement only
holds for messages that were sent out in encrypted form – why not for all
the others? It would be no problem to simply encrypt the mailbox file as a
whole. Thirdly, why does the mechanism require the sender to have a cer-
tificate, why not simply use password-based encryption for protecting the
session keys? (When stored in software, the private key is protected by a
password anyway.)
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The “all-or-nothing” way S/MIME is implemented in MUAs may be
well-meant, but has the consequence that messages are sent in the clear
which could have been encrypted – a result which somehow reduces this
particular threat model to absurdity. Note, that we did not yet speak of
the case when a communicant’s certificate cannot be validated. Similarly,
the message is sent in the clear, readable for everyone, instead of encrypting
it with an “unknown” and not yet validated key, which would reduce the
number of potential attackers to only one. We further elaborate the subject
of opportunistic behaviour in security in Chapter 6.
Less is More The idea is slowly catching on that finding a reasonable
trade-off between security and usability is superior to aiming at perfect
security in vain. Smetters and Grinter [215] are rather straightforward in this
respect, and ask “if you put usability first, how much security can you get?”.
Their concept is very similar to the pragmatic approach of Sandhu [200] who
states three golden rules of “good-enough security”:
1. Good enough is good enough.
2. Good enough always beats perfect.
3. The really hard part is determining what is good enough.
It is of particular interest where complex security measures cannot (due
to technical reasons) or should not (as not to restrict user convenience) be
strictly enforced every time (cf. our Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Both engineers and
users may have difficulties to understand the functioning and limitations of a
certain involved technology or complex policy. Therefore, weaker techniques
can surpass such technologies in practice when people are more likely to
“know what they are doing” and how to behave correctly. Secure systems
should try to meet user’s expectations and mental models about security
instead of telling them that their expectations are wrong [111].
Being Paranoid Does Harm The enforcement of password policies is a
typical example. We focus on one aspect of password policies to illustrate
the problem: A lot of system administrators take it as an obligation of users
to change their login password regularly. Modern operating systems like
Windows XP have built-in mechanisms to enforce this rule in fixed intervals
of e.g. 30 or 60 days. However, a significant part of users feels uncomfortable
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with it and tries to work around it [4, 204]. In order to prevent users from
re-entering their current (or a previously used) password when it comes to a
mandatory password change, systems keep a password history for each user
– this was called some kind of “stalking” [202]. While in this situation, a
lot of effort was put into technology, the actual threat model was not stated
explicitly and precisely. From a security point of view, not much is gained
if passwords are re-newed every month instead of every year, say. If one
has a very powerful attacker in mind that mounts an oﬄine attack on the
encrypted password file, this precaution reduces the attacker’s time frame
only by a small factor. In contrast, the enforcement of password quality or
entropy would have a much greater impact on security. Password entropy
depends on password length, the size of the alphabet password characters
are picked from, and – above all – the way how passwords are generated (see
Chapter 4 for details).
Online guessing attacks can be detected and defeated no matter how
often the password is changed. Protection against shoulder-surfers might
be an argument for the strict change policy. Shoulder-surfing refers to an
attacker who tries to learn the password by surreptitiously observing a user
entering the password on the keyboard. Consequently, one might say that
the strength of a password decreases with every time it is used. However,
the 30-days policy exactly does not address this issue since the number of
logins during the respective period is not taken into account. On the other
hand, a lot of memorability problems arise with passwords that are used
infrequently and that are subject to a strict change policy [204].
If the threat model really emphasizes shoulder-surfing, other and more
appropriate mechanisms are at hand, e.g. the method of Roth et al. [192].
If the threat model emphasizes password guessing attacks, the rule to never
write down a password should be abandoned as robust passwords are too
complex to remember – an explicit recommendation by security expert Bruce
Schneier [3]. These considerations again show the importance of analysing
and stating a matching threat model.
Being Pragmatic Pays Off User identification and authentication on
the Internet is a good example where pragmatic security mechanisms have
been widely deployed. If you would ask – in an abstract way – a security
expert how “to secure an application responsible for business transactions
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on an insecure network”, you would probably get the answer to use a PKI for
user identification and public key cryptography for authentication. However,
this is absolutely not the way things happen on the Internet today. The
overwhelming majority of electronic commerce web sites does not rely on
a PKI to identify their customers. (Even major players like Amazon do
not strictly enforce an SSL-only access policy as this could exclude some
customers.) In fact, fraud, phishing, and identity theft do happen on the
WWW as we can see in Section 2.2.2, but the pressure to adopt a more
secure technology is not yet there as financial losses are still too small.
The common security mechanism of email-based identification and au-
thentication (EBIA) relies on email addresses as unique identifiers and the
ability to receive email at a certain address as an authenticator. This mech-
anism is often used for password resets. In this case, the new, machine-
generated, password is sent out to the user or a hyperlink that leads to a
page where a new password can be entered (the link contains a unique num-
ber as an authenticator). Obviously, the security relies on the assumption
that it is hard for an adversary to read a user’s mailbox – an assumption
that has proven to be reasonable in most practical cases. We refer the reader
to [90] for a thorough discussion of the potential as well as the limitations
of EBIA in practice. A major benefit of this approach is the fact that users
(both end users and system engineers) can assess the security properties of
the system, which clearly are not very high, but have proved to be robust
in the users’ own experience.
EBIA is a good example for a reasonable threat model that led to a fairly
usable and secure mechanism. A “textbook” threat model of a powerful
attacker would probably have resulted in a more complicated mechanism as
we argued above. We believe that the “good-enough” and “put usability
first” approach mark a profound change in the way many “secure” systems
will be engineered in the future. Rather than being driven by a conservative
assessment of threats and security requirements, the safety and usability of
such systems will be at the focus of many low to medium risk application
areas.
2.3.3 Engineering Process Frameworks
Numerous frameworks exist for general software engineering as well as se-
curity or usability engineering in particular. There are basically three ways
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of how to get a usable security application [260]. Two of them are naive
solutions which take as a starting point a usable (resp. a secure) application
and add security (resp. usability) to it. We discuss their drawbacks and
advertise the approach of user-centred security as an alternative.
Adding Usability to a Secure Application We have already sketched
usability methods in Section 2.1.4. All those can be applied in a security
context as well. Eckert describes a number of security engineering meth-
ods in her book [70]. These methods often fall back upon general software
development process models (see e.g. [19]). The four steps of plan-build-
assess-modify form the basic phase of the process which is iterated multiple
times. This process can be adopted to the security setting as well. A func-
tional analysis of the future system forms the starting point. Security issues
are then addressed by means of a threat and risk analysis. Here the impact
of a predetermined set of attacks towards the system is assessed such that a
security strategy can be formulated. The subsequent design and implemen-
tation phases take turn with testing and evaluation periods.
From a software engineer’s point of view, adding usability to an appli-
cation whose security mechanisms are fixed is problematic. In this case
applications tend to make technical details directly visible without a fur-
ther level of abstraction [97]. Abstraction on the UI includes, for instance,
the use of meaningful metaphors or the design of interaction mechanisms
that separate security from primary tasks. Such a lack can be seen for in-
stance in the field of email clients. Consider for instance the key and trust
management in PGP: Attempts to facilitate and improve the UI without
touching the underlying concepts only addressed the symptoms, but did not
change things fundamentally. The approach of Dhamija et al. [64] focussed
on making visible PGP’s complex internal trust metrics and the way the
authenticity and trustworthiness of a key is calculated. However, their in-
terface ended up with technical details that only have marginal importance
for the productive task of sending secure email. Whitten [251, 252] took a
somehow opposite approach in forcing the user into training lessons before
letting her or him access key management functionality. This can be a last
resort, but surely not a panacea.
Adding Security to a Usable Application Another approach is to take
an existing usable application and add security features (Schneier [206] iron-
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ically calls this “sprinkling on magic security dust”). The field of Computer-
Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) is a typical example where this strat-
egy has been followed [260]. An important drawback of this approach is the
fact that it tends to produce “security-agnostic” applications as security
functionality is kept transparent or separate from the core functionality, for
instance when security features of the underlying operating system (OS) are
used. This approach has its pros and cons. On the one hand, application
designers relying on OS security capabilities do not have to re-implement
functionality, which anyway is a tedious and error-prone process, possibly
going beyond their knowledge. On the other hand, contextual information,
which can be useful when a security-relevant decision is to be made, is usu-
ally only available in the application itself [215]. As an example consider the
situation where an incoming email message carries a digital signature that
cannot be verified as no appropriate certificate path can be established. If
the email is a contract, the recipient will care about its authenticity, but not
if the email’s content is unimportant. The current email standard RFC 822
provides only a rudimentary way to include meta-information about the
content of an email.10
To cut a long story short, some security-relevant decisions will always
have to take into account contextual information that is why they cannot
be completely left to lower technical layers. Nevertheless, some tasks can
and should be handed over to the OS or a crypto library for the sake of
security (and a hopefully standard-compliant and proper implementation).
Functionality that is both essential from a security point of view and invisible
to the user typically is suitable to be delegated to the operating system, like
the generation or protection of keys or the provision of good pseudo random
numbers. Tasks that require a direct user involvement should ideally be
provided by some kind of toolkit that can be more tightly integrated into
an application. Smetters and Grinter [215] call this the “Lego Bricks for
Security” approach.
User-centred Security The third and most promising approach is a syn-
thesis which considers both aspects simultaneously from the outset. Zurko
and Simon [260] have come up with the notion of user-centred security to
10The header field X-Importance stores a numerical value representing the (of course
subjective) urgency of the email.
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“refer to security models, mechanisms, systems, and software that have us-
ability as a primary motivation or goal”. Concrete engineering guidelines
have been formulated by several authors (see next section). In the remainder
of this section we have a closer look at engineering frameworks that integrate
security and usability from the beginning. AEGIS (Appropriate and Effec-
tive Guidance for Information Security) is a high-level framework which is
due to [81]. It is a systematic approach based on the spiral model of software
development where multiple specification-implementation-testing phases al-
ternate. AEGIS starts with asset identification, which means the specifi-
cation of security requirements. During a risk analysis and security design
phase, vulnerabilities are identified. Costs and likelihood of a certain attack
are taken as an indicator which countermeasure to select. Each countermea-
sure’s costs are then weighted against the impact of the attack to make an
appropriate choice. Gerd tom Markotten [97] synthesizes an established se-
curity engineering method with best practices of usability engineering. This
highly technical process is combined with a method due to Nielsen [173]
to obtain her user-centred security engineering (UCSec) method. Nielsen’s
usability engineering process is characterized by parallel design and testing
phases. UCSec pays special attention to user behaviour (as users may be
both the subject or object of an attack), user needs, and sets forth a number
of general usability guidelines for security software (see Table 2.3).
Without doubt, the latter of the three approaches is the most promis-
ing one. There is consent that neither security nor usability can be simply
“retrofitted” after completion of the design process [259, 17]. However, as se-
cure systems only change slowly, there are often situations in practice where
user-friendly mechanisms had to be retrofitted as the original design did not
anticipate them. As an example consider our approach to the problem of
credential delegation presented in Chapter 7. Here the constraint is that
technology on the server side is completely fixed and the client side should
not significantly change as well.
2.3.4 Design Guidelines
In the previous section, we confined ourselves to general, high-level frame-
works governing the development process as a whole. Compared to these
frameworks, which represent a planning strategy and organizational struc-
turing, engineering guidelines, which we will discuss now, provide more con-
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crete support for developers who are about to solve a concrete problem or
make a design choice. There is a range of recommendations, most of them
are stated in an ad-hoc fashion centred around sample applications or expe-
rience reports. Saltzer and Schroeder [199] advocate for a system design as
simple and small as possible with mechanisms that have fail-safe defaults,
and are easy to understand and use. Although their proposals date back to
the year 1974, their general principles are still valid today. Apart from the
two usefulness-related rules economy of mechanism and psychological ac-
ceptability, e.g. the least privilege or the complete mediation principle have
made their way into modern operating systems [70].
General guidelines for the design of ergonomic user interfaces have been
stated in the ISO standard 9241 [131]. They are listed in the first col-
umn of Table 2.3. Gerd tom Markotten and Kaiser [100] rightly argue that
those guidelines cannot be used literally in a security setting. Their mod-
ified guidelines are shown in italics in the right column of the table. We
have added references to the five properties listed in Figure 2.4 in order to
motivate each adaptation.
Implicit Security A lot of usability problems with secure applications
originate from the logical and/or technical separation of productive and se-
curity tasks. An elegant way to overcome this problem is to let applications
infer a user’s security objectives (the secondary goal) from her productive
tasks (the primary goal) and the corresponding UI actions and inputs. This
approach was termed implicit security [215]. Associated with this challenge
is the feedback about the current security state such that users are able
to control and change the state without hassle. Dourish and Redmiles [69]
suggest using event monitoring combined with security heuristics (compara-
ble to those in intrusion detection systems) to visualize the security status.
Their approach aims at providing users extensive information about config-
uration, activity, and important parameters of a networked system.
In independent work, Yee [258, 259] uses a similar approach to incor-
porate security decisions into the users’ workflow. Yee proposes to initially
grant only minimal abilities to applications and to enhance these authorities
through explicit user interactions. An important benefit of the idea that user
interactions can convey security implications is a strategy called security by
designation. The set of permitted and acceptable actions stays coherent
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general principle relevance for security applications∗
error tolerance
Error prevention is considered the most important
principle because of P4 and P5.
suitability for
individualisation,
controllability
Users should receive more rigorous guidance where
needed to avoid weaknesses due to misconfiguration
or mistakes (P4).
suitability for
learning
Humans tend towards the ”trial and error” method
when starting to use an application (P1). Even a
carefree first-time operation must not lead to security
breaches or severe errors.
self-descriptiveness
Presenting status or security messages clearly and
precisely is crucial (P2, P3).
conformity to user ex-
pectations, consistency
The application should use a correct, homogeneous
and usual terminology to describe things (P3).
suitability for the task
Users want to accomplish security-related tasks eas-
ily and efficiently. The design should take into ac-
count that users have varying abilities and do not
consider security as a primary goal (P1).
∗ P1, . . . , P5 refer to the properties listed in Figure 2.4 on page 21.
Table 2.3: UI design principles for security applications (based on [100]
and [233]).
with what the user actually wants, but this does not require confirmation
prompts or an a priori formulation of a policy. Security by designation is
user-friendly as decisions can be made in a meaningful context (cf. the dis-
cussion on page 46). Yee gives the examples of file access rights or cookie
management. In contrast, the strategy that most applications follow is se-
curity by admonition, i.e. to explain to users what may happen when they
try some unacceptable action and demand their confirmation (for example:
“After deleting your private key, you won’t be able to read emails encrypted
with that key – do you want to proceed?”). Yee’s guidelines are built around
the concept of actors (applications, other users of the system etc.) and their
abilities (those of interest for the current user). Granting authority should
always require a user action which conveys it implicitly or explicitly. The
UI should make abilities visible and provide methods to revoke them.
Yee’s approach has some limitations as it is more or less tailored to
the management of privileges like access to resources (file system, address
book, user interface, network connection etc.) and for applications running
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locally on the desktop. Up to now, it deliberately ignores the task of user
authentication in an open network, which accounts for a large portion of
usability problems with PKI-enabled applications [253]. An extension in
this direction is an open research problem.
2.3.5 Metaphors
Logical and/or visual metaphors are methods to make the operation of a
complex technique easier for users by mapping analogies of their everyday
life to technology. When it comes to concrete user interface design of a secure
application, the challenge is to find understandable, precise, and appealing
metaphors for security-related tasks, objects, and properties. The padlock
icon, which is used in most web browsers to indicate SSL connections, is an
example for a metaphor that is widely applied. This does not necessarily
imply that the metaphor is precise or cannot be misunderstood. Friedman
et al. [88] report that a padlock may give users an incorrect idea about SSL
(see Section 2.2.2.3). However, it seems that users regard the padlock icon in
general as a natural choice to represent the concept “security” (see [193] and
Section 6.5.3). In contrast to web browsers, a uniform labelling mechanism
for digitally signed email is not implemented by current MUAs [92].
Mental Models Metaphors are closely related to mental models as they
provide shorthands for communication with the system. Mental models refer
to the conceptual understandings that users hold of the domains in which
they operate; actions are planned and interpreted with respect to these
models [69]. A mental model can be formed through experience, training,
and instruction. It depends on the interpretation of perceived actions of
a system and its visible structure [179]. Ideally the user’s model matches
the designers’ conceptualization of the system. In her PGP usability test
Whitten showed that this condition is not always satisfied: many partic-
ipants of the test “did not understand the necessary conceptual model of
public key cryptography well enough to be able to figure out which public
key to use when encrypting a message for a particular recipient.” [253, 251].
It was proposed to visually represent key pairs according to the Yin-Yang
symbol, where two individual halves coloured black and white fit together,
but this did not lead to an improvement in users understanding of the con-
cepts of public key cryptography. This provides some evidence that complex
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PKI-enabled applications cannot be made significantly easier to use without
touching the technical layer.
2.3.6 User Education and Awareness
At the end of the day, most security mechanisms require some form of user
interaction to be effective. Consider for instance the TCP/IP network stack
as an example. Data encryption and integrity protection with the help
of public key cryptography may take place on the data link, the network,
the session, or the application layer. L2TP (Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol),
IPSec, SSL, and PGP are examples for each alternative. Albeit these tech-
nologies are quite different, all of them nevertheless require a manual initial
configuration and continuous management (e.g. for the update of trust an-
chors). The term “user” surely extends from end user to system or network
administrator in this case. At this point, security depends on the correct
behaviour of the responsible person. We repeat once again the observation
that security is a secondary goal for users11, which directly decreases user’s
motivation to adhere to security policies or to take pains in operating the
application correctly.
User Attitude With a lack of motivation and awareness users tend to
underestimate the risk of being the target or victim of a security incident.
“I’m not so important” is a common statement [250], obviously ignoring
the fact that, for instance, breaking into an arbitrary user account on a
system allows an attacker to get one foot in the door of an organization and
possibly gain administrator privileges afterwards. A similar attitude is “I
have nothing to hide” [138]; such employees do not overlook the far-reaching
consequences of their carelessness. People were also found to violate security
because of personal attitude (“I am not pedantic/paranoid”, [250]) or social
issues (“Sharing a password is a sign of trust”, [204]). Furthermore, it was
shown that – due to a lack of security knowledge and information about
real dangers – users construct their own, inadequate mental model and are
guided by vague experiences [204].
Creating and maintaining information security awareness is therefore an
obvious goal. However, awareness and motivation cannot be created by drill
11With the sole exception of “security service providers”, for instance ISPs that offer
VPN services for their customers.
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or threat of punishment, which is a frequent implicit assumption among the
management, possibly another relic from the time before security escaped
the military environment [4]. An individual chapter of this thesis is devoted
to security awareness, so we do not explore this issue further at this point.
User education is surely another important building block. It is consent
that user education is a good thing in general and for secure applications in
particular. In the light of the disappointing results of her usability study,
Whitten proposes to pay more attention to user education and guide users in
a step-by-step fashion through the application [252]. She suggests a concept
of “safe staging”, which increases the application’s complexity that is visible
according to the current knowledge and experience of the user. A weaker
form of this concept is contained in the idea of “user levels”, where tasks are
automated with a wizard for inexperienced users and experts are allowed to
tweak detail settings.
Limitations Usability expert Jakob Nielsen [175] has recently voted against
relying too much on user education. In his view, this does not resolve the
general problem of removing burden from the user, which originates from
preconditions and assumptions on the technical layer. User education can
be a last resort for existing secure applications with poor usability that are
mission-critical (e.g. for military purposes). There should also be user train-
ing for secure applications as it should be for any other type of software in
an enterprise setting. However, one should not expect a home user having
received previous training or being willing to do so. We came to the same
conclusion at the end of Section 2.1.4. Schneier [206] sums up the impor-
tance of education and awareness for enterprise security in saying “Security
measures that aren’t understood by and agreed to by everyone don’t work”.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we recalled the common terminology from the area of usable
security like threats, protection mechanisms, and the like. As an introduc-
tion to the subject, we studied a number of security incidents and examples
in order to derive a categorization of usability-related security problems. We
introduced a fine-grained distinction between user-caused violations, shaded
by the degree of intent, versus application-caused vulnerabilities, shaded by
the degree of impossibility. Finally, we turned to the question of how the
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usability of secure applications can be improved. The main result of this
chapter is a multi-layered model consisting of different hierarchical “layers”
which describe approaches to tackle the problem. The pros and cons of a
design choice in favour of a certain layer are discussed. We also reviewed
related work and classified it according to our model. For each layer, we
present an example in the remainder of this thesis to demonstrate the re-
spective methodology. We believe that, in the context of PKI, especially the
threat model should deserve more attention as various reasons for usability
problems originate from this layer. This may lead to technical innovations
that – by design – evade major problems from the outset.
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Chapter 3
Measuring Usability and
Utility of PKI-enabled
Applications
Q: How is a key pair like a hand grenade?
A: You get two parts, there’s no aiming, and it’s hard to use
safely.
Q: How are they different?
A: With a grenade, you throw the dangerous part away...
– Don Davis
If you think technology can solve your security problems, then
you don’t understand the problems and you don’t understand the
technology.
– Bruce Schneier
In Chapter 2, we followed the well-known approach to IT security in
that we identified security threats and formulated the corresponding pro-
tection goals. We now show how these goals can be achieved in practice by
cryptography-based and PKI-based mechanisms. This chapter starts with
a brief introduction into these mechanisms before a number of technological
challenges are outlined (Section 3.1 and 3.2). Being aware of such challenges
is crucial as they directly affect the usability and may hinder the deployment
of PKIs as well.
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It is obvious that the UI plays the major role for usability. But in the end
it strongly reflects and depends on the underlying concepts of the software,
especially for secure applications as we have already argued in Section 2.3.3.
We will see that – compared to well-known security mechanisms like pass-
words or file access control – public key cryptography and PKI are a much
more complex matter, less intuitive, and more difficult to understand for
users (and software engineers as well). Looking behind the scenes is also
instructive as PKI users will get involved in technical details sooner or later.
Davis [60] points out this as an inherent property and the price to pay for
the advantages of PKI. He observes that systems using public key meth-
ods burden the user with responsibility for tasks that are otherwise being
centrally managed by an administrator or a server.
The main topic of this chapter is our framework to measure the usabil-
ity and utility of PKI-enabled applications. This framework grew out of a
large usability study [44], which was conducted by the Darmsta¨dter Zen-
trum fu¨r IT-Sicherheit on behalf of Microsoft Deutschland GmbH and was
co-authored by the author of this thesis. The scope, the testing process, and
the findings of this study are summarized in Section 3.4.
The framework has subsequently been applied to the evaluation of trust-
center software, namely the Windows 2003 Server CA and Entrust’s PKI
package (see Section 3.5 and [150]).
3.1 PKI in a Nutshell
PKI provides an infrastructure – the “I” in PKI – for the use of cryptography
in large and dynamic user groups. In Chapter 2 we emphasized openness as
central property.
The approach we will follow now is bottom-up in that we first explain
the necessary basics of cryptography before we delve into the details of PKI.
We treat the subject straight-forward as we start with the idea of encryption
and the notion of symmetric cryptosystems, then we proceed to asymmetric
cryptography by a discussion of key management issues. Furthermore, we
pay attention to the problem of public key distribution and show how to
provide integrity and authenticity. Digital signatures, certificates, and the
concept of a public key infrastructure plus some practical considerations
conclude this section.
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We can only give a coarse introduction here, a more comprehensive treat-
ment is out of the scope of this thesis. The reader is therefore referred to
the textbooks [8, 42, 70, 163, 205, 219, 224] to name but a few. Readers
familiar with the subject may want to proceed directly to Section 3.2.
3.1.1 Confidentiality through Encryption
The need for confidentiality in personal or organizational communications
dates back to ancient times. Gaius Iulius Caesar is probably the most pop-
ular and most often cited historical example in crypto literature. He al-
ready gave a precise description of an elementary cipher in his book [47]
two thousand years ago. It transforms a clear text (or plain text) message
by substituting letters one by one. Clear text letters are circularly shifted
three positions such that – when applied to the (modern) Latin alphabet –
A, B, C, . . . , W, X, Y, Z, thus get mapped to D, E, F, . . . , Z, A, B, C. The
process of transforming clear text into cipher text, that is unintelligible for
an outsider, is called encryption. The inverse operation is called decryption.
The Caesar cipher is a simple, so-called substitution cipher.
Obviously, some kind of secret information must be part of every cryp-
tosystem to provide the legitimate communicants with an advantage com-
pared to an attacker from the outside. In the example above, the encryption
algorithm (the idea of shifting letters) is such a secret piece of information,
while the number of shift positions (which is 3 in the example above) is
the other. According to Kerckhoff’s principle stemming from the 19th cen-
tury [141], the communicants should not rely on the assumption that the
former piece of information is unknown to the attacker. For their security,
they should not rely on the secrecy of the cipher algorithm, but only on its
variable input data, which is called a (cryptographic) key.
Of course, for the simple substitution cipher with a key consisting of a
number between 1 and 25, the “security margin” between the communicants
and the attacker is rather small. Modern cryptosystems have a much larger
key space, which effectively inhibits an attacker from trying out each possible
key in order to decrypt a cipher text. Typical state-of-the-art cryptosystems
have key spaces consisting of for instance 2128, 2192, and 2256 (AES) or 2112
and 2168 (3DES) elements – the time for a complete test would exceed the
lifetime of the universe even on a very powerful computer (see [27] for some
illustrative figures). A cryptosystem is considered strong enough if no attack
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is known which takes less effort than on the order 280 operations [163]. This
gives a lower bound for the size of the key space.
The approach of Kerckhoff is justified as revealing the design of the al-
gorithms allows independent experts and the scientific community to scru-
tinize the cryptosystem’s security properties and to rule out design weak-
nesses. Besides, keeping the algorithm of a cryptosystem itself secret is
virtually impossible if the system is used by a large number of people and
en-/decryption devices might get lost, e.g. in the army while in action.
A system which has undergone intensive studies and which is widely
deployed is – with a high probability – stronger than a “home-made” or un-
common scheme.1 It is therefore reasonable that applications only support
a selection of established algorithms. Leaving too much choices to a user in
this respect can be dangerous (cf. Section 3.3.4.1).
3.1.2 Symmetric Cryptosystems
Albeit not stated explicitly, we have exclusively spoken of cryptosystems so
far that are symmetric in that the keys used for encryption and decryption
are either identical or the latter can be derived easily from the former (e.g.
a 3-step encryption shift corresponds to a decryption shift by 26 − 3 = 23
positions in the Caesar scheme).
Up to the mid 1970s only symmetric ciphers had been known. We explain
the idea of asymmetric ciphers in Section 3.1.3. Asymmetric ciphers are very
important as they help overcome some drawbacks of symmetric ciphers and
open up a number of new applications within “asymmetric cryptography”.
The Key Management Problem Consider a group of persons where
each two of them want to communicate in a confidential way over an insecure
network such that the rest of the group cannot understand the data they
exchange. This implies that each pair has to use its own secret key. Several
problems arise in this setting if a symmetric cipher is used. At first, each
two communicants have to securely agree on a common secret key prior to
their actual communication. This requires what is called an “out-of-band”
1Even if a weaknesses of a widely used algorithm is found and exploited by an attacker,
such news will spread quickly. For instance, during World War II, the Allies were able to
read German radio messages encrypted by the Enigma, but could not make tactical use
of them as this would have informed the enemy that the system is broken.
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channel. Such a channel might be a personal contact or a secure second
communication medium (telephone, letter, etc.). Pairwise secure out-of-
band key exchange may be feasible in small user groups. However, it does
not scale well as the number of keys, which need to be securely generated,
exchanged, and stored, totals n(n−1)2 , n being the number of participants.
The quadratic complexity renders this scheme impractical, since even in a
community of only 1000 users, nearly half a million keys are required.
Apart from this fact, the necessity for an initial out-of-band channel also
precludes people to directly communicate with previously unknown peers
in a secure way – a feature we identified as crucial for open networks. In
such a situation, the only way to avoid sending messages in the clear (apart
from not sending them at all) is to rely on a third party which is trusted
by both communicants. Acting as an intermediary the third party would
receive messages encrypted with the sender’s key, decrypt, and re-encrypt
them with the recipient’s key. This has the obvious drawback that all mes-
sages must be routed through and can be read by the intermediary. As a
bit less security-critical alternative, the third party could act as an “intro-
ducer”, which generates a new secret key and transfers it securely to both
parties. We will soon see that there is also an introducer in the figurative
sense in the context of asymmetric ciphers, but not with opportunistic se-
curity (Chapter 6), which can be considered a main characteristic. Such a
key distribution center (KDC) is, for instance, an integral part in the fa-
mous Kerberos authentication and key distribution service [221, 145]. In a
Kerberos “realm” (i.e. an network domain or organization), each user has a
bilateral trust relationship to a central entity that operates the KDC. Ker-
beros also allows the interconnection of different realms (e.g. crossing the
borders of a company) thus supporting the requirement of openness to a
certain extent. However, individual users who are not member of such a
realm, cannot communicate securely with others.
However, a centralized KDC suffers from the typical problems all central-
ized IT systems suffer: Without further technical measures, it represents a
single point of failure and a single point of attack. Plus, it may also become
a communication bottleneck in large user groups [8].
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3.1.3 Public Key Cryptosystems
The aforementioned problems of pairwise secret key exchange and scalability
can be overcome by asymmetric cryptography. The ground-breaking idea
of Diffie and Hellman to construct ciphers where the encryption key and
decryption key are significantly different such that computing the latter
out of the former is infeasible in practice. The main characteristic of an
asymmetric cipher is the use of a so-called key pair consisting of a public
key and a private key. The public key is the encryption key while the
private key is the decryption key, so both operations can be separated. Here
encryption is often called a trapdoor one-way function as it is infeasible
to invert it (one-way property) without the knowledge of the private key
(trapdoor information) [163].
At the time their seminal paper [67] was originally published in 1976, no
instance of such an asymmetric cipher was known. The RSA cryptosystem
(named after Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman who came up with the idea
in 1978, [191]) is still the asymmetric cipher used most often in practice.
Mathematical details of RSA and its variants are given in Chapter 5. Typical
key lengths for RSA are 1024, 2048, or 4096 bit. For practical purposes,
asymmetric ciphers are in general not used directly to encrypt payload data
as they are significantly slower than symmetric cryptosystems. Instead,
payload data is first encrypted with a symmetric session key (or transaction
key) generated at random. This key in turn is encrypted with the recipient’s
public key.
3.1.4 Authenticity and Integrity Protection
The computational asymmetry between the encryption and decryption op-
eration in an asymmetric cryptosystem can be exploited in a second way.
Consider how a paper document is signed with a handwritten signature –
a process that is typical for the everyday business world and that is re-
garded as being reasonably secure. Such a signature provides authenticity
of the data towards an arbitrary party as forging a handwritten signature
is deemed rather difficult while it can be easily verified (e.g. by means of
the reference template contained in an ID card). A digital (or electronic)
signature scheme has very similar properties, but is even harder to forge.
Like an asymmetric cipher it makes use of a key pair where the private key
is required for the creation of the signature while the public key alone allows
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its verification. In the RSA signature scheme for instance, the operation for
signing (verifying) data uses the same maths as the operation of decrypting
(encrypting) in the RSA cryptosystem.
Hash Functions Signature schemes do usually not work directly with
the data to be signed, but apply an initial transformation that shortens the
input to a few bytes. Such mappings are called cryptographic hash functions.
They assign a bit string of fixed length (128, 160, 224, or 256 bit are typical
values) to a bit string of arbitrary length. This has the advantage that the
length of the signature always equals the key length. (Compare this to the
case of encryption where the cipher and the plain text have equal length2.)
In particular it does not depend on the length of the document itself that
is why the document cannot be reconstructed from the output value alone
(the scheme is said to not support message recovery).
A hash function h is suitable for digital signature if it is collision resis-
tant, i.e. the chance of finding two different messages m,m′ with h(m) =
h(m′) is negligible. (Such collisions nevertheless always exit as h is not injec-
tive.) Collision-resistance is a must as the signature is tied to the hash value
of the message, not the message itself. Otherwise, the signer could later deny
having signed m and claim that he signed m′ 6= m if h(m) = h(m′). This
violates the requirement of digital signatures to be non-repudiable. (The
trick works the other way round when Mallory sells something to Bob and
lets him sign the order m which maps to the same hash value as a text m′
with a different price or amount of goods.)
A weaker requirement than collision resistance is second pre-image re-
sistance (also called weak collision resistance), which means that, given a
certain message, it is infeasible to find a different message such that both
messages map to the same hash value. This property prevents fraud as a
digital signature does not directly refer to the document, but only indirectly
via the hash value.
Non-Repudiability The non-repudiation feature is a precondition for
digital signatures to be useful for legally binding declarations of intention,
e.g. for business transactions, contract agreement, etc. Signers should be
prevented from being able to repudiate a signature they created with their
2Not taking into account data compression of the clear text before encryption or
padding.
62 3.1. PKI IN A NUTSHELL
private key. Given the strength of the underlying digital signature scheme,
the only plausible reason to do so is that their private key got lost or became
broken. Therefore, EU legislation dictates that cryptographic devices like
SmartCards, which had to undergo a security evaluation, should be used
to store the private key. Such devices apply the private key for signature
computation, but do not reveal it to the outside.
According to the EU directive 1999/93/EG [181], “electronic signatures”
may have three different legal qualities as an evidence. Only for two of those
levels, namely advanced and qualified signatures, digital signatures in a cryp-
tographic sense are compulsory. The main differences between those two
levels is the fact that the latter one requires the private key to exist only on
a SmartCard and that the binding of the key pair to an identity is confirmed
by an appropriate authority. German laws allow to use (with a few excep-
tions only) qualified signatures in place of handwritten signatures [144]. An
equipment for qualified signatures (consisting of a SmartCard, an approved
card reader and appropriate software) and the service of certificate renewal
still costs a significant amount of money compared with the possible benefits
for individual users. For instance, people buy goods online without caring
about digital signatures and they only have one or two situations a year
where digital signatures may be useful for the communication with public
administration. Benefits are thus more on the administration’s or on enter-
prise users’ side [155]. Besides, the effective legal value of an advanced, but
non-qualified, signature is not yet clear.
Message Authentication Codes Non-repudiability is currently a rare
requirement in practice. On the other hand, as we have already pointed out
in Section 2.1.3, repudiability indeed might be a desirable feature. Crypto-
graphic authentication protocols should also avoid hidden challenge seman-
tics, i.e. messages that are determined completely by one party and signed
by the other one. For example, this was a privacy issue with an earlier pro-
posal for an authentication protocol for electronic passports [236]. A more
profane reason not to use asymmetric crypto is performance. Hash-based
message authenticity codes (MACs) consist – roughly speaking – of a hash
function depending on a secret key. They can only be used between parties
that agree on a common secret in a separate way.
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3.1.5 Public Key Distribution
Since knowledge of the public encryption (resp. signature verification) key
does not allow to derive the private decryption (resp. signature) key, the
former can be made publicly available for everyone without affecting security.
A way to publish such information could for instance be a public directory
similar to a phone book (as already proposed by Diffie and Hellman), a
personal or corporate Web page, the footer of an email, or a business card.
(Users of the PGP system often use one or more of these three possibilities to
disseminate their public key or at least its “fingerprint” or “thumbprint”, i.e.
a hash value, and a reference to the whole key, which can then be downloaded
from a public key server – see below.)
The fact that public keys can be made public allows to solve the key
exchange problem elegantly. Given the electronic equivalent of a telephone
book that stores the public encryption keys instead of the phone number
of each user, confidential communication is possible even in an open user
community and especially without prior out-of-band key exchange. In this
setting, the implicit assumption is made that public keys retrieved from the
directory are authentic, i.e. the lookup process returns the genuine public
key of a certain entity. This point is crucial as Mallory, the attacker, may
try to make Bob believe that a public key belongs to his communicant Alice
when in fact it belongs to Mallory. As a consequence, Bob might be tricked
into inadvertently encrypting a message for Alice with Mallory’s public key.
(A similar attack is possible in the case of signature verification keys.)
There are basically three, significantly different, ways of ensuring a public
key’s authenticity. Each of these variants has its pros and cons. Although
the third variant is the one used most often, the other two also have their
justification in practice.
(i) The simplest approach is for Alice and Bob to exchange their public
keys bilaterally and in an out-of-band fashion. This guarantees a high
level of confidence when Alice and Bob know each other or authenti-
cate with each other using official paper documents, e.g. a passport or
company badge. However, this scheme suffers from nearly the same
weaknesses as pairwise out-of-band secret key exchange outlined in
Section 3.1.2, namely practicability and scalability, with the exception
that the communication must not be confidential, but authentic in the
present case.
64 3.1. PKI IN A NUTSHELL
(ii) An appealing idea is to rely on the trustworthiness of the source of
information, i.e. Bob would always assume that the key repository re-
turns the genuine key attributed to the person Bob asked for. From a
user’s viewpoint, this reduces the problem to ensuring that the repos-
itory cannot be tampered with (i.e. the information’s integrity is pre-
served), the assumption that the repository as a third party works in
due form, and the communication channel back from the repository to
the requesting user applies some form of authentication. The first and
the second requirement are out of a user’s scope. Compared to variant
(i), the authenticity of an entire electronic repository can usually not
be verified directly (while this works for a printed phone book, which
an attacker is unlikely to forge).3
A similar mechanism is used for the dissemination of public keys, which
are pre-installed in operating systems (shipped on a CD), applications
(downloaded from a repudiable Web site), and the like.
(iii) A drawback of the second variant is the fact that the authentication
only covers the source of information, but not the data itself. With
entity authentication, however, the data retrieved from the directory
is only useful for the requesting party, but cannot be verified by others
(including the party itself at a later point in time). This limitation can
be overcome by letting a trusted party issue “digital IDs” that bind an
identity to a public key and that are digitally signed by the issuer –
comparable to the analogue of a paper ID card. The idea of public key
certificates (or digital certificates) is due to Kohnfelder [146]. Certifi-
cates form the basis for an infrastructure that provides the authenticity
of public keys (a public key infrastructure or PKI for short).
3.1.6 Digital Certificates and Public Key Infrastructures
In the previous section, we motivated the need for verifying the authenticity
of public keys and explained different mechanisms to do so.
In a narrower sense, a public key infrastructure can be seen as a security
infrastructure. Such an infrastructure lets participants communicate with
3In fact, the Bundesnetzagentur as the German authority for a digital signature in-
frastructure uses a similar mechanism. The public keys retrieved from the “white list”
directory are authentic per definitionem.
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each other securely using public key cryptography and allows them to verify
each others keys with the help of certificates and trust relations. A formal
calculus of trust in the authenticity of public keys is due to Maurer [162].
In this model participants can compute a numeric value indicating how
much confidence they have in a certain public key (based on their own,
incomplete view of the whole set of certificates). The model captures the
idea of certificates as well as the notion of direct trust (first variant in 3.1.5)
and indirect trust (“I trust you to vouch for another person’s key” – variant
(ii) or (iii) in 3.1.5).
In a broader sense, the term PKI also captures the technical infrastruc-
ture behind the certificate and trust infrastructure. This view, taken for
instance by [8], comprises a number of concrete services (like issuance, stor-
age, and revocation of certificates, the generation, backup, and recovery of
keys, time stamping and so on) and logical components (like certification
authority, registration authority, directories etc.). This perspective leads us
to the notion of a trustcenter, i.e. a trustworthy organization that delivers
one or more of those services to its customers. We have a closer look on the
internal processes of a trustcenter in Section 5.1.2.
It will become clear from the context whether we speak of a PKI in the
narrower or broader sense in the following. When speaking of PKI, some
people implicitly mean an X.509-based infrastructure or assume a particular
(the “centralized” or “hierarchical”) trust model. Both constraints probably
hold for the majority of actual PKIs (in the broader sense). Although most
of the existing PKI-enabled applications are X.509-based, we do not a priori
exclude others as the analysis and results of this thesis also apply to them.
ID Card Analogon We have already introduced the concept of a pub-
lic key certificate in the preceding section and linked it to ID cards and the
like. Certificates are similar in that they contain a unique serial number, the
name of the issuer and the subject (i.e. key holder), their affiliation and/or
location, a validity period, possible usage clarifications (“for all countries”,
“for signatures and financial transactions up to 10.000 EUR” etc.). Certifi-
cates are digitally signed by the issuer. As a consequence, if Alice obtains a
certificate purporting to be Bob’s and signed by Trent, Alice has to obtain
Trent’s authentic signature verification key, then check the integrity of his
signature on the certificate, and then trust Trent that he in fact diligently
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verified Bob’s identity before issuing the certificate (like it should be the
case with the issuance of ID cards).
Certificate Chains As we can see, the problem shifts to ensuring the
authenticity of Trent’s public key. Trent may in turn have a certificate for
his public key signed by Trudy, then Trudy’s signature has to be verified
and so on. Such a series of certificates where the issuer of certificate i is the
subject of certificate i+1 is called a certificate chain. Obviously, such chains
cannot continue ad infinitum. The authenticity of the public key of the last
entity in the chain can only be established by one of the other means listed
in Section 3.1.5. Finally, this always boils down to the non-technical issue
of trust. The last public key in the chain is thus called a trust anchor.
Trust Models A lot of research effort has been put on the role of trust in
the areas of cryptography and security (see [162] for an overview). Different
trust models have evolved that differ in the entities that are assumed as
trustworthy.
Very often the distinction between the centralized and the decentralized
trust model is made alongside the different certificate standards, namely
X.509 [52] and PGP/OpenPGP [48]. This is short-sighted as the centralized
model can also be implemented with PGP certificates. On the other hand, a
decentralized approach would technically be possible with X.509 certificates,
but X.509-based clients only support the centralized approach.
In a centralized model only a few dedicated players issue certificates to
a large number of subjects. Such parties are called certification authorities
(CAs) in contrast to end entities that cannot issue certificates. They might
be official institutions like public authorities, commercial or non-profit orga-
nizations like banks or universities respectively. The amount of trust relying
parties place in such CAs strongly depends on their overall reputation and
the security of their certification process. As such, professional CAs take
pains to provide a high level of security working with skilled personnel, eval-
uated and certified hard- and software, extensive physical security measures
etc. Such installations are therefore also called trustcenters. CAs often form
hierarchies, e.g. VeriSign has one so-called topmost or “root CA” and several
subordinate CAs for different purposes. We also speak of root certificates
omitting the CA in between.
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The so-called web-of-trust or decentralized model is a generalization as
all players can issue certificates, no matter whether they are individuals
or large organizations. This property makes up the main difference to a
purely CA-based PKI. As a consequence, there is typically more than one
certificate chain for a certain public key, so public keys can “accumulate”
trust. Each user has the freedom to judge the authenticity of a public key
based on the number of disjoint chains, their lengths, and the trust placed
in the intermediaries.
Personal Security Environment The storage location of an individual’s
private key is called a personal security environment (PSE). Private keys
can be stored in a so-called software or hardware PSE (also called softtoken
and hardtoken). Depending on the enrolment process, PSEs are produced
in a trustcenter or by the certificate holder himself. We also use the term
credential when speaking of private keys, which indicates their use for strong
authentication.
A software PSE is a piece of data on the file system that can be protected
by a password (or another key), for instance according to the PKCS#8
and PKCS#12 standards [195, 196]. If the PKCS#12 format is used to
protect a private key when send from the trustcenter to an end entity, one
also uses the term “transport PIN” or “transport password”. In order to
access the private key inside a softtoken, the user has to provide a password.
Depending on the application, the key may or may not be cached in memory
until it is used the next time. One also uses the term key store (or key
ring) to denote a file that contains private keys as well as other parties’
certificates in a confidential and integrity-protected way respectively. Apart
from PKCS#12, Java key stores or the containers of Microsoft’s CryptoAPI
for instance provide the same functionality.
Obviously, softtokens have some shortcomings from a security perspec-
tive. For instance, they can be copied easily when stored on a network drive.
Hardtokens are devices like SmartCards (requiring an additional reader) or
USB sticks (ready to plug in without additional hardware). Hardtokens are
designed to implement a two-factor authentication (possession of the token
and knowledge of a PIN) and to make the theft and/or illegitimate use of
private keys nearly impossible. An important characteristic of hardtokens
is the fact that they do not hand out the private key to the application, but
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compute the necessary operations on their own. However, this does not com-
pletely prevent fraud as a signature application may show a document on
the screen while letting the hardtoken sign the hash value of another. This
is called the presentation problem as USB sticks or card readers typically do
not have the ability to display the whole document to be signed [70].
Revocation Management PSEs might get lost or destroyed. As a secu-
rity precaution, PKIs allow to revoke certificates of end entities or even CAs
when the private key is suspected or known to be in danger or unusable. We
describe the way of how this situation is handled in an X.509-based PKI. A
certificate revocation list (CRL) according to the X.509 standard contains
the serial number, the revocation date, and optionally the revocation reason.
It is digitally signed by the CA that issued the certificate or a proxy thereof.
In the latter case, one uses the term “indirect CRL”. CRLs are updated
on a regular basis, say once per month, and immediately if a certificate is
revoked. CRLs are usually distributed according to the ”pull model” which
means that clients have to retrieve the information from the CA. OCSP [168]
is a client/server protocol that, in contrast to CRLs, provides real-time in-
formation about the status of a particular certificate. Support for CRLs
and/or OCSP is crucial when certificates have a long validity (for instance,
some of the VeriSign certificates that are shipped with Windows XP have a
30 years lifetime).
3.2 Challenges
In the previous section, we laid out the main concepts of cryptography and
PKI. We did this mostly without referring to their concrete realization or
actual implementations, which we will catch up on now. This section is en-
titled “challenges” as some of the tasks necessary to put PKI into practice
require elaborate technical mechanisms or even fall into the category “left
as an exercise” we introduced in Section 2.1.4. Therefore applications which
fail to address these challenges suffer from usability problems. Among the
tasks discussed here are the lookup and validation of certificates, the secure
and reliable management of credentials and the interpretation of policies
and trust models. These issues were taken into consideration for the orga-
nization of the evaluation framework in Section 3.3. This thesis proposes
new solutions to some of the problems in Chapter 5 to 7; the corresponding
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references are given below. In what follows we often have an X.509-based
PKI in mind (especially when referring to technical details), but the obser-
vations hold for PGP-based PKIs in a very similar way. Plus, looking at
other technologies gives us further insights about innovative approaches.
We remark that the evolving technologies of identity-based encryption
and identity-based signatures (IBE, IBS, see [210, 33]) is no panacea to the
challenges listed below. IBE offers no end-to-end security as it requires
trusted third parties, the so-called private key generators (PKG). In order
to make use of IBE, the encrypting party has to know the parameters of
the PKG (an issue of information access as described in Section 3.2.4) and
check their authenticity (similar to obtaining an authentic root certificate,
see Section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 Certificate Validation
Let us first look at certificate validation, which is a frequent task in a PKI.
Certificate validation occurs each time the authenticity of a public key is
checked before the key is applied to verify a signature or to encrypt data.
The following aspects have to be taken care of. The presentation is guided by
the one in [212], an algorithmic and much more comprehensive description
can be found in RFC 3280 [128]. The complexity of the RFC-compliant
validation is illustrated, e.g. by the flow chart depicted in [43], Mun˜oz et al.
describe certificate validation as “one of the toughest scalability problems
in a PKI” [167]. Due to this high complexity the process might exhaust the
resources of, for instance, mobile devices. Proposals have been made to allow
the delegation of one or more steps (like lookup, signature verification etc.)
to dedicated parties, so-called validation authorities (see e.g. RFC 3029 [6]
or the New Security Infrastructure NSI proposal by Fraunhofer-Institute
SIT [129]). Unless not explicitly stated otherwise, we restrict ourselves to
the so-called shell validity model.
Certificate Chain Building The correctness of the signature of a cer-
tificate is checked by applying the issuing CA’s public key. In order to
check in turn the authenticity of this key, the whole certificate chain has
to be processed. PKI-enabled applications build the certificate path auto-
matically based on their locally available information (contained in their
certificate store and possibly retrieved online). This is not an issue users
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have to cope with as long as the certificates of the entire chain are at hand,
valid, and trusted. In case the public key of the last certificate in the chain
is untrusted or an intermediate certificate is invalid (for one of the reasons
listed below), this also requires a positive, manual security decision about
the trust anchor, an intermediate CA, or the end entity certificate itself.
Validity Period The currency for each certificate in the chain is also
checked. In the shell model this requires that the current point of time (i.e.
the time when the validation algorithm is executed) lies in the validity inter-
val defined by the certificate. Otherwise the applications treat the certificate
in question always as invalid – although this does obviously not imply that
the key is insecure. At first sight, this constraint seems rather simple to
meet and enforce.
However, we know of no PKI-enabled application which automatically
ensures that the clock on the end user’s computer is up-to-date, e.g. via
the Network Time Protocol [166]. For instance, Firefox at least reminds the
user to check that the local time is correct, but Microsoft applications simply
state that “the certificate has expired or is not yet valid” (they all behave
likewise as they share the same operating system libraries for certificate and
key handling).
On the other hand, there are often no mechanisms established to guar-
antee the automatic renewal of certificates before they expire. We already
mentioned in Section 2.2.2.3 that, unfortunately, one in eight SSL web pages
presents a certificate chain to web browsers where one or more certificates
are not yet or no more valid. Among those are the web sites of banks or for
instance of a security conference4 – i.e. sites maintained by people who re-
ally should know better. Although this does not necessarily mean a security
breach, as we argued above, it is very critical from a usability point of view:
As SSL warnings appear so often for no good reason, users get conditioned
to ignore them generally no matter what the respective situation is like.
Certificate Extensions and Semantics Version 3 of the X.509 stan-
dard allows to include extensions in a certificate. While there are only 16
so-called standard extensions (plus two more defined by the PKIX working
group of the IETF in [128]), each CA in turn is free to define its own, pri-
4https://amsl-smb.cs.uni-magdeburg.de/sicherheit2006/
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Figure 3.1: Critical Extended Key Usage extension, Mozilla certificate view.
vate extensions and encode the corresponding data into its certificates. An
extension is simply a triple, consisting of a name-value pair of a globally
unique object identifier (OID) and the corresponding value plus an addi-
tional flag that allows to mark the respective extension as “critical”. If this
flag is set, applications that do not know how to treat a certificate with a
private extension (as they do not recognize the respective OID) must reject
the certificate as invalid. For instance Mozilla in its certificate view does
not resolve the name of some standard extensions properly, these extensions
are only listed by their OID and the data is not interpreted (see Figure 3.1).
Applications are free to ignore the additional information if the extension
is non-critical. This rule easily renders the semantics of certificate contents
unclear and could affect the interoperability of certificates negatively [114].
Even severe security holes can arise from interpretation elbowroom con-
cerning extension attributes as experience has shown [230, 63]. Microsoft’s
CryptoAPI and the Linux web browser Konqueror were found to not handle
the basicConstraints extension properly. This well-known extension indi-
cates whether the corresponding key pair belongs to a CA or not (remember
that the main characteristic of the centralized trust model is the fact that
only CAs are allowed to issue certificates). CryptoAPI and Konqueror re-
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garded certificates without this extension as CA certificates – in violation
of the X.509 standard.5 The consequences are indeed very security-critical
with respect to, for instance, phishing web sites that can obtain a “valid”
SSL certificate exploiting this weakness: A free email certificate from a CA
which is a pre-installed trust anchor would do to issue a certificate for a web
site of the attacker’s choice.
Revocation Checking The last component of certificate validation in-
volves CRLs or OCSP. Every certificate in the chain should be checked
against a fresh CRL or with the help of an OCSP responder. However,
these features are often implemented rudimentarily in current PKI-enabled
applications [44]. Clients that are ready for CRL processing or OCSP access
differ in the way they handle status information. For instance, Mozilla sup-
ports manual CRL import via HTTP and automatic updates under the given
URL. Thunderbird (version 1.0) in turn does without status information at
all.
The question of how to exactly check the revocation status of a certificate
is often left as an exercise to the end user. The decision whether to use
CRLs and OCSP at all and the choice what to do in case a fresh CRL
or OCSP response is not available, is left to each individual application or
the user respectively. As a consequence, the semantics may vary. Mozilla
for instance regards a certificate as valid when OCSP is deactivated, but
considers it invalid if OCSP is activated and the responder cannot be reached
due to network problem. In contrast to that, Outlook Express (version 6)
may tell the user that the certificate is “not revoked or the corresponding
information could not be determined” indicating that it equates the status
“not revoked” with the status “unknown”. A uniform policy (including
caching rules and the definition of update intervals) is thus hard to enforce
with current standard clients. A related problem is the fact that certificates
often do not indicate how and where the corresponding status information
can be found (see below).
3.2.2 Managing Trust Anchors
We dedicate a whole section to the issue of trust anchors and especially
certificate fingerprint verification for two reasons. On the one hand, the
5This bug is now fixed by Windows Service Pack 2 and newer versions of Konqueror.
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(manual and/or out-of-band) verification of trust anchors is extremely im-
portant from a security perspective. On the other hand, unfortunately, there
are very few mechanisms that make this process comfortable for users. Often
enough this process requires the manual comparison of, say 20 hexadecimal
characters.6 As a consequence, users skip this step (implicitly or explicitly)
and do not check trust anchors at all [92]. From a security perspective, this
is intolerable.
PGP It is very likely that the awareness and experience with respect to
manual fingerprint verification is highest in the PGP user community. The
verification of new peers’ keys is crucial for the functioning of the PGP
web of trust as otherwise users cannot find appropriate certificate paths.
Fingerprint verification has less relevance in the context of a centralized PKI,
where it only occurs occasionally. End users typically ensure the authenticity
of CAs’ keys, which only account for a small portion of all keys. Nevertheless,
the idea of openness forces end users sooner or later into adding new trust
anchors as they communicate with men or machines outside their own PKI.
There is a certain difference as a personal contact between the peers is more
likely in the PGP world as with CAs. Commercial CAs offer hotlines where
(in theory) the fingerprint of their certificates can be asked for over the
telephone. There is some anecdotal evidence with the German division of
VeriSign Inc. that this mechanism fails in practice as service employees do
not know what to do in such a situation [154].
Windows Certificate Store Adding a new certificate into the Windows
certificate store takes six steps, a process which has proven to make high
demands on users [17]. Concentrating only on the fifth and most critical
dialogue, there is criticism both from a usability and a security perspective.
The dialogue, which is shown in Figure 3.2, at least violates the design
principles of error tolerance, suitability for learning, and self-descriptiveness:
It is difficult to undo a click on the “yes” button as this would mean to
navigate through the certificate view in Microsoft’s Management Console,
a tool unfamiliar to most users. Furthermore, the window does neither
emphasize how security-critical the task is, nor does it provide clues how to
6This figure holds for a SHA-1 or RIPEMD-160 fingerprint. As the security of the
SHA-1 hash function has recently been called into question, longer fingerprints with 224,
256, or 512 bit (i.e. 28, 32, or 64 characters) will be used in the medium term.
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verify the fingerprints. Besides, the translation of “root” into the German
word “Stamm” (instead of “Wurzel”) is non-standard terminology.
Figure 3.2: Adding a trust anchor to the Windows certificate store.
What is Missing As we can see, the system does not ensure that the user
indeed verifies the fingerprint (which admittedly is a hard question) or at
least is aware of her decision. Plus, the Windows certificate store does not
keep a record, which would allow to later distinguish certificates that are pre-
configured from trust anchors added by the user herself including for instance
the date of import or the origin of the certificate. Compare this to the way
software is downloaded and installed from the Internet – a process which can
also have far-reaching security implications: A lot of people run anti-virus
software and personal firewalls on their machine, which examine the code
and stem malicious behaviour. Plus, software from unknown sources can be
run in a quarantine environment, a “sandbox”, where it cannot do harm.
A similar mechanism for the “installation” of new root certificates does not
exist. In our opinion this could be a promising starting point for further
research.
The common way to shield end users from fingerprint verification (on
the individual level) is to deliver pre-configured trust anchors in operating
systems, browsers, email clients, and other PKI-enabled applications. For
instance, more than 200 root CA certificates come with Windows XP.7 It
remains unclear which were the criteria the selection of the software manu-
facturer is based on and what security level is achieved (see also the discus-
sion about policies in Section 3.2.3). It is therefore essential that users are
7Gutmann [116] extended this idea somewhat in putting third parties like ISPs in
charge of providing clients with trust anchors. This process should happen transparently
during dial-in, comparable to DHCP (dynamic host configuration protocol) bootstrapping.
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– at least in principle – able to check the authenticity of keys on their own.
Interestingly enough, some applications (e.g. Konqueror or Opera) do not
at all offer the possibility to view certificate details including the fingerprint
of CA certificates used to issue SSL certificates for web servers.
On the enterprise level, PKIs may decide to cross-certify, i.e. the root
CAs mutually certify each other, or to join a bridge CA. A bridge CA is
often a separate CA that issues certificates to existing CAs, making them a
subordinate CA, or cross-certifies with each of them. The European Bridge-
CA8 for example interconnects PKIs from a handful of larger companies
(Allianz Group, Deutsche Bank, Siemens, Deutsche Telekom) and some Ger-
man trustcenters. It is no bridge CA in the strict sense, but uses a so-called
certificate trust list, i.e. a container of root CA certificates which is digitally
signed. The rationale behind this is to provide relying parties with authentic
CA certificates, but to let them chose which ones to trust. Both the list and
the signer’s X.509 certificate can be downloaded by everybody from the web
page. The PKCS#7 data structure however cannot be processed without
additional software on a Windows platform therefore limiting its value for
the masses.
Manual Fingerprint Verification Let us look once again at how PGP
users handle the task of fingerprint verification. Fingerprints are distributed
by various means, for example, they can be found on business cards, web
pages, or email footers. Relying parties could compare the received finger-
print and the one computed out of the downloaded certificate to ensure the
authenticity of the public key. So-called key signing parties, where people
meet in person to mutually exchange their keys and mutually issue certifi-
cates, are popular in the community. Fingerprints can be compared over the
phone by exchanging strings of hexadecimal characters or a representation
which assigns words of the English language to each byte (e.g. the value F8
is mapped to the word “Vulcan”).
Manual fingerprint verification has proven to be feasible for occasional
use, but it does not scale well and can get tedious for a larger number
of communicants. Therefore, some applications, for instance Secos9 try to
make things easier for users. Their idea is to present some sort of “cloze
8http://www.bridge-ca.org
9See http://www.secos.org. Secos is an application suite for secure email as well
as secure instant messaging and file transfer. Its certificate and messaging formats are
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test” that has to be filled in (see Figure 3.3.). This reduces the number of
characters that has to be typed in manually, and on the other hand it ensures
that the user really has gone through the verification process (as “guessing”
the missing 8 characters by filling in arbitrary data is nearly impossible). We
are in favour of such an approach as it reduces the overhead for users, allows
to keep track of the keys that have been verified, and – where applicable –
enforces the verification policy.10
Figure 3.3: “Cloze test” for manual key fingerprint verification in Secos.
3.2.3 Certificate Policies
We have already touched upon policy issue in the two preceding sections.
There is another area where security policies are relevant, namely a trust-
center’s certificate policy (CP), “a named set of rules that indicates the
proprietary, but the trust model has strong similarities to that of PGP, although the
terminology is also proprietary.
10Observe that such a “cloze test” mechanism has to be designed carefully as the
effective length of the hash value is diminished, which in turn increases an attacker’s
chance to find a key pair with the same fingerprint (second pre-image). The source code
of Secos is not (yet) available, therefore the details of the verification method remain
unknown (e.g. the hash function or the way the gaps are arranged).
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applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of ap-
plications with common security requirements” [52]. The purpose of a cer-
tificate practice statement (CPS) is to refine the CP and to document the
practices which a trustcenter employs in issuing certificates. We can see in
Chapter 5 that there are numerous security aspects a trustcenter has to take
care of.
A relying party can judge the trustworthiness of a CA according to in-
ternal processes and protection measures as well as legal assertions (e.g.
warranties, liability in the case of fraud) which are put down in writing in
a CP and a CPS. In this section, we argue that the idea of having differ-
ent security levels from CAs expressed in the corresponding CP and CPS
is somewhat reduced to absurdity as there is no client-side integration or
support to help users access and interpret this information.
Certificate Classes Important criteria are the type of the subject’s PSE
and the way how the identity of an end entity (a person or a machine, e.g.
a web server) to be certified is checked: For instance, a very weak form of
identity check is applied for gratis or low-cost email certificates where only
the subject’s ability to access a certain email account is verified. Some trust-
centers call these “class 1” certificates as they only provide a low confidence
and liability level. In order to receive a class 3 or 4 certificate, subjects must
use a hardtoken and establish a personal contact to a registration author-
ity of the trustcenter where they present their ID card and possibly further
paper credentials (the labelling with class A, B, and C is a similar scheme).
Some trustcenters, the trust anchors of which are pre-configured in com-
mon browsers, offer SSL certificates for about $ 50 a year. In this case, the
identity of the organization running the server is checked only via a contact
email entry in the DNS (domain name system) record.
It is obvious that there can be huge differences between various trustcen-
ters and certificate classes. Despite this fact, current PKI-enabled clients do
not indicate the confidence level one might have in a certificate. In particular
they do not distinguish between high-assurance and low-end certificates in a
way such that end users can percept it easily. There is a technical standard
within X.509 to let a certificate refer to the policy under which it was issued.
Inspecting the certificates that come with a fresh Windows XP installation,
one finds out that only few of the commercial trustcenters make use of the
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corresponding certificatePolicies extension. We do not conceal the fact
that including this extension anyway does not help very much:
Open Issues Firstly, it only contains the OID of the CP and/or CPS or a
hyperlink to these documents at best. According to Gutmann [114], earlier
VeriSign certificates used to hard-code parts of the policy directly in the
certificate or even in the Outlook Express client (sic!). A more recent exam-
ple are certificates of the German root CA for qualified digital signatures.
These certificates in fact include a policy identifier (1.3.36.8.1.1), but one
cannot obtain the policy from the Bundesnetzagentur (as the operator of
the trustcenter) neither via WWW, nor by email.
Secondly, the interpretation of the CP is left to the user alone, there is
no easy and user-friendly way to assess the trustworthiness and confidence
or liability level at a glance or to compare different policies. Some CAs have
gone into the habit including “class x” into the DN, but this would only
help if users inspect the certificates manually. However, if they do so, they
should be prepared to sometimes discover strange name components like
“OU = NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriSign, Inc.”. This deficit
also complicates the management of trust anchors for users. Consider for
instance the new PKI of the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft that plans to issue
certificates both to employees (and servers) of the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft
as well as for external business partners [20]. While internal users will be
equipped with hardware PSEs, external users will only receive softtokens
issued in a simplified enrolment process. Consequently, two different CAs
for internal and external users respectively will be set up. However, those
two CAs could not be joint together under a common root CA (which would
make validation easier). A single trust anchor would not allow to distinguish
between the different policies and security levels. One thus had to resort to
use two disconnected root CAs and to hope that relying parties will recognize
the difference when importing the trust anchors.
3.2.4 Information and Service Access
Fundamental tasks like retrieving a communicant’s certificate or obtaining
a key pair and a certificate pose major hurdles to PKI users as it is often
unclear how and where to find the necessary information.
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Getting One’s Own Certificate Obtaining a key pair and the corre-
sponding X.509 certificate is harder as it sounds. In contrast to the PGP
community. where user can easily generate their own keys “on the fly” (with
the PGP software itself) and distribute them in in the form of self-signed
certificates, this is no common practice for X.509-based clients in the light
of the centralized trust model. PKI-enabled applications offer some support
for end users, but the integration with the certificate application process is
very loose. Outlook’s dialogue windows for the configuration of user key
pairs and certificates for digital signature and decryption contains a link to
Microsoft’s web pages. Here three certification service providers from the
U.S. are listed that offer class 1 certificates for free or for $ 20 respectively.
Outlook Express also contains a button “request digital ID”, but nobody at
Microsoft seems to care that the corresponding hyperlink is broken. Mozilla
refers to a web page with more than a dozen, international CAs.
In most cases key pairs can be generated and the corresponding certifi-
cates request through a standard web browser, which is favourable from a
usability point of view. However, experiences indicate that it “takes a skilled
technical user between 30 minutes and 4 hours work to obtain a certificate
from a public CA that performs little to no verification” [116] – needless to
say that this is deterrent. There is a particular difficulty when using non-
Microsoft email clients and/or alternative browsers on a Windows operating
system: users may be forced to find out how to export a key pair from the
browser, which generated it and transmitted the request to the CA, and
import it into the email client.
Getting Other People’s Certificate Let us now turn to the problem
of retrieving a communicant’s certificate. The most common mechanism to
store certificates and make them available to relying parties in an X.509-
based PKI is a central LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) di-
rectory maintained by the trustcenter [8]. Although LDAP is a relic from
the time of X.500 [51] directories (that “invented” X.509 certificates as their
authentication mechanism), it is supported by current email clients. The
lookup of a certificate works fairly well (and merely transparent with the
sole exception of the short delay an LDAP request may cause) provided
the email address of the communicant and the network address of the cor-
rect LDAP server is known (and there are no multiple entries per per-
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son [115]). The latter condition can be a problem as companies do not
open their directory to the general public at all or do not publish its ad-
dress (in order to hide possibly sensitive information, e.g. their internal
structure). Especially there is no “canonical name” for the certificate di-
rectory belonging to a certain domain name. Compare this to the situation
with the World Wide Web. If one knows the email address, for instance
tstraub@cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de, of a person, one can easily
infer the name www.cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de of the web server
of the corresponding organization by adding the canonical prefix to the do-
main part. PKI would benefit from a similar established mechanism for
certificate lookup, e.g. by a canonical name or an extension to DNS. (Need-
less to say that the problem of certificate lookup goes hand in hand with the
difficulty of finding out the configuration settings for e.g. OCSP responders
or CRL distribution points when they are not explicitly indicated in the
certificates themselves.)
What Can Be Done In an X.509-based PKI, a common, yet ad-hoc so-
lution to disseminate certificates for encryption keys is to sign all outgoing
mail automatically. RSA key pairs can be used both for encryption and
digital signatures, so a recipient of a digitally signed email may answer the
sender in encrypted form. This requires not only that a common key pair
is used, which may interfere with the need for key backup or shared use of
credentials (see below), but that the recipient can successfully validate the
sender’s certificate. If the corresponding trust anchor is unknown to the
recipient, current implementations create more cognitive and operational
overhead showing warning messages and demanding immediate security de-
cisions from the user [92]. Therefore this approach is only of limited value.
The problem of certificate dissemination is elegantly solved with PGP:
There are only a handful of so-called key servers, they synchronize with each
other, one or more key servers are already pre-configured in PGP-enabled
applications, and new public keys can be published easily (even by the key
holders themselves or third parties). Secos implements a similar mechanism
in that it uses only a single, system-wide server. In this respect however, it is
a closed system violating our postulate of openness. For instance, for secure
messaging users have to set up a new email address on the Secos server
(those addresses are internally indicated by a double @ sign, see Figure 3.3).
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Clearly, a concentration on only a few certificate directories will not hap-
pen with centralized PKIs, not least because organizations or trustcenters
may not want to loose control over “their” data. An interesting alternative,
however, is the setup of intermediaries in the form of meta-directories that
offer a “single point of entry” to a multitude of directories. This idea is
realized by the so-called LDAP proxy described in [76]. Such a proxy acts
as a mediator, transparently passing on client requests to a possibly large
number of physical directory servers. Among the advantages of the proxy
are its centralized configuration and the possibility to filter out sensitive
entries before returning an answer to the client. We are in favour of such
approaches as they facilitate the pure technical and auxiliary tasks without
affecting security.
In order to promote the dissemination of directory information, we sug-
gest a new, heuristic method how email users could extend their list of
LDAP directories. Assume that an incoming email carries a digital signa-
ture. Current clients also include at least the sender’s certificate or even the
whole certificate chain in order to assist the recipient in signature validation.
As clients have to parse the certificates anyway, they could automatically
add to their local list pointers to directories extracted from, for instance, the
CRLDistributionPoints extension if present. Again this approach does not
affect security, as new certificates are always validated prior to use. But if
the recipient already knows the authentic trust anchor of one communicant
of the PKI, she may benefit from this heuristic as she can then use other
certificates from that PKI, too.
3.2.5 PSE Management
Last but not least we point out some challenges in the area of PSE man-
agement. It is a characteristic of PKI that, with end-to-end security, re-
sponsibilities get shifted towards the end users (cf. page 56). In this con-
text challenges can arise from the requirement to handle passwords (which
are used to secure private keys), to manage key rollover and the renewal
of certificates, as well as practical business demands like vacation replace-
ments. Here we do not treat passwords further as they have been discussed
in Chapter 2 and they are also the subject of one of the sample modules in
Chapter 4.
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Key Rollover Key rollover is a periodic process in a PKI. It means that an
entity changes its key pair and obtains a new certificate. This process is also
called key/certificate renewal.11 We have seen in Section 3.2.1 that timely
key renewal is an issue with SSL server certificates. Let us now look on the
client side: PKI-enabled applications that use PSEs allow no automation of
rolling over to a new key. This again has negative implications for usability,
as there is no built-in mechanism. While this is typically not so critical
for keys that are used for authentication or digital signatures, it may cause
trouble with encryption keys, e.g. when used for secure email. Encrypted
emails are stored in the local mailbox in the same form as they were received
by the MUA (holds both for S/MIME and PGP). Subsequently the user
has therefore to provide her PSE each time when she wants to read such
messages again. In course of time, she changes her key pair over and over,
but she also has to keep a key history of old decryption keys the certificates
of which expired long ago. This is not only problematic from a security
angle (as old keys or algorithms may be easier to attack), but also from a
usability perspective: a growing number of PSEs has to be kept securely
and loss of one PSE implies data loss as well. Besides, the user is forced
to work with multiple devices if her private key are stored on hardtokens.
Current S/MIME-enabled MUA cannot cope with this problem. Additional
software like FlexiTrust 3.0 ReCrypt Tool for Outlook [82] has to fill the gap
as the MUA does not allow to decrypt all mails encrypted with an old key
and write them back on the hard disk re-encrypted with the current public
key. However the author knows of no such tools for other clients like Mozilla
or Thunderbird. Related to key rollover is the process of key backup, i.e.
the storage of copies of private keys at a secure location where they can be
regained from when the original key gets inaccessible. Prudent PKI design
always takes this question into consideration (see [20] for an example).
Delegation of Private Keys A typical situation is where an employee
is on holiday and the proxy should be given the possibility to access her
email. Assume that Alice has key pairs she uses for her business, individual
email and for authenticating at web portals. There are standard techniques
11One typically assumes implicitly that not only the certificate changes, but also the
key pair. CAs may issue a new certificate for the same key – this is called “certificate
update”. From a security point of view it is desirable to always generate a new key pair,
so this is no common practice.
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to forward email temporary or permanently to another address which Alice
can use if she is on holiday or a business trip and wants her replacement Bob
to access her mailbox. However, things work only fine as long as emails are
unencrypted as otherwise what gets forwarded to the proxy are unintelligible
messages. In Section 5.5.1 we show how one can solve this problem without
handing out the private key, neither to the mail server nor to the other
person.
In Chapter 7 we present a solution for delegating credentials in the form
of a private key for authentication. Temporarily delegating the ability to
access a service or resource on the web to a colleague is a natural require-
ment, but it is rarely supported originally on the server side. Consequently,
people have no choice other than sharing the respective PSE. Obviously,
this has negative security implications, especially when the same secret is
used for multiple purposes, e.g. the key pair is used for authentication and
encryption. Besides, this naive method does not allow to restrict the proxy’s
capabilities to a certain period of time or prevent him from further distrib-
uting the secret.
3.3 PKI Evaluation Tool
In this section, we present our tool to measure the usability and utility of
PKI-enabled applications with respect to their security features. Our eval-
uation tool can also serve as a design guideline and systematic check list for
software developers who have to cope with the before-mentioned challenges.
Sample applications of the tool are the topic of Section 3.4 and 3.5. The
evaluation and rating process resembles that of evaluating security prod-
ucts as proposed in the Common Criteria [1]. Since the Common Criteria
methodology is an ISO standard and receives worldwide acceptance, we con-
sider it a reasonable basis for our approach, too. Throughout our framework
we often use the term user. Depending on the concrete scenario, this may
either denote an end-user or an administrator.
Before the evaluation categories are described in detail in Section 3.3.2
to 3.3.4, their organization and the idea of usability profiles are explained
in the first two sections.
84 3.3. PKI EVALUATION TOOL
3.3.1 Organisation
3.3.1.1 Evaluation Categories
In all, our framework consists of 15 evaluation categories which are evenly
spread in three groups named deployment issues, ergonomics, and security
features. The motivation behind this choice is Schneier’s famous saying ”se-
curity is a process, not a product” [206]. We thus have to follow an integral
approach and must not restrict ourselves solely to ergonomics or technical
features. To illustrate the ideas behind each category and to simplify the
evaluator’s task, we propose a number of exemplary questions. These cen-
tral questions have to be investigated throughout the evaluation to obtain
a category score.
In order to make use of a PKI-enabled product, it has to be deployed.
For this reason, the first category group is named deployment issues. For
instance, the user has to obtain the product and install its components,
which often means that he has to be familiarized with the PKI features
before being able to use them. We turn in detail to the deployment issues
in Section 3.3.2. With the unmotivated user property P1 of Figure 2.4 in
mind, this category should not be underestimated.
Secondly, the handling of a PKI-enabled application in service is dis-
cussed in the category group ergonomics. In a classical sense this category
group is the core of any usability. Typical categories of ergonomics are the
composition of the menus and dialogues, respectively, and the help system
available. We present the central questions of ergonomics in Section 3.3.3.
The categories defined so far may easily be adapted to other use cases
than PKI. However, the best product with respect to ergonomics is pointless,
if the use case specific security features are substandard. Our third category
group security features takes the properties P4 (barn door) and P5 (weakest
link) into account. It deals with the algorithms and key lengths in use, the
certificate management, and how the validation of a certificate may be done.
We turn to the security features in Section 3.3.4.
3.3.1.2 Usability Profiles
In order to obtain a quantitative measure, an evaluator will award points for
each category. The result of each category is an integer score in the interval
[−2, 2] where 0 denotes an average result, ±1 a little above/below average
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result and ±2 an outstanding/substandard result. The guidelines on how to
assign points are part of a so-called usability profile. A usability profile has
to be defined before the evaluation actually takes place. This can be done
based on the central questions of our framework. Each usability profile has
to list sample answers and a guideline on how to award points. We provide
appropriate clues in the following sections.
The definition of the usability profile may, for instance, be done by the
evaluator himself or by a usability specialist involved in the process. An
evaluation result has always to be interpreted with respect to the under-
lying usability profile. We point out that this procedure is analogous to
the definition of so-called protection profiles as described in the Common
Criteria.
Our framework allows for an adaptation to different environments since
the partial results of a category group are weighted to get an overall score.
The weight definition depends on the concrete usage scenario and is part of
the usability profile. Figure 3.4 shows three coarse examples for scenarios
with high security requirements and skilled personnel (e.g. in the military or
a research department), enterprise usage with low deployment and helpdesk
budgets (with average security demands), and a private usage scenario. Let
us quickly explain the proposed weighting in Figure 3.4 in case of private
usage: A private user is in general not supported by an administrator, that
is he has to deploy the PKI-enabled product himself. In addition, the un-
motivated user property P1 requires an easy to deploy and easy to install
application. Therefore, deployment is rather important that is why we assign
a weighting of 40% to this category group. The properties P2 (abstraction),
P3 (lack of feedback), and P4 (barn door) motivate a weighting of 40% for
the group ergonomics, too. Due to the small assets and threats in this sce-
Figure 3.4: Sample weightings of the category groups.
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nario, the security features are of secondary importance and thus weighted
by 20%.
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the category groups. The individual cat-
egories are explained in the remainder of Section 3.3.
Deployment Issues
Gathering Information and Obtaining the Software
Technical Requirements
Installation and Configuration
Technical Support
Training
Ergonomics
Menus and Dialogues
Transparency of the Security Features
Warning and Error Messages
Help System
Reaction in Potentially Threatening Situations
Security Features
Algorithms and Parameters
Secret Key Handling
Certificate Management
Status Information
Advanced Functionality
Table 3.1: PKI evaluation categories.
3.3.1.3 A Note on Evaluation Methods
To give the evaluators a maximum degree of freedom, we formulated the
framework in a way that does not prescribe a certain usability evaluation
method. This is mostly of interest for the category groups of deployment and
ergonomics, but may also have a certain relevance for the security features.
Consider for instance the way of how end users manage certificates and trust
settings.
Two classes of usability evaluation techniques are prevalent in the HCI
area today, namely empirical and informal methods; automatic and formal
methods only play a secondary part [176, 174]. Empirical methods assess us-
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ability with the help of “real” users, i.e. test subjects that are representative
of the actual user circle. In contrast to that, informal methods rely on the
ability of expert evaluators that inspect the user interface themselves. We
applied both types of methods for the evaluation of usability-related issues
in the context of our framework. A heuristic evaluation can be performed
based on the central questions given for each category in the generic ver-
sion of the framework or a specialization thereof. A cognitive walkthrough
method can, for instance, be used to pass through the steps necessary for
the initial system setup. For the Microsoft Usability Study we used a com-
bination of both approaches in a “pluralistic” way (as not only a single,
but two or three evaluators at a time inspected the interface together). For
the evaluation of trustcenter software we added a laboratory test based on
plausible usage scenarios.
3.3.2 Deployment Issues
First we turn to the category group deployment issues which describes the
prearrangements necessary to set up the system. The central questions listed
in the following mainly address property P1, i.e. the user’s little motivation
to really use built-in security features of existing software or to switch to
another application of the same kind for the sake of better support of PKI
features. Suppose that a computer administrator or an end-user chooses to
increase the level of enterprise-wide or personal security, respectively. Then
it should be made as easy as possible to realize this plan. People who once
tried to improve security but did not succeed are likely to get frustrated and
to give up.
In all, the deployment issues comprise the following categories: The
first step is gathering information about candidate products which is closely
related to the question of how the software itself can be obtained. Since
sophisticated applications tend to have special infrastructure demands, it is
necessary to consider technical requirements before installing and configur-
ing the application. During the latter two steps, there may arise the need
for technical support. Finally, it should be assessed how much training is
required for the product to be used securely. We present in detail the central
questions for each category in what follows.
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3.3.2.1 Gathering Information and Obtaining the Software
If an evaluator has no a priori knowledge of appropriate products, it is im-
portant that comprehensive information, maybe even an evaluation version,
of the software is easily available. In addition, analysis from professional
journals or experience reports found in news groups provide more neutral
and objective information. It goes without saying that the easier informa-
tion and the product itself are available, the better the rating is in this
category. Central questions are:
• How much meta information (surveys, tests etc.) comparing different
products of the same kind is available?
• Is there already enough experience about a product of recent date?
• Does the vendor offer precise product information on his web pages?
• How complicated is it to obtain the product, can it be purchased on-
line?
• Is it possible to upgrade an evaluation copy to a full version simply
by an activation code, i.e. without re-installing and re-configuring the
software?
3.3.2.2 Technical Requirements
A successful installation often depends on the technical environment in use.
For instance, the hardware of a five-year old PC is not sufficient to run
current server applications due to performance and memory restrictions.
Again, we refer to the unmotivated user property and stress that a good
PKI-enabled application should make it easy for users getting started with
it. It should ideally not require high-end hardware nor additional software
(e.g. special plugins) to do its task properly. These requirements can only
be rated in the light of the actual prerequisites, since some software, e.g. for
a certification authority, may in fact have very particular needs. We thus
propose that the easier it is for the user to fulfil the requirements of the
software, the better the application is rated. In this context, “easier” has to
be interpreted in terms of time or money.
• Is it possible to install and operate the application with existing hard-
and software?
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• Are multiple operating systems supported? Which ones?
• What about standard compliance and the application’s compatibility
with auxiliary programs?
• Does the installation require additional programs?
• If the application needs additional hard- or software: Which/how
many third-party products are supported?
3.3.2.3 Installation and Configuration
The background of this category is that proper installation and initial con-
figuration are crucial to security with respect to the barn door property P4.
On the one hand, there should be enough support, e.g. an installation wiz-
ard or a list of commonly used configurations, to guide the user. On the
other hand, the default configuration must provide an appropriate security
level. This is due to the consideration that it may be a security novice who
is installing the software and who is above all not interested in the security
features themselves but in getting the software running. An example is the
selection of cryptographic parameters like key sizes. While this does not
affect the functionality of the software, it is indeed security-relevant.
• Is there an installation wizard guiding an inexperienced user?
• Does the product offer to choose from predefined scenarios?
• How time-consuming, how difficult is it to adapt the configuration to
individual needs?
• How does the software check user settings for consistency and security?
• Which level of security does the default configuration provide?
• How much expertise is necessary to successfully install and configure
the application for the first time?
3.3.2.4 Technical Support
Even if the PKI-enabled software may have advanced installation and config-
uration wizards, a user may sooner or later need additional help. Therefore,
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we direct our attention to the quality of support, too. Once again, the cri-
terions in this category strongly depend on the actual application scenario.
The rating scheme is analogous to that of the category technical require-
ments.
• What kind of support does the vendor (the supplier) offer? How ex-
pensive is that support? Is it charged per request or is there an annual
fee?
• How can the user contact the support team? (e.g. phone, email) At
what times? (7x24 or office hours only)
• Are there FAQ or manual pages on the Internet?
• Is the information provided in the user’s native language?
3.3.2.5 Training
The deployment of every new application should ideally be accompanied by
training lessons for users. As we all know, this is more wishful thinking than
reality. Due to the abstraction property (P2), teaching users to deal with
security-related tasks may in particular gain importance where ergonomic
deficiencies have to be compensated.
• Which amount of training for the intended users is absolutely necessary
to provide an appropriate usage?
• Does the software provide an interactive guided tour explaining its
basic functionality?
• How many companies offer training lessons? At what price?
• Which books provide course materials?
3.3.3 Ergonomics
One may argue that deployment issues, which we have discussed in the
previous section, also fall into the range of usability. To make clear the
following difference, we decided to name the current section ”ergonomics”:
Contrary to deployment issues, which cover non-recurring actions during
the setup process, software ergonomics is an everyday concern which in
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general affects much more tasks and people. It may be tolerable that the
installation phase requires expert knowledge (which means that the category
group deployment issues is assigned a smaller weight in the usability profile).
But this does not hold for the ”operational” phase where people are expected
to actively use the PKI-enabled application to get their work securely done.
A natural category to start with is the UI design concerning menus and
dialogues. The information given there should be self-descriptive using a
consistent terminology, whereas its organization should try to anticipate
how users will operate the application. Because of property P1 (unmoti-
vated user), security software should follow the maxim to hide complexity
from the average user, acting in a seamless way. Hence, the second cate-
gory is the transparency of security features. Since it cannot be guaranteed
a hundred percent that the respective PKI-enabled application will always
work without interaction, warning and error messages are treated in the
corresponding section. It is exactly in this situation when a user may ques-
tion the help system, probably for the first time (a` propos ”trial and error”,
cf. Figure 2.3). From the viewpoint of security, it all depends on how the
application reacts in potentially threatening situations since errors should be
prevented at all costs.
3.3.3.1 Menus and Dialogues
This category groups two types of UI components, the menus being the
more static and dialogues being the more dynamic elements. Once again,
we think of the user as a security novice and unmotivated subject (P1).
Therefore, on the one hand it should be possible to intuitively find all the
security-relevant menu entries because of P5 (weakest link). On the other
hand, dialogues should show a careful design due to the lack of feedback
property. Where users are supposed to change security parameters, there
should be clues to underline sensitive settings and a possibility to restore
a previous or even a default configuration. A general requirement is that
technical terms stemming from PKI and cryptography should be used in a
precise and consistent manner.
• Does the organization and structure of PKI-relevant menus follow the
general principles used throughout the application?
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• How are the security-relevant menu items organized? Are they easy
to find and grouped reasonably?
• Does the visual design of the dialogue reflect its level of security rele-
vance? (e.g. special symbols for low, medium, high security relevance)
• Are the technical terms chosen well and intelligible? (even more im-
portant if the application does not come in its native language)
3.3.3.2 Transparency of the Security Features
This category refers to a common paradigm to encounter the unmotivated
user property. UI experts agree that an ordinary user should at first get
into contact with as few security features and settings as possible. However,
the more he is interested in the details, the more information the appli-
cation should provide. This serves a twofold purpose: First, to increase a
user’s trust in the application by giving further insights. A second aspect
is the suitability for learning (cf. Figure 2.3). A standard technique, for
instance, to both hide complexity and allow users to get deeper into it, is
an “Advanced Settings” button.
• To what extent does the user have to get involved in security settings
to be able to use the features?
• Do the default settings meet the requirements of an ordinary user?
• How difficult is it to change the transparency settings?
• Can a user adjust the transparency level according to his individual
skills? (e.g. ordinary user, interested layperson, expert)
• Is every necessary piece of information accessible at all? (e.g. details
about cryptographic algorithms and protocols)
3.3.3.3 Warning and Error Messages
In situations where the user or his communication partner behaves wrong or
in a non-standard way, this category plays an important role. When faced
with a warning or error message, a user’s decision is often crucial for security.
The user must understand the warnings and behave in an appropriate way.
Otherwise he will just click the ”close” or the ”continue” button. It is
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therefore indispensable that an explanation of alternative actions and their
consequences is given. A good practice is not to force the user to make an
immediate decision, which is the case when using modal dialogue windows,
but to give him the possibility of proceeding in another way, e.g. browsing the
help pages or postponing the task. Consequently, the abstraction property,
the barn door property, and the weakest link property are the basis for the
following central questions.
• How many details are given in message dialogues?
• Does the text explain what to improve if a single step of a complex
PKI operation, e.g. signature verification, fails?
• Are there warnings in case of a security-sensitive operation? What
advice is given in such a situation? (e.g. if the chosen key lengths are
too small)
• How precise, understandable, and insistent is the information given?
Does the message encourage to ignore it?
• Are there useful links to matching topics in the help system?
3.3.3.4 Help System
The built-in help system of an application is the primary source to get
information during usage. The help system should be designed to suffice
an average user in most of the cases. We think it advisable to have a short
glossary of commonly used technical terms of cryptography and PKI, as well
as a short introduction to the topic on a rather easily intelligible level, but
with links to more detailed information. A nice feature would for example
be an integrated FAQ section. While it is common practice to refer the user
to the vendor’s web site for further help using hyperlinks in dialogues, we
vote against it. For the sake of convenience this mechanism should only
be used for non-critical, additional, and up-to-date information. But not
for answering standard requests since a user may not be connected to the
Internet at the moment a question arises. We consider it a must to have
context-sensitive help in all security-related menus and dialogues, at least
in the most critical ones. The central questions touch the same areas (P2,
P4, P5) in the current category as in the previous category.
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• Which of the main technical terms of PKI and cryptography are ex-
plained? (e.g. certificate, key pair, certification authority) Are the
explanations correct and intelligible?
• How detailed is the introduction to PKI and its concepts? Is the text
written in an abstract fashion or are there useful examples?
• Is a context-sensitive direct help implemented? If yes, in which way
does it support the user? Are there further links to the help system?
• In which way is the user assisted when accomplishing a complex task?
(e.g. when installing his own private key)
• Are there links to external information sources about PKI and current
developments?
3.3.3.5 Reaction in Potentially Threatening Situations
In order to get a reasonable measure on the utility of a PKI-enabled applica-
tion, we have to test its reaction in critical situations. We consider this worth
a separate category due to the potentially high damage that may be caused
in case of failure. A typical scenario is a digitally signed message which has
been tampered with. Then the application has to reject the document and
explain in detail not only the reason of failure, but give a concrete guidance
which measures the user has to take next. In case the local key or certificate
store is manipulated, the application must react accordingly and trigger an
alert. It is also important how status information is handled. Suppose, the
application wants to use an X.509 certificate, which specifies the URL of a
CRL distribution point or an OCSP responder, but the corresponding server
is unreachable.
• What is the behaviour of the application in case of a certificate that
cannot be validated successfully due to an unknown issuer?
• Does the application tell the user how to check the fingerprint of a
certificate when introducing a new CA to the system?
• How does the programme react in case a source of status information
specified in the certificate is unreachable?
• Does the application has the ability to automatically check for and
download security updates and patches?
3.3. PKI EVALUATION TOOL 95
3.3.4 Security Features
The subject of the third and last category group are the security features
of the PKI-enabled application under evaluation. These features relate in-
directly to the issue of usability as decisions on the technical layer often
have an influence on UI design. If, for instance, the application does not
implement functionality, which is necessary for using PKI in a certain envi-
ronment or does not support a common standard, users are urged to find a
way to work around this problem (probably weakening the system). Secu-
rity on the cryptographic layer and utility of a PKI-enabled product are thus
crucial factors for user acceptance, too. With regard to the barn door and
weakest link property (P4, P5), we emphasize that the application should
provide a proper implementation of the security mechanisms since it is vir-
tually impossible for the user to detect flaws on this layer.
The arrangement of the following categories is relatively straight-forward:
First of all, we review algorithms and parameters which belong to the cryp-
tographic layer. The next category revolves around the handling of secret
keys. This leads us to the certificate management and the question of how
the application deals with status information. A last category is named
advanced functionality.
3.3.4.1 Algorithms and Parameters
In order to achieve compatibility towards different communication partners,
an appropriate set of cryptographic algorithms should be available. We
emphasize that a reasonable selection of methods should include standard
and widely deployed algorithms. This does not call for as many as possible
and moreover exotic algorithms as this may bear additional risks (at least to
confuse the user). However, it is important that the cryptographic building
blocks rely on independent mathematical problems, e.g. integer factorisation
and discrete logarithm in an elliptic curve (EC) group. This is because
of the observation that mathematical or technical progress may render a
single algorithm insecure. The cryptography inside the application cannot
be treated separately since its effectiveness also depends on the protocols
built on top of it. Thus, the word algorithms extends to protocols in this
section. The second aspect in this context are the cryptographic parameters,
typically including key sizes and lengths of message digests.
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• How many different combinations of cryptographic algorithms and pa-
rameters are available?
• Does the selection comprise state-of-the-art algorithms? (e.g. AES,
RIPE-MD, EC cryptography)
• Is it possible to choose individually from the set of combinations of
algorithms and parameters? Does the system warn against weak com-
binations?
• Are all weak combinations disabled in the default settings?
• Are cryptographic primitives based on independent mathematical prob-
lems?
• Does the application implement a strong pseudo-random number gen-
erator? What source of random is used as seed?
3.3.4.2 Secret Key Handling
This category is about how secret keys are generated, protected, applied,
transferred, and destroyed by the application. In this paragraph we use the
term secret key in a generic way. While it is often replaced by the term
private key in the context of a public key scheme, a secret key in a narrower
sense is used for a symmetric algorithm, e.g. as an ephemeral session key.
It goes without saying, that secret keys have to be protected carefully by
versatile technical precautions.
• Is the application able to generate keys and key pairs on behalf of the
user?
• What kind of storage devices for secret keys are supported? (e.g.
SmartCard with corresponding reader, USB token, hardware security
module, or softtoken)
• Which cryptographic and other technical precautions are provided to
secure a secret key when stored on the hard disc or in memory?
• How is a secret key enabled for usage? Is it possible to enable a batch
processing? (e.g. for bulk signature generation)
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• In case a secret key is exportable: Are there efforts to enforce a certain
password complexity when using password-based encryption?
• Can key data be securely destroyed, e.g. by multiply over-writing the
corresponding area on the hard disc?
3.3.4.3 Certificate Management
We now turn to the management of third party certificates. Two things
are important in this context: In our opinion, the application should first
support the import of certificates via different channels to facilitate this
task for the user. This means that a lookup on a certificate server or –
in the PGP terminology – key server should be supported, using different
protocols like LDAP, HTTP, FTP, or simply retrieving the certificate from
the file system. The second question is how the integrity of the certificate
database is guaranteed. If the certificates are stored on the hard disc, a
typical method is to use a password-based MAC or a central storage location
to ensure that the database has not been tampered with.
• How does the import and retrieval of certificates take place?
• Is it possible to read/write a certificate from/to a hard token?
• Does the application cope with certificate trust lists (CTL) for import
or export?
• Which technical measures are taken to protect the certificate store?
• How can the user assign and withdraw trust to third party certificates?
Is this possible on a fine-grained basis?
• Can the certificate handling be delegated to a central point or author-
ity? (e.g. the OS or an administrator)
3.3.4.4 Status Information
Especially with regard to signature verification in the context of non-repu-
diation, the ability to gather information about the validity of a certificate at
a certain point of time is crucial. It is also important to guarantee a timely
revocation of public keys used for encryption. However, status information
often is not retrieved automatically or processed properly by PKI-enabled
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applications. Today, different methods are available to answer a validation
request. We point out that the answer to such a request is nontrivial, as
there are different validity models.
• Does the PKI-enabled application automatically gather status infor-
mation?
• Which mechanisms for status information are supported? (e.g. CRL,
delta CRL, indirect CRL, online requests via OCSP, see [52])
• Does the application make use of a CRL distribution point entry in
an X.509 certificate?
• Does the application allow to manually import status information ob-
tained from another source?
• Is there a mechanism to archive validation material?
• Does the application ensure that the machine’s local time is correct?
3.3.4.5 Advanced Functionality
Finally, we come up with some additional features. While some of these
features are well known in the community, they are often not implemented
by current PKI-enabled applications. Particular use cases, like for instance
the processing of signed documents which is subject to digital signature leg-
islation, may have very special requirements. In environments with high
security demands, e.g. for governmental use, a certain level of security eval-
uation may be an absolute must.
• May an administrator enforce a group policy concerning e.g. key export
or maximal usage periods for cryptographic keys?
• Is the application ready for enhanced concepts like cross-certification
or bridge CAs? Are time stamping services supported?
• In case the application processes X.509 certificates: Which extensions
are implemented, are critical extensions always handled correctly?
Does the application require proprietary extensions? Is the application
compliant to major standards? (e.g. the PKIX or ISIS-MTT profile)
• Does the application support key sharing/backup? (e.g. a` la Shamir [211])
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• Has the application undergone an evaluation of its security features?
(e.g. according to the Common Criteria)
3.4 Microsoft Usability Study
The experiences made in the course of the usability study carried out on
behalf of Microsoft, stimulated the development of the formal PKI evaluation
tool which is the core of this chapter. In order to give an insight in the
development process and practical aspects of the evaluation, we give a short
overview of the study in the following. Due to space restrictions, only a small
fraction of the information can be presented here. The interested reader is
strongly advised to consider the original work [44].
3.4.1 Objectives and Scope
To cut a long story short, the focus of the study can be stated as follows:
• to motivate the need for PKI-enabled applications with respect to
current security threats and requirements,
• to illustrate the various use cases that have already been supported
(in large parts even by standard and/or free software),
• to show shortcomings and common pitfalls applications suffer from,
• and to test and compare products for selected use cases according to
a uniform evaluation methodology.
The application scenarios covered by the study include the protection of
communication channels on the Internet (via SSL), secure email (according
to the S/MIME standard), the security of groupware, file encryption and
digital signing of documents, access control and token-based logon, virtual
private networking, and the protection of wireless networks. In addition,
cryptographic application programming interfaces (APIs) are also reviewed.
In total, the study covers a dozen different use cases and three products
on average for each use case. The names of the products can be found
in Table 3.2 (page 102). We originally planned to investigate PKI-based
services in SAP like secure workflows, but we did not find evaluators with
sufficient previous knowledge in this area.
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3.4.2 Methodology
Structure For each use case, we conducted a market analysis and chose
the most common (according to third-party surveys and usage statistics)
products for our evaluation. The respective software makers were then asked
for an evaluation version, which was successful most of the time. To give
the reader of the study an impression of the security features and the op-
eration of the application, we described at least one of the products in de-
tail, providing technical background information and screenshots. This part
was subdivided into sections covering installation, ergonomics, and security
features. These systematics match the category groups the products were
actually evaluated according to. The results for each product were presented
in a table providing marks and a textual explanation.
As the categories used in the Microsoft study are quite similar to those
used in our framework, which is the subject of Section 3.3, we refrain from
enumerating them here. The differences between the study and the frame-
work consist of generalisations (“status information” instead of “revoca-
tion lists”, “secret key handling” instead of “management of one’s own key
pair”), logical combinations (“installation and configuration”, “menus and
dialogues”), and additions of categories (“gathering information and obtain-
ing the software”, “reaction in potentially threatening situations”).
Test Subjects The test subjects for the product tests were two faculty
persons having a “Diplom” degree in computer science as well as 16 main
course university students (having already earned a “Vordiplom” degree in
computer science or mathematics). Most of the students (14 of 16) came
from Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt. They were recruited out of the
lecture “Introduction to Cryptography” given by Prof. J. Buchmann in the
winter term 2002/2003 (4 hours lectures plus 2 hours exercises a week). The
idea and concept of the study had been presented during the lecture. At
the end of the winter term, the students had to undergo a written exam the
results of which we took as a criterion to chose potential test subjects. We
send an email to the 38 of the 230 overall exam participants whose mark
was 1.0 or 1.3 (scale ranging from 1 to 5, average result: 2.59). In return
for participating in the study, students were offered to choose from either
earning some money (60 hours short time contract, approximately 500 EUR)
or credit points (equivalent to a seminar).
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Evaluation Procedure Before the evaluation started, the authors of the
study briefed all the test subjects about the objectives and explained the
test framework to them. Test subjects were supervised and assisted dur-
ing the whole study to ensure a standardized evaluation procedure and the
comparability of the results. The test subjects worked together in groups
of two or three on one of the use cases listed in Table 3.2. Some of the use
cases consisted of a server and a client component like Groupware or VPN.
Here the same test subjects looked at both issues, i.e. from an end user’s
and an administrator’s point of view.
The work of the subjects comprised some initial product and market
research in order to identify relevant test candidates and the setup of a test-
ing environment. The test platforms mainly consisted of Windows 2000 or
Windows XP PCs in small networks. The VPN team also used a Linux
machine to run a FreeS/WAN server. The results can nevertheless be gen-
eralized to some extent since a significant part of the test candidates is also
available on multiple platforms. For instance, Microsoft Internet Explorer is
also available for Mac OS, the Apache web server or the Netscape/Mozilla
clients run under all common Windows, Linux, or Unix versions etc. Dur-
ing the evaluation, the test subjects examined all the categories and central
questions given therein. Results were summarized in written reports and
finally presented in class.
3.4.3 Findings of the Study
In this section we summarize the main findings of the Microsoft usability
study and point out conclusions that had found their way into subsequent
research.
Benefits of PKI In its beginning the study clearly pointed out the need
for PKI to face the risks of modern IT systems. The theoretical background
of (public key) cryptography and public key infrastructures were then ex-
plained in detail (comparable to our treatment in Section 3.1). It was argued
that the underlying concepts necessary for PKI are a mature technology
as they had been known and researched by the scientific community for
decades. A number of use cases had been identified where PKI provides a
real added value as an “enabling service” allowing secure communication in
situations where it would have not been possible otherwise. From an end
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Use Case Candidates
SSL-enabled HTTP
Server &
Apache 2.0 (with integrated mod ssl)
Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) 5.1
SSL-enabled Web
Browser
Internet Explorer 6.0
Mozilla Navigator 1.3
Secure email
(S/MIME-
conformant)
Netscape Mail 7.0
Outlook Express 6.0
Outlook 2000
Pegasus Mail 4.11 (with pm-smime extension)
The Bat! 1.62r
Groupware
Exchange Server 2000 (with Outlook client)
Lotus Notes/Domino 6.01 (client+server)
Novell GroupWise 6.5 (client+server)
File encryption and
document signing
Abylon Protection Manager Pro 4.0
Microlog Cabinet Manager 2003 v4.1
Microsoft Office 2003 (signing only)
RSA Security SureFile 6.0
SECUDE Office Security Suite 2.4
T/bone FileProtector 1.1
Vigilant 4.3.3
Windows XP Pro EFS (encryption only)
Token-based System
Logon
KOBIL Smart Token (for Windows XP)
T-TeleSec NetKey for Windows XP
VPN Server &
FreeS/WAN Server 2.0rc1
Windows 2003 VPN Server
VPN Client
SSH Communications Sentinel Client 1.4
Windows XP VPN Client
RADIUS Server &
AEGIS Premium 1.1.3
Odyssey Server 1.1
Steel-Belted Radius 4.04
RADIUS Client
AEGIS Client 2.0.5
Odyssey Client 2.0
Windows XP Standard Client
Cryptographic APIs
Generic Services Security API (GSS-API)
Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA)
Microsoft CryptoAPI
PKCS#11
Table 3.2: Applications/APIs tested in the Microsoft Usability Study.
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user’s viewpoint, the use cases significantly differ with respect to the level
of transparency of the PKI features and the level of direct involvement into
security tasks. While for instance secure Web browsing can happen in a
rather seamless way, secure email still requires a considerable cognitive and
operational workload.
Market Situation A pleasant finding of the market analysis was the fact
that for each use case a sufficient set of programmes existed. These pro-
grammes provide built-in PKI base functionality in a suitable way and re-
lieve users of installing it separately. Users that are anxious about security
thus have enough alternatives to select their PKI-enabled application of
choice. A lot of the applications are available free of additional costs as they
are part of the operating system or open source software/freeware. The cur-
rent version of the Windows operating system, for instance, provides basic
client-side support for all of the use cases.
Product ratings Altogether, the product tests yielded a satisfactory re-
sult. For the most common use cases (e.g. secure Web browsing), our test
subjects assigned an overall score of “good” or “very good” to the majority
of products. They estimated the necessity of training as low for applications
that target end users, but non-negligible for administrators that manage
server applications. With respect to the design of security-relevant menus
and dialogues, the test persons raised a number of issues. They criticized
that configuration settings are not organized logically and properly and com-
plained about the sloppiness of warning messages and error handling. In
their opinion most of the applications lacked the possibility to adjust the
transparency level. Among the open issues of most applications were the
functionality for certificate lookup and validity checking. Standard protocols
like LDAP or OCSP and standard mechanisms like CRLs and delta CRLs
had often been found to be unsupported.
3.4.4 Lessons Learnt
In this section we summarize the experiences we got from applying our eval-
uation framework in practice. From the feedback we received from the test
subjects during the evaluation and the quality of their final test reports, it
can be said that our approach is indeed an effective and practical evaluation
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tool. The organisation and categorization given therein had been considered
a natural and logical choice, which covers all relevant aspects and provides
clear guidance for evaluators.
The focus of the study (and especially our client) was to examine the po-
tential of PKI-enabled applications that is why we developed a methodology
that clearly falls into the category of inspection methods. Conducting labo-
ratory tests with end users alone would probably not have been sufficient to
satisfy this requirement and to provide an in-depth analysis of technical fea-
tures as experiences from the field indicate [176]. Within the bounds of this
study, laboratory tests would have also been by far too time-consuming and
thus infeasible due to the numerous use cases and test candidates. In our
opinion, the expert inspection method we chose allows a reasonably deep
assessment of security features and usability pitfalls at an excellent cost-
benefit ratio. In all, the study had been a valuable and successful testing
ground for our evaluation framework.
3.5 Trustcenter Software Study
Apart from the Microsoft Usability Study, our framework has also been
applied to carry out a thorough analysis of trustcenter software. Microsoft
offers a built-in trustcenter component in its server system since Windows
2000. For the following section, the most recent and most powerful version,
namely Windows 2003 Server Enterprise Edition, was evaluated according to
the framework. We also had the rare opportunity to evaluate a full-fledged,
high-end professional trustcenter software in the form of Entrust PKI.
The complete results of these evaluations can be found in the publica-
tion [151] and the extensive (about 100 pages) evaluation report [150]. Due
to space restrictions we can only summarize them here as we did it in the
case of the Microsoft Usability Study.
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3.5.1 Test Candidates
The following two sections contain a brief technical description of the test
candidates to give the reader an impression of the feature richness. Product
descriptions can be found on the vendors’ web sites12.
3.5.1.1 Windows CA
The Windows 2003 Server CA or Windows CA for short is an X.509-based
PKI solution that implements a bunch of PKI services. It supports a lot of
use cases by means of pre-configured and extendible certificate templates.
Templates do not only govern the X.509v3 certificate profile (for instance
validity period, certificate contents, and extensions), but also specify pol-
icy issues with respect to the enrolment process, cryptographic parameters
like algorithms, key length, and CSP (cryptographic service provider). The
template mechanism is a powerful tool since its introduction in Windows
2000. It facilitates the management of the PKI user base. User enrolment
automation is possible as Windows CA strongly integrates with Microsoft’s
Active Directory (AD) server and Windows domain controllers. This state-
ment, however, holds only in a homogeneous Windows operating system
environment. CAs can be operated online or oﬄine and can be organized in
multi-stage hierarchies and connected to other PKIs via cross-certification.
Windows CA originally supports the common cryptographic algorithms
(RSA or DSA as signature schemes in combination with SHA-1 or MD5
and key lengths up to 16384 bit) and allows to load other algorithms via
additional “providers” – a library function mechanism similar to those of
the Java Cryptography Architecture/Extensions (JCA/JCE). The CA’s as
well as users’ private keys may be stored either on PKCS#12 softtokens or
hardtokens like SmartCards or USB devices. Windows CA supports X.509v2
CRLs as well as delta CRLs, which can be distributed by all common means
(LDAP, HTTP, or via the file system), but does not include its own OCSP
responder.
12http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/winxppro/plan/
pkienhancements.htm, http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Windows/Server/
2003/Certificate/Services.html, http://www.entrust.com
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3.5.1.2 Entrust PKI
Entrust Limited, a Canada-based company, is one of the market leaders
in certification services and trustcenter software. Entrust has offered PKI
software since 1994 claiming to having sold the “world’s first commercially
available PKI”.13 In contrast to the Windows CA, this solution targets really
large CA installations serving millions of users. Obviously, the Entrust PKI
would typically be an oversized and overpriced product for a small company.
The two products can nevertheless be compared as our requirements towards
key and certificate lifecycle management are similar – Entrust focussing more
on automation in large user populations and the Windows CA on the ease
of deployment in a homogeneous environment.
The Entrust Authority Security Manager (version 7.0) as the core certi-
fication authority is the basis component needed to build up a PKI. It has
quite specific operating system (several Windows server or Unix platforms)
and database (Informix or Oracle) requirements. The Informix database is
bundled to the Security Manager such that the PKI can be setup without ad-
ditional third-party software. The minimal installation is completed by the
“Entrust Authority Security Manager Administration” module, a graphical
user interface for the Security Manager.
Entrust Authority implements a similar certificate template mechanism
allowing flexible enrolment including automated enrolment and user self-
services. All major PKI standards (X.509 certificates and CRLs), PKIX-
CMP, PKCS#7, PKCS#10 and SCEP are supported. The software inter-
operates with LDAP directories, OCSP responders as well as SmartCards
and HSMs (hardware security modules). Entrust Authority is EAL 4+ cer-
tified according to Common Criteria and successfully passed an ISIS-MTT
conformity assessment.
3.5.2 Methodology
Before we explain our methodology for the evaluation of trustcenter software
in detail let us note a few particularities of the test. Obviously, trustcenter
applications are neither general user nor COTS software. As such they tar-
get a small user circle, say network and system administrators, corporate
security coordinators or security consultants. However, end users are typi-
13http://www.entrust.com/pki/index.htm
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cally also involved as they get into contact with the PKI when for instance
requesting or retrieving certificates. Both perspectives have to be taken care
of.
In addition to the heuristic approach, we broadened our methodology
and added laboratory user tests. Those tests were based on two usage sce-
narios with an increasing number of constraints. These scenarios describe
the situation in small and medium enterprises (SMEs); a description is given
below. The test subjects acted in the role of system administrators that had
been given the task of setting up an internal PKI for the company. We be-
lieved that proceeding along the lines of a scenario is an appropriate way
to focus on a realistic subset of a trustcenter application’s functionality.
Besides, the complexity of the subject usually requires to pre-configure an
appropriate environment in order to be able to access certain dialogues of the
application (e.g. attach the application to a domain controller or directory
service in order to assess certificate publishing facilities). It thus seemed
more natural to restrict oneself as in practice one would typically also use
only a fraction of the whole features. Anyway, we had to cope with limited
resources for the evaluation, so the two SME scenarios were what we could
cover realistically.
3.5.2.1 Test Scenarios
We formulated two scenarios, a relatively small one and a more complex one.
The latter has a superset of requirements compared to the former one. This
choice is not only advisable due to the complex nature of the subject, but
also reflects the way one would work in practice. Typically, a pilot phase
of manageable size, where tests can be made in a controlled environment,
would precede a large, company-wide system installation.
Scenario I reflects the requirements of a small company, having 20–100
employees, where all of them work at the same location. We assume the
protection of email with customers as being the dominant use case in this
setting. Companies of this size are likely to rely on standard software, so
we assume a homogeneous environment where all machines have the same
Windows operating system and use Outlook Express and Internet Explorer14
as clients. We deliberately state only very few constraints. The motivation
14The choice of the web browser in fact matters as some PKI tasks are browser-based,
e.g. client-side key pair generation.
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is to model an administrator whose idea of the final shape of the PKI is a
priori not too clear and to allow some degree of freedom.
For the second scenario we assume a larger user base and take into
account that the employees are spread over different locations. As a con-
sequence, requirements towards key and certificate management, auxiliary
services (e.g. with respect to the need for some form of automation), and the
security level in general grow. It should be possible to use different key pairs
for signing and decryption. A backup of decryption keys should be made by
default, but copies of signature keys must not exist. We also demand that
there are certain users in the system for which key backup is deactivated.
Key backup in general is a desirable feature as to prevent data loss, but
there are sensible environments, for instance think of the R&D department,
were key backup violates the observance of secrecy. The heterogeneity of
the application side is reflected by the choice of MUAs and web browsers.
We chose beforehand not to consider hardware PSEs as interoperability
and driver issues have often shown to be a significant technical obstacle with
PKI in the field [126]. Details of the two scenarios are listed in Table 3.3
and 3.4.
3.5.2.2 Adaptations and Extensions
As already mentioned, we combined an inspection and an empirical method
for the evaluation of the two trustcenter applications. Consequently, we also
slightly adapted the evaluation categories to the particular situation. First
of all, the category “reaction in security-critical situations” was dropped in
favour of the scenario analysis as we could treat that issue in much more
detail there. We outline the particularities of each evaluation category in
the following.
Gathering Information and Obtaining the Software Trustcenter soft-
ware is not very widely deployed or used, so it is often hard to get ap-
propriate information especially with regard to standards compliance
and the support of a particular intended usage scenario.
Technical Requirements With respect to hardware: mostly a question
of performance as we did neither use HSMs nor SmartCards nor USB
tokens. With respect to software: restrictions towards the operating
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• Users: 10 employees at a common location.
• Use Case: secure email with customers (encryption and signatures).
• Keys: only one key pair per user, stored in a softtoken.
• Client OS: Windows 2000.
• Applications: Outlook Express, Internet Explorer.
Table 3.3: Scenario I for trustcenter evaluation.
• Users: 100 employees at three different locations.
• Use Cases: secure email (internally and externally), encrypting and
signing files.
• Keys: two distinct key pairs, one for encryption and one for signa-
tures, both stored in softtokens.
• Client OS: Windows 2000
• Applications: Outlook Express, Thunderbird, Internet Explorer,
Firefox, Opera.
• Additional requirements: key backup/key recovery should be made
possible for certain user groups and certain keys respectively. Sep-
aration of duties for administrative tasks according to a reasonable
role model. The CA component should reside on an oﬄine machine.
Table 3.4: Scenario II for trustcenter evaluation.
system (version, build number, language15) and components like the
directory.
Installation and Configuration During the setup of a trustcenter, in-
stallation options and design choices at an early stage may affect the
system’s functionality and options with a certain delay. The definition
of certificate profiles or the decision whether to operate the CA online
or oﬄine are two examples. In order to avoid dead ends the software
should either accompany the installation by a wizard or avoid such
determining.
15For instance it turned out that Entrust Authority does not work with a German
version of the OS although stated otherwise.
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Technical Support We actually could not assess the quality of the ven-
dor’s individual hotline or email support. Instead we resorted to
product-related man pages and the online knowledge base.
Training Similar to the previous category, product-specific trainings could
not be assessed. We estimated the amount and type of training which
seemed necessary against the background of the dialogue design and
the available documentation.
Menus and Dialogues Trustcenter software is clearly a niche application.
As a consequence there are no established best practices for interaction
design in this field (as opposed to for instance secure email or secure
web browsing). Using a precise and understandable language is crucial.
Transparency of the Security Features The products under test allow
a myriad of settings. In order to not let users get lost, the application
should hide complexity in an appropriate way and provide reasonable
default settings that can be refined later.
Warning and Error Messages There is a typical phenomenon with se-
curity software in general and trustcenter applications in particular:
Warning and error messages do not provide clear instructions of how
to react or do not point out alternative ways when the user is stuck.
Help System Especially in the course of the installation, a user may easily
get lost in the details and lose track of things. Therefore, the help
system should contain sample scenarios or step-by-step guides (e.g. in
the form of a check list) for complex tasks.
Reaction in Potentially Threatening Situations Category is treated
separately (see above).
Algorithms and Parameters The application should provide some clues
in judging the appropriateness and strength of algorithms. This is
important with respect to long-term security and directly influences
the choice of certificate validity periods.
Secret Key Handling On the one hand, this issue is relevant for the CA
keys (usage of hardware PSEs). On the other hand, it also applies to
end entities keys and the possible transport of software PSEs to end
users or networked machines during the enrolment phase.
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Certificate Management A trustcenter potentially has to cope with large
numbers of users/certificates over a long time. Therefore, it should be
feasible to ease or automate the process of certificate lifecycle man-
agement as much as possible. For instance this includes certificate
renewal notifications or batch processing.
Status Information For the special case of trustcenter software we widened
the meaning of status information to also capture the application’s log
files in order to allow an independent auditor to assess the security of
the PKI. This includes for instance key history and archival.
Advanced Functionality There are a lot of potential specialisations here.
We only name two of them which were important for our evaluation
scenarios. One of them is the enforcement of security policies, e.g. with
respect to role-based access control. Implementing a proper password
management and password “hygiene” is also crucial as administrators
often do not authenticate via public key methods, but use passwords.
3.5.3 Evaluation Reports
In the following we summarize the course of the evaluation of both prod-
ucts. For the Windows CA, we restrict ourselves to the first scenario as this
overlaps to a considerable extent with the second one. Entrust Authority
was evaluated by the three test subjects working in group. Since Entrust
has high and very specific hardware demands for Scenario II (two additional
machines for the installation of a second CA and a domain controller respec-
tively as well as one machine for Entrust’s Enrollment Server), we restricted
ourselves beforehand to the evaluation of Scenario I. We refer to [150] for a
complete and much more detailed description.
3.5.3.1 Windows CA
The installation process of the software can be subdivided in the steps shown
in Figure 3.5. At the very beginning the test subjects had to chose between
one of four possible CA types: “enterprise root CA”, “enterprise subordinate
CA”, “stand-alone root CA”, and “stand-alone subordinate CA”. The choice
determines to a large extent the shape of the coming PKI hierarchy.
The test subjects were somehow helpless and indecisive which variant to
select. They all rated the explanation as incomplete and misleading as, for
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Figure 3.5: Installation process of the Windows CA.
instance, the “enterprise root CA” is characterized as the “most trusted CA
in an enterprise” while the “stand-alone root CA” is described as the “most
trusted CA in a CA hierarchy”. The installation wizard did not provide
further information nor a context-sensitive link to the documentation.
Two of the testers finally settled on the enterprise and one for the stand-
alone root CA. In their first run of the installation, they all decided to accept
the default setting for the CA’s key including signing algorithm and hash
function, key length and Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP). Neverthe-
less, they complained about the lack of feedback as the system defaults were
not visible. When playing around with the custom settings in a later run,
they missed a wizard that recommends certain combinations of algorithms,
key lengths, and CSPs or at least checks them for consistency. The remark
“individual CSPs may have different cryptographic algorithms that provide
various levels of security” completely confused them. A checkbox labelled
“allow this CSP to interact with the desktop” and the insufficient infor-
mation in the documentation (“Without this option, system services cannot
interact with the desktop of the user who is currently logged on.”) made one
of the test subjects intensively search the Web. He found some clues that
3.5. TRUSTCENTER SOFTWARE STUDY 113
this option could have something to do with PIN entering for SmartCards,
but still wondered whether it was about a security-critical setting.
The testers chose the default settings concerning the CA’s distinguished
name (DN) and certificate validity in the next dialogue. Later we recognized
that the application neither checks the DN for consistency – e.g. it was pos-
sible to include two country attributes (“CN=TestCA, O=TU Darmstadt,
OU=CDC, C=DE, C=FR”) , which could confuse PKI-enabled clients – nor
aligns the certificate lifetime with the key length. Even a lifetime of 1000 (!)
years could be selected without warning. The initial key length also affects
the renewal of CA certificates as the length can only be increased for keys
with less than 1024 bits, which the testers found incomprehensible. Last
but not least, none of the dialogues informs the user which signature and
hash algorithm is actually used.
Up to now, none of the test subjects had installed Microsoft’s IIS web
server as they had been given no appropriate hint. Consequently, they were
surprised to encounter a warning that web-based certificate enrolment will
not work. One of them thought that it would be necessary to install the CA
anew preceded by the IIS installation. The second one tried to configure
the web interface via the command line tool certutil while the third did
not care about web enrolment at all. The three testers praised the CA’s
configuration menu (see Figure 3.6) as well-understandable and comfortable
to use. The menu offers to set for instance CRL distribution points (i.e.
publication locations for CRLs), the internal roles of the CA, and the policy
module. After modifying the policy in a way that certificate requests have
to be confirmed manually, all three were ready to request sample certificates
on behalf of an imaginary user.
Basically, there are two ways to request a certificate, namely via a so-
called snap-in of the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) or via the web
interface (if installed). Users are authenticated using their Windows login
credentials. In both cases, the user may post new requests, view the status of
pending requests, install personal certificates, and download CA certificates
and CRLs. The test subject who had chosen a stand-alone CA had to enter
the subject name and email address in the web interface as the CA was not
connected to an Active Directory. Prior to that, he had to activate ActiveX
controls for Internet Explorer, which he found cumbersome as this step
requires individual configuration of each client with administrator privileges.
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Figure 3.6: Main Windows CA configuration menu.
The other two subjects created their key pair and certificate signing request
via the MMC, which they considered a tool unknown and unfamiliar to
most of the average Windows users. In the course of the evaluation of
Scenario II they learned how to restrict the requesting person’s alternatives
concerning CSPs via certificate templates. They were surprised to see that
this presetting did not influence the MMC dialogues (however, it works
properly for web-based certificate requests). This results in unintelligible
error messages if the end user selects an unsupported CSP.
Scenario II required an oﬄine CA, i.e. a system that is not connected
to the company’s network let alone the Internet. The test subjects had to
look for workarounds as they could not figure out a proper way to solve
the problem. Microsoft proposes to use a hierarchy composed of an oﬄine
“stand-alone root CA” plus a subordinate CA that manages all requests, but
is online again which the testers regarded as counter-intuitive. Furthermore,
they considered this a dead end because it does not match the scenario’s
requirement. None of them came up with the idea to try issuing end entity
certificates with the root CA.
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One workaround consisted in setting up the CA including web front end
(as the web pages could not be installed separately) and then deactivating
the CA service, but keep the IIS running. The rational behind this try was
that the key pairs are generated locally in the user’s web browser. However,
this approach did not work. The second workaround was to use a dummy
CA that accepts incoming requests, but does not certify them. Instead, the
request should be transferred manually to the actual CA by the CA admin-
istrator. Two alternatives were explored, namely saving the request via the
web interface or retrieving it from the “pending requests” folder. Certifi-
cation indeed worked with the first variant, however, the certificate subject
got changed to the identity of the administrator. A similar phenomenon was
noticed in the second variant although one of the testers reassured himself
that the intermediate request file still contained the correct value. To cut a
long story short, the test subjects did not succeed in setting up an oﬄine
CA in the sense of the literature.
For Scenario II the testers experimented with certificate templates. It
took them some time to figure out that the unleashed power of the template
mechanism could only be used in the enterprise edition of Windows 2003
Server, not the standard edition they had on their machines. Only one
person found some hints in the documentation regarding the differences
between the two versions. For instance, new templates could be defined,
but not applied in the standard edition – a restriction that yielded much
confusion and frustration as the whole operating system had to be installed
anew.
3.5.3.2 Entrust PKI
The first impression the test subjects had of the Entrust PKI was the loads of
documentation, which was shipped with the software (more than 2000 pages
in total). These documents treated particular aspects of the CA installation,
however, the testers were unable to structure the material and especially
find out the order in which the documents are needed for the installation.
They commented that – because the module names sound similar and not
very descriptive – it would have been helpful to have a central place where
the relevance of the separate modules, their functionality, and links to the
corresponding documents is listed. As they did not find clear guidance
concerning the order of the installation, they determined it manually on
116 3.5. TRUSTCENTER SOFTWARE STUDY
the basis of the installation prerequisites listed in the various documents.
To sum it up, it can be said that an intuitive approach (without extensive
reference to the documentation) failed, because the wizard does not provide
sufficient guidance. Among other fatal errors that occurred, the installation
routine did not point out that the CA cannot interoperate with a German-
language version of Active Directory (see below).
Figure 3.7: Entrust’s formula to calculate database size (taken from the
manual).
Entrust uses an Informix database for internal purposes. Its installation
did not pose major problems given the small number of users in the test
scenario. Nevertheless, the dialogue window responsible for the database
configuration was criticized because of the cumbersome method the database
space has to be calculated by hand (Figure 3.7 shows an extract from the
manual). It remained unclear whether the database size can be increased
later on.
The testers praised that Entrust Security Manager allows to control
hardware requirements and, in principle, allows to start by choosing one
of several installation profiles. Unfortunately, they felt that the descriptions
were vague and complained about the lack of a context-sensitive help. Hav-
ing chosen the “simple configuration using Microsoft Active Directory” they
were able to continue, but were not informed about the signature algorithm
or the key length until the CA certificate was produced. The default selec-
tion of an RSA key with 1024 bit is at the lower end of what should be used
today.
In the following major usability flaws and severe UI bugs were detected
by the test subjects. When they used the “next” and “back” buttons to
navigate through the Security Manager’s configuration dialogue, previously
entered data got lost or could not be modified again. In one case a complete
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new installation was necessary. The wizard did not inform properly about
complexity rules for the various operators’ passwords. The testers found it
astonishing that passwords had to be set via a command shell which – to
top it all – crashed after three incorrect password entries (see Figure 3.8 for
a screenshot).
Figure 3.8: Entrust security manager password dialogue.
After they had successfully accomplished this task, the software reported
an error telling that the Security Manager could not be initialised and re-
ferred to the log files. Assuming that they had mis-configured something,
the testers restarted the configuration steps with varying settings, but with-
out success. An analysis of the installation log made them intensively search
the web, Entrust’s support web pages, the product documentation, and the
CDs shipped with the software. Finally, they found a tool on a CD to
administer the Active Directory in a way that it could interoperate with
the Entrust CA. Making the AD fully compatible with Entrust turned out
to be a complicated process as directory schemas and attributes had to be
modified. As the testers were inexperienced with LDAP, they demanded
for more detailed explanations and guidance. This is especially important
against the background that a directory mis-configuration may bring other
networked applications relying on the AD to a standstill. To make things
worse, some configuration changes are irrevocable. As already mentioned
above Entrust does not support non-English versions of Active Directory.
It took the testers hours to track obscure error messages back to this con-
straint. The problem is that obviously some DN components (like “cert
publishers” which is “Zertifikatsherausgeber” in the German AD version)
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were hard-coded in the software. At this point the test had to be inter-
rupted and restarted with an appropriate AD.
The Security Manager administration tool allows to manage certificate
types (i.e. certificate profiles), user groups, policies, and audit logs from
within a single interface. The UI and its feature richness were clearly over-
sized for the given scenario, a context-sensitive help or wizard support is
missing. Certificate types can be assigned to persons either on the basis
of group membership or individually. The testers wondered which of this
alternatives would have the higher priority if both were conflicting.
Having set up the CA components, the test subjects set about testing
the trustcenter software from an end user’s point of view. Entrust Authority
scans the Active Directory for new users. An administrator may manually
add persons to certify. For each of them, a random 12-character activa-
tion code is generated, which the future certificate holder has to provide as
authenticator during enrolment. This activation code is accompanied by a
8-digit reference number. Both pieces of information had to be transferred
to the user in a secure way. According to the testers’ opinion, Entrust does
a fairly good job in pointing out the security level of the different transport
alternatives (personal contact by phone or during a conversation, paper
mail, electronic mail, or by a setup file, which can optionally be password-
protected).
The web site which users have to access in order to enrol is shown in
Figure 3.9 (when using Internet Explorer). It seems a common practice to
make available the CSP detail settings to the end user (which the testers
already criticized as both superfluous and error-prone in the Windows CA
evaluation). A few issues were carped about. Firstly, some of the CSPs
listed were unavailable. Secondly, weak providers that only supported RSA
keys up to 512 bit were included. Such CSPs could in fact be selected by
the end user clearly violating the policy previously set by the administrator
that dictates a minimum key length of 1024 bit. Neither the user nor the
administrator at least got notified of this problem.
3.5.3.3 Results
In this section the results of the evaluation according to the framework are
summarized. In Table 3.5 the points for each category are indicated. Ob-
serve that we use the symbols −−,−, ◦,+,++ representing the integers from
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Figure 3.9: Entrust Authority web frontend.
−2 to 2. The rating scheme keeps to the one described in Section 3.3.1.2.
The categories were assigned a weight of 5% or 10%, the respective value is
listed in the second column. Detailed justifications for the individual scores
can be found in [150, 151].
To sum it up, the overall scores of both products are pretty close to one
another (Windows 2003 Server CA: +0.3; Entrust Authority: +0.5). This
may look surprising at first sight. One reason for this is that the weighting
for the small and medium enterprise scenarios was done according to what we
called the “enterprise” setting in Section 3.3.1.2, where security features do
not play an outstanding role. If more importance is attached to this category
group, the overall picture will change as Entrust Authority is clearly leading
here. In order to recalculate the score in the “high security” setting, it would
be necessary to fix new weightings for the individual categories, too.
The results have to be taken with a grain of salt since the focus of the two
test candidates is different. While the Windows CA in fact targets SMEs,
the solution of Entrust would be definitively oversized for this use case. The
comparability is somehow limited by the variation in the test methodology
(cf. Section 3.3.1.3). However, some interesting tendencies were found during
the evaluation.
The Windows CA distinguishes itself by the only slightly below-average
usability and the GUI design and mechanisms that resemble the familiar
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Deployment Win CA Entrust
Information 5% ◦ ◦
Technical Requirements 5% −− −−
Installation & Configuration 10% ◦ −
Technical Support 5% ◦ −
Training 5% + +
Ergonomics
Menus & Dialogues 5% + −−
Transparency 10% − −
Warning & Error Messages 5% − −
Help System 10% ◦ −
Security Features
Algorithms & Parameters 5% + ++
Secret Key Handling 10% + +
Certificate Management 5% ++ ++
Status Information 5% − ++
Advanced Functionality 10% + ++
Table 3.5: Results of the framework evaluation.
ones of the server operating system as a whole. As in this respect the CA
is an additional feature only, we expected a limited functionality, but the
evaluation set us right. The time needed to install and put the CA into op-
eration, however, was quite high. The test subjects needed approximately
5 workdays for Scenario I and 14 workdays for Scenario II. This sounds a
lot, but one has to take into consideration that the test participants were
no professional and experienced Windows system or network administra-
tors. Nevertheless, this number is not too far away from Microsoft’s own
estimation of 100 hours (sic!).
The Entrust CA made a bad impression as it over-emphasizes security
features to the disadvantage of ergonomics. The significant usability deficits
may quickly have a negative impact on the set-up costs of such a CA in-
stallation. In our opinion the investments in security do not justify to ne-
glect usability because the user errors we encountered during the evaluation
may lead to security problems again. The time frame which was originally
planned for the evaluation of Scenario I was exceeded by far with no less
than 24 workdays. Therefore, we refrained from extending the requirements
according to Scenario II. A resumption of the evaluation on the basis of the
present findings would nevertheless be possible. As a next step, a broader
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test of Entrust’s rich features, that go beyond Scenario II would be desirable
and should be feasible with our framework.
A number of weaknesses was found during the evaluation (see [150] for
details). Although the systematic search for usability deficits or security
flaws was not in the main focus of the evaluation, this is more than only
a by-product. Weaknesses were classified according to their severity and
grouped logically according to the category groups of our framework.
3.6 Conclusions
After giving a brief introduction into the main concepts of public key cryp-
tography and PKI, we identified a number of challenges on the technological
layer, which are a major source for usability problems with PKI-enabled ap-
plications. Among those challenges are the management of keys and trust
anchors as well as the delegation of private keys, which one could consider
open problems. We present solutions to two instances of these problems,
namely opportunistic security for email and delegation of WWW creden-
tials in Chapter 6 and 7 respectively.
The analysis of technological challenges also is the foundation for our
new and generic framework to evaluate the usefulness of PKI-enabled ap-
plications. It is not restricted solely to usability, but also treats deployment
issues and security features to get utility ratings, too. Our PKI evalua-
tion tool can be adapted to a multitude of PKI application families. In
the context of the Microsoft Usability Study the framework has proven to
be flexible enough to fit to a wide range of use cases – ranging from se-
cure web browsing to the assessment of cryptographic APIs. The design
of the framework is technology-agnostic, use case-neutral, and evaluation
methodology-independent. As we show in Chapter 7 it can also be used as
a tool for application development.
We showed how to use the framework for the evaluation of trustcenter
software, which is possibly the most complex example of a PKI-enabled ap-
plication. We combined a heuristic evaluation with an extensive laboratory
user test. Surprisingly, the test candidates suffer from elementary usability
flaws, which decreases the confidence in their functionality, e.g. when crash-
ing due to false inputs. The products also did not check security-relevant
settings for consistency and plausibility (key length, certificate validity).
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Although the test participants were students with some basic experience in
the administration of Windows server and with deeper security and PKI
knowledge, it took them intolerably long to complete the laboratory tasks
(approx. one and two weeks for the Windows CA and more than three weeks
for the Entrust PKI only with the simpler scenario). It would be desirable to
cross-check these findings with actual system and network administrators.
Microsoft estimates at least 100 hours to set up its trustcenter product,
which in the light of our evaluation, does not seem too pessimistic. Another
idea is to extend the framework to some kind of “usability test bed” by
formulating precise scenarios for each application family or use case. This
test bed could serve as the basis for further analyses.
Part II
Solutions
123
Chapter 4
Awareness by Doing
O negligence! ... what cross devil made me put this main secret
in the packet I sent the king? Is there not way to cure this? No
new device to beat this from his braints?
– William Shakespeare
The human side of computer security is easily exploited and
constantly overlooked. Companies spend millions of dollars on
firewalls, encryption and secure access devices, and it’s money
wasted, because none of these measures address the weakest link
in the security chain.
– Kevin Mitnick
Experience has shown that information security incidents can often be
traced back to human misconduct or misunderstanding. Technical mea-
sures seldom can solve the security problems alone. The goals of so-called
information security awareness programmes or “campaigns” are to attract
attention, to gain and maintain users’ interest, and to impart basic and prac-
tical knowledge. In the following, we will often write security awareness or
just awareness for short. The importance of security awareness is accepted
among IT managers and backed by relevant surveys (see below). It has also
become an important part of the curriculum for IT security consultants,
e.g. in the CISSP (Certified Information Systems Security Professional) or
T.I.S.P. (TeleTrusT Information Security Professional) education [232].
In this chapter, which is based on our paper [16], we propose our new
approach of Awareness by Doing, which involves users more directly and in-
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tensively into the awareness programme in order to achieve a substantial and
lasting effect. In Chapter 2 and 3 we saw that PKI is a complex matter, not
only from a technological, but also from a cognitive point of view. It is cru-
cial that users are aware of threats and know when to be suspicious and how
to act properly. This holds for IT security in general and for cryptography-
and PKI-based mechanisms in particular. We already mentioned the chal-
lenges of validating certificates and fingerprints or human factor issues with
SSL (cf. Section 3.2 and 2.2.2.3). On the one hand, the approach described
in this chapter is the continuation of the previous analysis and experiences
gathered from user studies as it shows how to translate the ideas into con-
crete action. On the other hand, our approach also incorporates elements of
laboratory user testing and may therefore give a fresh impetus to the study
of security mechanisms, e.g. in the form of a field study.
We begin with a description of the status quo providing some recent
figures and continue with a review of related work and activities in this area
(Section 4.1.2). As our approach falls back on findings from the domain of
experiential learning, we summarize these prior to the presentation of our
methodology. We also provide guidelines how to organize an Awareness by
Doing campaign and how to measure its success. At the end of this chapter,
some sample learning modules are described to illustrate our approach.
4.1 Status Quo
4.1.1 Some Figures and Insights
An Ernst&Young survey [75] asked companies which threats to IT security
they perceive as being the most important ones. Unsurprisingly, viruses and
worms are at the top of the list (77%), but employee misconduct was already
second, being relevant for more than half (57%) of the respondents. Despite
these figures companies still have a very strong focus on technology when
planing security measures and pay too little attention to employee awareness
or education programmes. Only 29% of organizations list employee aware-
ness and training as a top area of information security spending, compared
with 83% of organizations that list technology as their top information se-
curity spending area – a finding that is backed by the analysis of [254]. This
study concludes with the observation that “relegating human resource con-
cerns to such a low priority may be seriously shortsighted, in view of the
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potential threat and costs” as a greater security benefit could be achieved
by intensifying efforts on human capital issues.
The recent kes/Microsoft “Lagebericht zur Informations-Sicherheit” (sta-
tus report on information security, [142]), an in-depth review of the status
quo of information security in Germany, came to similar conclusions. The
companies taking part in the survey identified their own workforce as the #1
source of threats to the company’s security. Human error and carelessness
are by far the most important causes for endangering potential. More than
half of the companies traced concrete incidents and damages back to these
phenomena. The findings are very similar to the preceding study [245] two
years before. The situation is not likely to improve, staff error is still leading
among the danger areas (cf. Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: Finding of the kes security research study (taken from [254]).
The idea of awareness however is not a restricted to staff members, but
also has to find its way to the minds of senior executives [240]. The biggest
hurdles to an effective improvement of IT security (apart from budgets,
which are always too small) is in fact the lack of awareness on every level
in the enterprise hierarchy [142, 113]. Of course, IT security awareness
is neither restricted to enterprise users. New research from the UK has
found out that 83% of the population do not know enough about protecting
themselves online [240]. Interestingly, to 17% of the people Internet crime
is of greater concern than physical crimes like car theft and mugging.
4.1.2 Related Work
Requirements and components of a successful security awareness training
are worked out by the American NIST (National Institute of Standards
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and Technology) in [177]. There a three-step approach is proposed: As an
introduction, users’ attitude should be changed such that they recognize
the importance of security measures and possible consequences of security
breaches. The actual knowledge transfer is the second and the most exten-
sive step. The purpose of training courses is to enable users to complete
their working tasks more efficiently and securely. Finally, the education of
IT security professionals (“train the trainer”) is outlined.
Based on his rich practical experience, Fox [84] describes a phase model
for the organization of a security awareness campaign in an enterprise: In
the first stage, “marketing” techniques like circular letters or flyers should be
used by the management to gain attention for the campaign and underline
its importance. The actual knowledge transfer which aims to influence users’
attitude is the subject of the second stage. Examples include informational
meetings, automated web-based trainings, or the provision of documenta-
tion and reading materials. As a further fortification, Fox mentions media
coverage by means of internal news letters or publicity gathering actions
like a lottery (stage 3). Depending on their PR strategy, companies may
chose to communicate their awareness activities and the goals achieved to-
wards partners, customers, or even the general public in the final stage of
the programme. Examples of successful awareness campaigns can be found
in [85].
There are various products and events available on the German market
today which aim at improving awareness. The CD-ROM “In’s Internet –
mit Sicherheit” (“Access the Internet – securely”) published by the German
Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or the BSI citizen portal1 are
good starting points. BSI’s Internet course “Baseline IT Security” covers
a wide spectrum of topics – including awareness and information security
education and training. It ranges from risk management and asset classifica-
tion to physical and environmental security. This course lets people proceed
step-by-step or delve directly into single modules. CrypTool2 is – accord-
ing to its self-description – a “demonstration application for cryptography
and employee awareness”. It is more targeted towards advanced users like
students or application developers than towards the main body of computer
users without prior knowledge in the area of cryptography.
1http://www.bsi-fuer-buerger.de
2http://www.cryptool.de
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IT security awareness is paid special attention, for instance by the Uni-
versity of Tennessee, which has its own Information Security Office3. It
provides a couple of short awareness videos, which users can view in their
web browser, covering topics from virus protection to firewalls. The UK
government in cooperation with major national banks, IT and telecommu-
nication companies, has recently launched a large campaign to improve UK
citizens’ knowledge about online security. The Get Safe Online Campaign4
targets both end users and small businesses. It provides in-depth infor-
mation at an online portal, risk assessment questionnaires, and web-based
training guides. What is interesting about this campaign is the fact that it
is not limited to online media, but also includes large-scale roadshows and
further events.
Lecture series and symposia are useful add-ons to an awareness cam-
paign. There are annual lectures series of the Darmstadt Centre for IT
Security (for instance “Secure computer usage in the era of viruses, worms,
and misuse of electronic debit cards” in the summer semester 2004 in coop-
eration with the BSI), or the monthly workshops of the Competence Center
for Applied Security Technology (CAST) and, last but not least, the annual
awareness symposium by Secorvo Security Consulting GmbH.5 User aware-
ness can only be achieved if the operators of IT systems are familiar with
the subject of IT security. A lot of universities offer lectures, seminars, and
internships as their standard programme. IT security is also on the agenda
of vocational education: The Kompetenzzentrum IT-Bildungsnetzwerke6, a
joint project of the IG Metall trade union and the association BITKOM
(Bundesverband Informationswirtschaft, Telekommunikation und neue Me-
dien e.V.), offers a course CD including examination questions for appren-
tices.
4.2 Our Methodology
In this section we motivate and explain our methodology. A short excursus
will also lead us to the subject of learning methods – this analysis will prove
3http://security.utk.edu
4http://www.getsafeonline.org
5See http://www.dzi.tu-darmstadt.de, http://www.cast-forum.de, and http://
www.secorvo.de.
6KIBNET, see http://www.kibnet.org
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useful in estimating the effectiveness of our concept. In the main part of
this section the organization of a campaign according to the Awareness by
Doing methodology is outlined.
4.2.1 Rationale
Besides technical and organizational protection mechanisms, user awareness
and user training are two important pillars of information security. As we
have argued above there is a constantly growing pressure to act on this
field, because today investments in IT security measures are still concen-
trated mostly on technological aspects and thus neglect user sensitization
and training.
Too few companies comprehensively engage in security awareness today.
If they do, they still rely on classical teaching instruments for knowledge
transfer. Among the tools which are used, are written materials in the
form of an IT security “vademecum” that describe data protection and data
security guidelines, computer-based multimedia courses (possibly combined
with online self-tests), face-to-face trainings, and seminars [84, 254, 198].
Seeing is Believing Our hypothesis is that these measures are not suf-
ficient. Computer users in general are slow in changing their habits and
they often do not achieve a lasting effect. This conjecture is backed by a
CERT/CC estimation7 that 80% of all network security problems are due
to weak passwords – a thing which users totally have on toast. Although
most users know the meaning of passwords in an abstract fashion pretty
well, one can often find that they are rather careless about the way they use
them in practice [202]. Users do not believe they are personally at risk – un-
less something happens to them [250]. A similar phenomenon can be found
in the context of email: Although many people may be aware of potential
eavesdropping on their email communication, they may dismiss that as im-
probable or they may be unbothered by it (see Section 2.3.6). Therefore key
components of our approach are so-called penetration tests and a demon-
stration centre, i.e. a computer laboratory, where the working environment
of users and possible attacks can be simulated in a realistic fashion, which
comes close to their own experience.
7SecurityStats Password Security, see www.securitystats.com/tools/password.asp
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Health – a Useful Analogy A telling analogy is due to Siponen [214]
who draws the comparison between security awareness and the way humans
deal with their own state of health: People do not worry about it very much
as long as things go well. However, if something is going wrong, people
suddenly have a strong interest in it. The trouble is that often, once you
are sick, a lot of effort is necessary to recover completely from your illness
– if this is possible at all. Let us stick to this point and the analogy for
a moment. A good example for a successful awareness campaign are the
efforts to fight AIDS/HIV, which started in Germany in the mid-80s and is
still going on to date. The assessment of the effectiveness of these campaigns
is the subject of annual polls which analyse people’s knowledge, attitudes,
and protection behaviour [45]. The education about AIDS is exemplary in
many respects – take for instance the “branding” with its high visibility of
the “mach’s mit” (“use a condom”) logo and motto on posters, in TV spots
etc. But the campaign also shows that one must not slacken the efforts and
eagerness: Infection rates are climbing again, indicators obtained from the
polls become negative, for instance the perception of AIDS as a dangerous
illness or the use of information offers. We believe that studying the results
gained and the methods used in this area surely provide insights for the
planning of information security awareness campaigns, too.
4.2.2 Goal
A security awareness campaign should result in an effective and lasting
change of behaviour in order to minimize the exposure to security threats.
Users should be taught to act in critical situations in such a way that mini-
mizes the risk for themselves and/or their company.
Motivating Users The motivation users have at the beginning of the
campaign has been identified as a crucial factor for the success of the pro-
gramme [198]. In our opinion, it should be clearly pointed out already in
the motivation phase that the user can also personally benefit from the se-
curity awareness campaign. Most users have IT systems in their private
environment (e.g. home computers, mobile phones, PDAs etc.). An increase
in users’ security awareness and a basic understanding of what is the correct
behaviour in security-critical situations thus also protects users’ own IT sys-
tems. This reduces the risk for users of personally suffering from financial
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loss, e.g. by becoming the victim of a phishing attack. The other way round
enterprises also benefit if their employees are aware of security risks on their
personal side as the attack vectors are often similar. For instance think of
the protection against “shoulder surfers” that spy out PINs when users enter
them at an ATM. This attack also applies to login passwords or the PIN of
a SmartCard.
Direct User Involvement The key idea of our concept Awareness by
Doing is the sensitization of users. Users should behave security-adequate
and show a healthy measure of mistrust. They should be capable of dis-
tinguishing harmless situations from security-critical ones and know how to
react appropriately in the latter case. Our concept aims at yielding more
effective and more lasting results than previous awareness programs. In or-
der to achieve this goal the user should play a role as active as possible and
experience dangers first hand instead of only passively consuming informa-
tion. We are not aware of similar approaches that emphasize direct user
involvement as we do.
This approach is comparable to the way children acquire knowledge,
which is an example of learning by doing. Typically children learn something
and change their behaviour by exposing themselves to a certain situation
and by experiencing the consequences of their actions immediately. A child
learns that hotplates or ovens are hot and therefore dangerous by burning its
hand. The feeling of pain illustrates the significance of the property “hot”
much better than a thousand words of its parents.
4.2.3 Learning Techniques
In this section we make a short excursus into the subject of teaching and
learning methods. There are two good reasons why one should apply dif-
ferent didactic and pedagogic methods in an awareness programme: On the
one hand people have different “learning types” which – roughly spoken –
means that the way they learn differs and that their method of choice is more
effective than the others. On the other hand, the combination of different
learning methods provides a higher and longer lasting result [147, 85]. The
latter is a very important point since our concept emphasizes the lastingness
of the contents in the awareness programme.
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Figure 4.2: Kolb’s learning cycle and learning types [147].
Kolb’s Model In the following we give a brief introduction into the classi-
fication of learning types according to Kolb. We refer the reader to [147, 220]
for an introduction. Kolb’s model of experiential learning identifies four
learning types on the basis of two criteria. These criteria refer to the way of
how information is collected and on its subsequent processing respectively.
Distinctions are made by using pairs of antonyms. In the first case, the
pair concrete experience (CE) – abstract conceptualization (AC) is used to
describe the extremes with respect to information grasping or perception.
With respect to information processing, the pair consists of active exper-
imentation (AE) of a concept in a new situation as opposed to reflective
observation (RO). This distinction implies that, for instance, abstract or
reflexive methods are not very well suited for people who prefer learning in
a more concrete way and by experimenting. This statement especially holds
for a subject that is as complex as IT security.
The four types, with a typical profession for each type, are depicted on
the right side of Figure 4.2. Research shows that the population is more or
less equally distributed among the four learning types [220]. It is reasonable
to assume that this is also true for the participants of an enterprise-wide
awareness programme. Kolb also interprets the four modi CE, AC, AE, RO
as the phases of a cyclic, continuous process as it is shown on the left in
Figure 4.2. This view is based on the idea that modes are process steps
which entail one another. For instance, concrete experience can be viewed
as a tool for reflection, reflection in turn brings forth a draft concept. Such a
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concept can again be actively analysed. The learning cycle starts over again
as this analysis has brought up new experience.
Studies have shown that – in order to achieve a high knowledge trans-
fer and retention – it is advisable to combine as many as possible of the
four modes. The retention rate may increase from 20% to 90% if all four
stages instead of a single one are used ([223] cited by [59]). The security lab
approach of Crowley [59] is designed according to these findings. It aims
at creating security awareness for threats (e.g. by sniffers or scanners) in
a computer network. Crowley’s training is organized as follows. An intro-
ductory lecture with a demonstration (mode: RO) is followed by an exercise
where participants are asked to repeat and apply the subject matter (AE) as
well as to answer questions concerning the expected outcome of tests (AC).
After that, they can play with tools in the lab to concretely experience how
network attack and defence works (CE).
Opposed to this, Awareness by Doing puts concrete experience at the
first place. More precisely, this means the concrete experience of one’s own
vulnerability against attacks towards IT systems. After a so-called pene-
tration test (mode: CE) the theoretical background is explained (RO) in
order to let participants abstractly understand the dangers (AC). A test lab
environment in the demonstration centre offers the possibility for practical
experiments (AE). By the combination of all four learning techniques, one
can expect a quantifiable improvement compared with other methods that
use less techniques. In the following our approach is described in detail.
4.2.4 Organization of the Awareness Campaign
The starting point for a campaign according to the Awareness by Doing
concept is the user’s everyday working environment. With respect to the
phase model of Fox (see Section 4.1.2), our campaign is placed in and extends
phases 2 and 3. Before users visit a face-to-face training, they are exposed to
simulated security-critical tasks during the normal business day. This part
of our concept is called penetration test at the working place or pentest@work
for short. After a presentation of the results gained during the pentest, users
receive theoretical and practical training lessons in the demonstration centre
in order to build up a healthy measure of mistrust.
Needless to say an Awareness by Doing campaign – like any other aware-
ness campaign – can either be organized and carried out by the company’s
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own personnel or by external specialists. The latter alternative will probably
be, at least for smaller companies, the method of choice as the preparation
of the pentests may require less efforts if it is done by an experienced service
provider. Besides, particular tools and resources might be necessary, e.g.
password cracking tools or servers that host (artificial) phishing web pages.
4.2.4.1 Penetration Test
The pentest is the first and foremost step. The term pentest is deliberately
chosen to reflect the similarity to the well-known analysis tool in network
or system security (see e.g. [70]). On behalf of the company’s management
participants are tested and observed during (simulated) security-critical sit-
uations at their working place. This phase is strictly limited in time and
serves as a means to “pick up people where they stand” with their knowledge
and habits. The information collected in this step can be used to illustrate
the status quo in subsequent training lessons in the demonstration centre.
Obviously, it is necessary to act very sensitively and to absolutely avoid
embarrassing single employees. An individual’s general right of personality
and data protection has to be weighted conscientiously against the learning
effect connected with revealing the whole story to the auditorium. If the
respective person does not consent, the awareness trainer will in any case
only explain the circumstances of the attack and the reaction of the “victim”
in a way that is sufficiently anonymized such that the individual cannot be
deduced from the information.
Due to legal reasons all measures must be agreed on beforehand with
the works council and the responsible for data protection. The design of
the pentest should respect the victim’s privacy and should avoid to gather
personal data and to come into conflict with data protection regulation.
For instance this implies that private email must be out of the scope of a
simulated attack.
4.2.4.2 Presentation of Results
Rudolph et al. [198] emphasize the importance of real examples as a critical
success factor in an awareness campaign. Such examples should be directly
linked to the respective organisation, the daily work of the employees, and
possible consequences of an attack. Concrete details like the attacker’s goal
and her line of action as well as the sum of possible financial losses or per-
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sonal consequences are the best ingredients of a presentation that guarantees
immediate impact on the audience. However, these pieces of information are
often unknown or not accessible for various reasons. Possibly, attacks have
not been detected at all or details could not be revealed due to legal re-
strictions. The attitude of the management towards the disclosure of past
attacks targeting the company may also stand in the way.
This is the point where pentest@work comes into play. It is the method
of choice to collect illustrative material for the campaign without doing real
harm. The impact on the audience can even be increased when the respec-
tive individual under attack consents to an “outing” and describes in her
own words how she perceived the attack and which (technical or economic)
damages a successful attacker could have caused. Perhaps the victim had in
fact received some warning signals, but then had difficulties in interpreting
them correctly or transforming them into concrete countermeasures. This
experience can be used as the peg to hang on subsequent training, i.e. to
convey the symptoms of an ongoing attack as well as to guide people to
correct behaviour in such a situation.
4.2.4.3 Demonstration Centre
A demonstration centre offers the unique possibility to let participants re-
produce and re-play what was learned in the first step – instead of only
presenting them the subject matter. Interacting with the system under
attack, a user can experiment with various security measures herself and
experience their (in-)effectiveness. Plus, she can try to identify concrete
symptoms that indicate an attack.
In the lab environment a concrete threat can be demonstrated by means
of a memorable example, similar to a “live hacking”. This is a good learning
opportunity for participants that were not yet included in the pentest@work.
Recognizing one’s own vulnerability leaves behind a lasting impression at the
user. The “aha-experience” is the essential impulse to learn about protec-
tion mechanisms and their application. Practical demonstrations go hand
in hand with the imparting of the necessary theoretical background. After
that appropriate countermeasures are introduced and their use is practised in
the lab environment. In such a “sandbox” people can play to their heart’s
content without being afraid of causing security breaches or doing harm.
During that time an expert behind the scenes (similar to the “Wizard of
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Oz” in usability testing) tries to compromise the participants’ systems via
the respective attack vector. The playful character of the whole setting addi-
tionally motivates the participants to increase their level of security. Similar
methods have been already applied successfully in the context of the evalua-
tion of mail user agents for secure email [253], the so-called “Hacker Contest”
at Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt [208], or the UCSB (University of Cal-
ifornia at Santa Barbara) Capture the Flag challenge8 to name but a few.
Small quizzes or competitions can also prove useful in order to motivate a
subject and to point out its general difficulties. Consider for instance Mail-
Frontier’s Phishing IQ Test9. In this test participants are shown screenshots
of a number of web sites. Some of these are genuine sites of popular services
like eBay or Amazon while others are fakes set up by phishers. Past tests
have shown that the rate of correct answers is amazingly low.
4.2.5 Success Control
What we propose is a security awareness training method that is completely
new in large parts. As such it should be subject to an empirical evalua-
tion in order to answer the question whether the long-term learning results
are better than with conventional methods. The realization of a concrete
Awareness by Doing campaign and the corresponding evaluation was out of
the scope of this thesis due the time frame of several years, which would
have been necessary. This is clearly an area for further research.
The evaluation method we consider reasonable is a comparative longi-
tudinal section study in the form of a so-called panel study. During such a
panel study the set of participants remains identical over the whole coverage
period which allows to obtain very precise and individual statements about
learning progress and the change in behaviour. Possible tools include the
observation of, for instance, the action sequences in the demonstration cen-
tre or at the work place as well as successive and periodical interviews. The
observation can be automated to some extent depending on the particular
type of the attack, e.g. it could be assessed automatically whether people
fall for phishing by setting up an appropriate web site and evaluating the
log files. Other types of attack may require more manual interaction. We
estimate the total length of the study to be around 2–3 years. In this case,
8http://www.cs.uscb.edu/∼vigna/CTF/
9http://survey.mailfrontier.com/survey/quiztest.html
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observations should take place at least every 6 months. On the other hand
repeated penetration tests are a means to quantify the lastingness of the
training efforts.
4.3 Examples
To give the reader a conception of our approach, we list some single training
modules that are conceivable for an enterprise-wide Awareness by Doing
campaign. For two modules we will go in a bit more details to give clues
how the pentest@work could be like in practice.
The modules can be combined and extended as required. In particular,
extensions will be necessary where user groups other than the “average” IT
user are to be sensitized (e.g. administrators that are interested in computer
forensics or executive personnel that is about to decide about a budget for
an awareness campaign). Important modules include, but are not limited
to Internet Security, Password Security, Malware, Magnetic Strip and Chip
Cards, Physically Accessible Computers, and Wireless Networking.
4.3.1 Internet Security
The purpose of the module Internet Security is to teach the most impor-
tant threats dealing with Internet-based services as we outlined them in
Section 2.2. Participants should learn how to react appropriately and get
to know reliable sources where they can find information about new threats
that affect the majority of Internet users.
Our concept is explained by means of an example for the case of (in)secure
email: The test person is an employee of a construction company who is re-
sponsible of preparing offers for invitations to bid. During the pentest@work,
the user receives an email with a non-authentic sender address requesting
confidential information. The alleged sender is an employee of a cooperating
company such that the user will probably not be suspicious when asked to
reveal confidential data of an offer she is working on. In the preparation of
the test, an email address is set up at a popular and well-known ISP which
sounds reasonably serious, e.g. AOL or T-Online. The local part of the email
address should contain a known person’s last name and/or the company’s
name in order to obfuscate the victim. The text of the email should be
somehow tailored to the particular situation, but only use information that
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an outsider can gather with some effort, e.g. the department’s name, the
hierarchy of the company and so on. One idea for an attack vector is the
following: The email’s sender address is forged to match a valid address of
the cooperating company. The alleged employee informs his colleague that
he will be out of the office for a few days, but will continue working on the
offer. As he has no possibility to access his company’s email account he
informs the victim to use his private email address instead. A few days later
he will then ask for the desired information.
Assume that the test person obeys to this request – possibly after one
or two “friendly” inquiries that underline the urgency of the issue. After-
wards this short example would be presented in the demonstration centre.
Depending on the consent of the victim, this happens in an anonymous way
or not. A similar attack is then simulated by means of a phishing attack
before theoretical Internet basics would be discussed. The idea of digital
signatures is presented as signatures are one way to fight such threats. Par-
ticipants would be told what digital signatures are, what security goals can
and cannot be achieved with them, and how digital signatures could be put
into practice. Depending on the particular needs of the company, the dis-
cussion can be broadened to cover topics like authentication on the WWW
using SSL (and all its pitfalls we have seen in the two preceding chapters) or
the use of data encryption (for emails and/or files). Finally, the test persons
would be confronted with similar attacks at a later date. Observation and
success control may also include automatic checks on mailboxes in order
to measure the amount of digitally signed and encrypted email. For this
purpose the statistics tool presented in Section 6.6.2 or an extension thereof
could be used.
4.3.2 Password Security
Passwords have always been a key issue of IT security as they are a common
mechanism for access control. We have already touched upon this subject in
Section 2.2.1 and pointed out the known difficulties users have when they are
obliged to manage and recall one or two dozens of different secure passwords.
The pentest@work adresses the following three phenomena, which are often
found in the wild [202, 257].
Password re-use Identical or similar passwords are used for different ser-
vices – no matter which. Therefore a goal of the awareness campaign
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is to teach participants to distinguish between security-critical and
uncritical passwords. For instance the credential used to login in the
company’s PCs should be considered much more sensitive than one for
an Internet forum or a blog.
In order to set a trap to users, the pentest@work may consist for
instance of an announcement of an expert web page or newsletter that
requires a gratis registration where a password has to be chosen.
Low entropy User-chosen passwords have lower entropy than passwords
that are machine-generated, i.e. they are relatively easy to guess as
they are too short or derived from words found in a dictionary. It has
been shown that – even in companies that have an explicit password
policy – one third of the users chose weak passwords [257].
This type of password misconduct can be addressed by brute-force
cracking attempts on the employees’ system login passwords. Here it
is the educational goal of the pentest@work to show that automated
password cracking is feasible on weak passwords.10
Post-it notes Even in cases where users follow the rules of selecting both
strong and different password (or where they are forced to do so by pre-
defined random passwords), they run into trouble recalling the pass-
words later on. Due to the high complexity, passwords get written
down on a piece of paper which is placed near the computer.
As the pentest@work must not invade in the privacy of the employees,
the trainer should only look out for post-it notes under the keyboard
or on the monitor, but not rummage through other person’s desks. A
better alternative is to interview room-mates if they have noticed their
colleague having to look up passwords before login in.
The most illustrative demonstration is surely about how fast user pass-
words in general can be found. On a modern PC, the number of passwords
10The importance of choosing a suitable threat model has already been pointed out
in Section 2.3.2. Here we assume a powerful adversary who can even carry out so-called
oﬄine attacks on images of passwords under a one-way function (e.g. the Linux system
file /etc/passwd). This model also covers the password-based protection of cryptographic
softtokens in transit or on hard disk and eavesdroppers on the local network that intercept
a login process to a web page protected by HTTP Digest Authentication (see Section 7.2.1)
.
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that password crackers like John the Ripper11 can probe is on the order of
200.000 per second. The company RainbowCrack12 already has large pre-
computed tables of hash values and offers password cracking as a service.
A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows the security of passwords
against brute-force attacks in relation to length and alphabet. These values
can be communicated slogan-like.
Before users are invited to a central Awareness by Doing kick-off meeting,
the organizers try to find out their passwords. In cases where the brute-force
attack succeeds, the passwords are printed out and handed over to the re-
spective persons in a sealed envelope at the beginning of the meeting. These
persons are then asked to open the envelope and confirm that what they
have got is really their password. After that, requirements towards good
passwords are formulated and algorithms are explained that allow users to
generate secure, but still usable passwords derived from a secret mnemonic
sentence (see e.g. [257]). Furthermore, the training would address practical
problems like strategies for the management of multiple accounts or mech-
anisms for setting file access rights properly to avoid password sharing. A
subsequent pentest@work may, for instance, also include social engineering
attacks and attempts to elicit passwords by telephone or email.
4.3.3 Malware
This module treats classical instances of malicious code like viruses, Trojan
horses, and worms by studying known examples of the past and their de-
structive potential. Then the correct handling of malware is explained and
practised. For this purpose, a sandbox-environment is used where malware
can reproduce itself without doing real harm. Malware that spreads fast and
produces a drastic reaction is most suitable for educational purposes. If nec-
essary, special demo software should be used. Tools for system or network
analysis allow the participants to monitor how fast the malware spreads and
to quantify the slowdown.
4.3.4 Magnetic Strip and Chip Cards
The vast majority of the German population possesses at least one chip card
or plastic card with a magnetic strip. In this module it is shown how easily a
11http://www.openwall.com/john/
12http://www.rainbowcrack.com
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magnetic strip can be read out and copied to another card. Test participants
are exposed to situations where the card is read with an unauthorized reader,
for instance using a counterfeit card reader which asks people for their card
in order to grant them access to the canteen. Alternatively, the cashier takes
the card away in another room that cannot be observed by the participant.
As a second step, it is demonstrated how attackers manage to learn one’s
PIN, e.g. by manipulated card readers, small video cameras, or shoulder-
surfing [192]. In the demonstration centre practical examples are dealt with.
Test persons should learn how to recognize genuine card readers and whether
a genuine reader (e.g. an ATM) has been tampered with. They should also
learn at which occasions it is necessary to enter a PIN.
4.3.5 Physically Accessible Computers
Computers that are physically accessible by an attacker are much more
easier to manipulate than systems that can only be reached via a network
connection. Users should understand that each of their files can be read out
if an attacker sits in front of their machine. During the pentest@work, we
try to boot the test persons’ computer from a CD or a USB stick and steal
a file (e.g. a word processor file that has been recently changed by the user).
This file is then presented to the user in the demonstration centre (without
revealing the contents to others). Encrypting file systems are discussed as
one possible countermeasure against this type of attack.
4.3.6 Wireless Networking
There are two main threats to wireless networks, namely unauthorized ac-
cess and eavesdropping on the communication between access point and the
mobile computer. As the majority of employees is typically not responsi-
ble for WLAN access control in their professional context, we concentrate
ourselves to eavesdropping during the penetration test. A selected part of
the intercepted data is given to the participant and possibly shown in the
demonstration centre. Companies often require a user login via a web page
before access to the wireless network is granted. Therefore, another idea
would be to set up rogue access point and fake the login page (again this
targets how users deal with SSL as a security mechanism).
More and more people are also using WLANs at home. For those users
we explain standard attacks to gain unauthorized access and show how to
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fight them. We present solutions like an adequate encryption and an ef-
fective access control mechanism at the access point (using cryptographic
techniques).
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we introduced a new approach to user sensitisation and IT
security awareness training. User studies have shown that users do not
believe they are personally at risk and therefore they are not motivated
to learn how to operate secure applications properly. This is the reason
why our method Awareness by Doing strongly focusses on exposing users
directly to threats in order to draw attention, instead of only explaining
them what could theoretically happen. By putting motivation at the first
place and mixing several learning methods we aim at initiating an effective
and lasting change in behaviour. Previous research results suggest that a
combination of both should indeed yield significantly better retention rates
and a higher lastingness compared to other awareness campaigns.
We sketched the concept of a panel study, which may serve as an evalu-
ation tool to measure the quality of the new method in comparison to other
approaches in the long term. As a future project a campaign according to
this new paradigm should be planned, carried out, and assessed over the
whole duration. We estimate that 2–3 years should be an ideal length for
the a campaign to gather reasonable data. The initial costs for preparing
the pentest@work units, instructing trainers, setting up the demonstration
centre etc. are likely to exceed those of a “classical” awareness campaign.
However, we expect that this investment will pay back in the medium term.
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Chapter 5
Outsourcing Security to an
Organization
When speaking of computer systems,
never use the word “secure”.
– Donald Rumsfeld
Trust is good, control is better.
– Vladimir I. Lenin
The discussion and the examples in Chapter 3 give an impression on how
challenging it is to set up and operate a trustcenter. And, note that up to
now we have mainly looked at the pure technical, PKI-related issues, e.g.
the definition of certificate profiles or the realization of the enrolment. But
“conventional” safety and security measures are the other side of the coin –
a myriad of things falls into this category: for instance physical protection
for the trustcenter facility, organizational and personnel security controls,
(legal) requirements for audit logging and records archival, general computer
and network security issues, or redundancy and fail safe mechanisms (see
e.g. [8, 55, 236] to get an impression).
In order to achieve a reasonable level of security in the PKI, obviously one
has to take care of a lot of aspects (weakest link property). Companies con-
sidering PKI adoption may have the possibility of choosing between “built or
buy” provided they have enough resources for their own, in-house trustcen-
ter. For the majority of organizations, and especially for smaller companies,
145
146
an outsourced PKI (or “managed PKI” as it is sometimes called) is the alter-
native of choice. However, although many companies regard IT outsourcing
as a good thing, they have reservations about outsourcing security-critical
tasks [120]. One important reason for this is the fact that companies do not
want to give away complete control over their security [249]. This sceptical
attitude proved appropriate as a concrete incident showed, which caused an
immense public stir [164, 62]. In this case the service provider had issued at
least two non-legitimate code signing certificates on behalf of the customer,
putting potentially millions of relying parties at risk of being attacked by
malicious code that appears to come from a trusted source.
In this chapter we first look at how outsourcing can be realized in a PKI
and what the security implications are. A new method for the effective pro-
tection of the enrolment process is presented and analysed in Section 5.2. It
enforces a cryptographically strong four-eyes principle, which can be applied
both to outsourced and non-outsourced PKIs. A prototype for the issuance
of X.509-compliant certificates using RSA or discrete log-based signature
schemes (DSA, EC-DSA) is also described. The process is completely trans-
parent for PKI users and relying parties. For instance, it can be retro-fitted
seamlessly in an existing trustcenter installation, but one can choose flexi-
bly from a set of integration variants. Secure multi-party computations are
an important building block of our method. A short introduction into this
cryptographic concept is the subject of Section 5.3. To be effective from
a security perspective, our outsourcing approach requires a distributed key
generation. We had to rule out existing schemes as they are too slow for our
particular case. A new and efficient distributed RSA key generation pro-
tocol is described in Section 5.4. Finally, we propose two new applications
of threshold cryptography in the field of secure email. One of them tackles
the problem of delegation (which is in the focus of Chapter 7 for the case
of WWW credentials), the other shows how to protect an enterprise email
gateway from key theft.
The presentation in this chapter is based on and guided by our research
papers [227, 226, 229], the new enrolment scheme is also the subject of the
patent application [231].
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5.1 Motivation
In this section we describe the outsourcing scenario with a distinction of
CA and RA (registration authority) between service provider and customer.
This is the common logical and business model of commercial trustcenters
like VeriSign, Entrust, and the like. However, there is a striking weakness
in the certificate enrolment protocol that has proven to be security critical.
At least one inglorious incident is publicly known where two big players
(Microsoft and VeriSign) were involved (see below).
5.1.1 PKI Outsourcing Scenario
In Chapter 3 we have already outlined the main components of a trustcen-
ter and their interdependencies. Here we only consider centralized PKIs as
this is the natural choice in an enterprise setting where outsourcing is rele-
vant. The three key modules of a trustcenter are the (actual) certification
authority, one or more (local or decentralised) registration authorities, and
a certificate/CRL directory (DIR). We assume that there is a division of
labour between CA and RA in that the CA is the central and trustworthy
party that issues certificates while the RA is responsible of registering users
prior to this step. The distinction between those entities is motivated by
security reasons, too. Having in mind the specific requirements of CA, RA,
and DIR, the canonical solution is to outsource the task of operating the
CA and the DIR to a service provider and keeping the RAs in-house. This
situation is depicted in Figure 5.1. Let us briefly explain this choice:
In order to provide strong protection and a high confidence level, a CA
has to enforce security on multiple layers as we mentioned at the beginning
of this chapter, ranging from cryptography, organizational precautions (con-
cerning workflows, trustworthy personnel) to physical protection like access
control, brick-and-mortar protection against particular attacks (break-in,
destruction etc.). To cut a long story short, these mechanisms, when ap-
plied correctly are very expensive, very likely too expensive for a small or
medium enterprise when compared to the small number of certificates issued.
On the other hand, the public key directory has large demands for round-
the-clock availability. PKIs can only be effective if certificates are available
implying that the appropriate directory (typically an LDAP or HTTP in-
terface) is available with very low downtimes. Plus, another task of the
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Figure 5.1: General PKI outsourcing setting.
directory is to ensure timely dissemination of revocation lists which is in
fact security-critical. Relying clients can be configured to retrieve a CRL
and check the certificate in question against this CRL each time a certificate
is used. CRLs are short-lived (e.g. 30 days or less) and are thus updated
frequently. Experience has shown that directories in fact have to withstand
large numbers of requests.1 Again, the reliability of the directory services is
mainly determined by the skills of the provider and monetary factors (yield-
ing to high redundancy, fast hardware, fast network connection etc.). The
task of maintaining a directory is itself not security-critical as certificates and
CRLs are protected against tampering through the signatures they carry.
5.1.2 A Critical Weakness in the Current Realisation
In the following we sketch a typical enrolment process in order to show an
important security risk in the PKI outsourcing scenario described before.
Decentralised Enrolment The process we look at in more detail is the
so-called decentralised enrolment. The term “decentralised” signifies that
end users generate their key pair locally, e.g. using a dedicated PKI client or
a standard web browser (see Section 3.2.4). The whole process is depicted
in Figure 5.2. It is initiated by the key pair generation, which goes hand
in hand with the creation of the corresponding certification request. This
1So large that the servers even may break down completely. This happened with
VeriSign Inc. in 2004, see http://computercops.biz/article4646.html.
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Figure 5.2: Typical certificate enrolment process.
request may, for instance, have the form of a PKCS#10 file (which is the
case for browser-generated keys). Alternatively, a user may pack her public
key in a self-signed certificate. The request is transferred to the next RA
in step 2 where its authenticity (and legitimacy) is checked. This message
(step 3) needs to be authenticated, e.g. by the user presenting herself at the
RA, to establish a binding between the entity and the public key. In order
to trigger the certification process, the RA passes on approved request to
the CA in step 4. This may happen in a bulk mode where several requests
are bundled in a digitally signed container (like a PCKS#7 file). Note,
that this signature has nothing to do with the signature of the certificate.
Upon receiving the requests, the CA verifies their integrity and starts the
production of certificates. The CA may be oﬄine, i.e. not connected to the
network, such that this step may require manual intervention (i.e. carrying
a storage medium from one computer to another). Finally, certificates get
published in an online directory (step 6). For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that end users retrieve their own certificate from DIR (directly or
indirectly via a web interface or the like).
Security Critique Security arguments motivate the RA/CA distinction:
Firstly, a level of indirection is used to protect the PKI’s certification key,
its most valuable asset. CAs often run on machines disconnected from the
network and far from the end user. The second reason is that a certificate can
only be as “strong” (i.e. meaningful) as the underlying registration process.
150 5.1. MOTIVATION
It is assumed that this process can be best done by decentralised RA offices
which are closer to the end user. Behind the sharing of responsibilities
there is also the implicit idea to achieve a four-eyes or double verification
principle. This principle claims that two different parties (who might be
natural or legal persons) are involved to complete certain crucial processes.
In the PKI setting, the issuance of certificates as the most security-
critical task falls into this category. However, in practice the process is not
as strong as intended. We claim that there exists a high, immanent risk in
an outsourced PKI. As the certificates which the CA issues are not tied to
the RA’s request, the CA could issue certificates on behalf of the customer in
an uncontrollable way. A fraudulent employee of the CA could impersonate
legitimate individuals of the company or generate new identities at will –
not to mention the theft of the certification key. As a consequence, relying
parties may fall for this kind of identity theft. They may place trust in such
certificates possibly revealing confidential data to attackers or consider data
as authentic which is not.
Attack Vector We believe that this is an intolerable, yet realistic threat.
Unfortunately Murphy’s Law had proven us right. A severe incident was
reported in 2001 when one or more attackers managed to impersonate Mi-
crosoft by means of fraudulent certificates [164, 244]. Microsoft uses code-
signing certificates issued by VeriSign’s CA to disseminate executable code,
e.g. Windows updates, in an authentic way. It was detected in spring 2001
that more than two months ago (!) VeriSign had produced two certificates
with “OU = Microsoft Corporation, CN = Microsoft Corporation, L =
Redmond, S = Washington, C = US, OU = Digital ID Class 3 - Microsoft
Software Validation v2, . . . ” as their subject DN. The certificates were suit-
able for secure mail and code-signing. As the issuing CA is a pre-configured
trust anchor in the Windows OS, the clients would readily access these two
certificates as genuine.
The exact circumstances of the incident were not disclosed. It is un-
known whether attackers had exploited this weakness and in what form. It
is conceivable that Trojan horses may have been distributed with a digital
signature declaring them as genuine Microsoft code. The effective window
of vulnerability also exceeded the two month between issuance and the pub-
lication of the incident and the revocation of the certificates in question:
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Although a new CRL was available in VeriSign’s directory, clients did not
update it automatically as they did not know where to search for CRLs. As
a final resort Microsoft had to distribute the CRLs via a software update.
5.2 New Enrolment Protocol
Above we argued that there is an intolerable risk that an outsourced CA
may issue certificates that have never been requested. We have seen that
indeed this threat is not unrealistic. As a countermeasure we propose a new
enrolment scheme. To be effective, a four-eyes principle should be enforced
in a cryptographic, not only an organizational way.
In this section we first list four abstract requirements towards a better
enrolment protocol. Based on the observations above, these requirements
are motivated by security and practical needs. In particular, we demand
that the new protocol should be resistant against the before-mentioned at-
tack. Apart from this, it should not make further assumptions and work in
the same setting as described above. Based on the requirements we explain
the big picture and the details of our realisation from Section 5.2.2 onward.
We deal with related work concerning practical applications of threshold
cryptography in general in Section 5.2.7. Due to its extent, the crypto-
graphic details of distributed signatures and key generation are postponed
to Section 5.3, the body of corresponding related work is reviewed there.
5.2.1 Requirements
For the sake of simplicity, we describe the protocol from the viewpoint of a
service provider which serves a single customer. We also assume that there
is a single certification authority (denoted CA) which certifies all end entities
using the key pair 〈priv, pub〉. Customers may need more than one CAs that
issue certificates for different purposes, e.g. certificates for employees who
use secure email and certificates for web servers. Extending the model to
multiple CAs is straightforward as those CAs are independent from each
other in that they have separate key pairs. What we seek is a solution
meeting the following requirements:
(R1) The protocol must support multiple registration authorities RAi, 1 ≤
i ≤ n, assigned to CA.
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(R2) Every creation of a certificate signed by priv requires the cooperation
of CA and RAi for an arbitrary i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This condition is also
sufficient.
(R3) A trusted third party (i.e. different from CA,RAi) must not be involved
in parts of the protocol where secret information is handled.
(R4) The protocol must output a standard-compliant certificate, which cur-
rent PKI-clients can verify using pub as a trust anchor.
Let us briefly discuss the motivation behind each condition: (R1) is a
natural condition as the customer may want to decentralise its registration
offices (see the discussion above). Our protocol provides support for multiple
RAs (see Section 5.2.4). The second requirement is due to the observation
that, in PKIs using the standard protocol, CA is always able to issue certifi-
cates completely on its own, i.e. without a legitimate certificate request (see
above).
An external party being substantially involved in the process interferes
with the idea of a four-eye principle. This motivates (R3). Consider a
scenario where a company outsources CA to a service provider, but remains
in charge of the registration. From the company’s viewpoint, there is no
difference in having to trust – to a large extent – the service provider or
another third party (both is undesirable). To be useful in existing PKI
environments, the protocol must support standard techniques (especially
concerning the certificate format) to avoid the deployment of additional
client software (R4).
5.2.2 Big Picture
From now on we assume that the CA is operated by the service provider
and the RA is under the control of the customer. using the terms CA (RA)
and service provider (customer) as synonyms, we now show how our design
fulfils the requirements above.
Shared Digital Signatures The basic idea of the new approach is to
apply a secret sharing of priv and to provide the parties with the corre-
sponding shares, say priv1 and priv2 such that (R2) is satisfied. This means
that the private key is not kept at a single location, but spread over two (or
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more) parties such that no party alone can find out the secret value based
on its knowledge. More precisely, a threshold function sharing scheme [201]
is required since priv must not be reconstructed during signature genera-
tion (otherwise, a single party would be able to subsequently create certifi-
cates on its own, contradicting (R2)). Appropriate schemes for “shared”
or “distributed” signatures are available for standard-compliant RSA [36]
and DSA [159]. They take as input the message m to be signed and return
signpriv(m), the regular digital signature of m with the key priv. These al-
gorithms require multiple local computations of each party and two or four
rounds of communication, the details of which are given in Section 5.3.2. In
any case, a relying party can verify signpriv(m) solely with pub as usual and
is ignorant of the way of how the signature was generated.
The Need for Distributed Key Generation During an initialisation
phase, a private key and the secret shares for the respective parties have
to be generated. We cannot delegate this task to a trusted dealer, a party
different from customer and service provider. The reason is (R3). The
parties have to use a shared key generation protocol instead because the
dealer may ally himself with one of the parties in order to discover priv.
Fortunately, protocols for shared key generation are available, too. While
the shared generation of DSA keys is very efficient for the two-party case,
this did not hold so far for RSA. An efficient protocol, which is due to Boneh
and Franklin [32], allows three or more parties to generate an RSA key pair
in a way such that neither of the parties obtains information about the
private key. However, if two of three parties in the Boneh-Franklin protocol
work together, they can find out the key. This precludes the involvement of
a third entity as a helper party because malicious coalitions of customer and
helper or service provider and helper again could reconstruct the key. We
devised a scheme tailored for the two-party case which is significantly more
efficient than previously known methods. It is the subject of Section 5.4.
5.2.3 Protocol Variants
Our new approach requires no fundamental change in the processes in a PKI
and therefore allows an integration into existing structures. As usually, we
assume that the registration takes place in a decentralised fashion as it was
the case before. The concrete realization depends on the signature scheme
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that is used, the mapping of the roles in the distributed scheme to the CA
and RA, and the way of how the corresponding protocol messages are added
to the process shown in Figure 5.2. As stated above, a distributed RSA or
DSA signature requires a 2-way or 4-way communication respectively. We
assume that the message to be signed, i.e. the certificate body, is a priori
known to both parties. We assume that priv1 and priv2 denote shares of a
private key which can be reconstructed by combining them. This relation is
expressed by writing priv = combineshares(priv1, priv2).
Full Integration Supporting Multi-Way Protocols The most generic
way to integrate the distributed signature into the enrolment protocol is to
modify step 5 of the protocol shown in Figure 5.2. As CA does no longer
create the signature on its own, a bilateral communication with the RA
is necessary. We call this variant “full integration” as it requires certain
changes on both sides. It is depicted in Figure 5.3. A benefit of this approach
is its generic nature as it can be used with any distributed signature scheme,
no matter how many communication rounds it requires. Besides, the roles
in the distributed signing protocol can be assigned to the CA and RA in an
arbitrary way.
Figure 5.3: New enrolment protocol – full integration variant.
However, this variant creates the need either for an online CA, which is
able to communicate with the RA in real time, or for manual processing as
the data has to be transported from a machine connected to the network
on to the oﬄine CA and back. Oﬄine CAs always require such manual
data transport, but the distributed signing protocol increases the number of
such steps. In order to minimize the changes of interfaces at the side of an
online CA, the functionality for shared signatures could be encapsulated in a
PKCS#11-compatible “proxy” that appears as a black box to the trustcenter
software at the CA. Such a proxy would open a network connection to an
RA process and would access CA’s local key store via PKCS#11 [194] (or
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Figure 5.4: New enrolment protocol – request-less certification variant.
another standard interface). This allows CA to re-use existing HSMs or
SmartCards.
Request-less Certification The name of this variant is inspired by the
observation that the approved requests in step 4 in Figure 5.2 could be
omitted in favour of “partially” signed certificates in case a 2-way commu-
nication scheme for the signature is used. We consider an abstract 2-way
scheme, which we modelled by two functions representing each of the proto-
col messages: Let partialsign denote a place holder for the computation
of the first party in the protocol, it takes the message to be signed m and
the private key share priv1 as input. The value σ := partialsignpriv1(m) is
sent along the channel. The second applies the function countersign to its
private key share priv2 and the value σ to obtain
countersignpriv2(partialsignpriv1(m)) = signpriv(m).
If RA is assigned the first role and CA the second, one obtains the variant
depicted in Figure 5.4. In comparison to the previous variant, it requires
one communication step less under the assumption that RA already knows
the complete contents of the certificate body. As a result of the registration
process, an RA always knows the public key and the name of the subject to
be certified and the name of the corresponding CA. The remaining variable
parameters are the certificate serial number and its validity period. The
former may be either obtained by increasing an internal counter, which is
known by RA and CA or by taking the hash value of the subject public key,
which is also common practice [128]. The latter may be determined by the
RA and cross-checked by the CA.
Seamless CA Integration with Post-Processing We can obtain an-
other variant for the 2-way case by exchanging the roles of the parties in the
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shared signature protocol. Now CA computes partialsign and RA counter-
signs the intermediate result. Under the condition that for all m and priv1
the equality
partialsignpriv1(m) = signpriv1(m)
holds, this variant allows seamless integration in an existing trustcenter at
CA. The only thing that has to be changed there is the prior generation
of a key pair 〈priv, pub〉 (with an extra tool) and step 5. Here we let CA
use a share priv1 of the private key instead of a “complete” private key.
The condition above holds for RSA such that the post-processing variant
should be adoptable by any trustcenter software as RSA is the most common
signature scheme. Obviously, the output of CA in this case is an X.509
certificate without a valid signature with respect to the public key pub. As
such it must not be published immediately on the directory.
This is where the post-processing is brought up. One can think of two
different directories, one that is publicly accessible and one that temporarily
stores the pending certificates coming from the CA. An alternative is to use
only one directory and write the pending certificate of a user in a hidden
entry which is only visible by the RA. In each case a process at the RA
scans the directory for new entries, checks and countersigns them, and writes
the complete certificates back at the appropriate location. This variant is
depicted in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: New enrolment protocol – post-processing variant.
5.2.4 Multiple RAs
The first of our requirements was the support of multiple RAs. Our ap-
proach in fact allows multiple RAs, but does not mandate that all of them
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use the same enrolment variant. There are basically two ways which dif-
fer in the key pair they use. A straight-forward variant is to use a two-
stage hierarchy where service provider and customer share the private keys
priv(i), i = 0, 1, . . . of several key pairs, say 〈priv(0), pub(0)〉, 〈priv(1), pub(1)〉, . . .
The key pair 〈priv(0), pub(0)〉 has a special role as it is used to issue certifi-
cates for the other public keys pub(1), pub(2), . . . The situation is depicted in
Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Multiple RAs – hierarchical variant.
In this variant new RAs can be added easily by letting service provider
and customer generate a new key pair in a distributed protocol and have
its public key certified by the topmost priv(0). A small drawback of this
approach is the fact that the certificate chain gets longer and the chains
differ for certificate holders of the same company. This should usually be no
problem. If it is, it can be avoided by the following approach: Only one key
pair 〈priv, pub〉 is used, but this key pair is shared in several different ways,
i.e. we have
priv = combineshares(priv
(1)
1 , priv
(1)
2 )
= combineshares(priv
(2)
1 , priv
(2)
2 ) = . . .
In this case customer and service provider set up the system by gen-
erating one key pair (in a distributed protocol). Later they can add RAs
as required by computing new shares. This process is called the re-sharing
of priv. For all i the shares priv
(i)
1 remain with the service provider while
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the priv
(i)
2 are known by the decentralised RAs. Depending on which RA
processes a request, the CA selects the appropriate share priv
(i)
1 . The result-
ing certificates do not reveal which RA was actually involved. This situation
is depicted in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7: Multiple RAs – single key pair variant.
5.2.5 Security Properties
All of the three proposed protocol variants solve the problem of enforcing
a cryptographically four-eyes principle between RA and CA. This method
is by far stronger than relying on organizational and procedural controls or
some sort of RA/CA trust relationship. Only cryptography can effectively
prevent the CA from deviating from the enrolment protocol. It can be shown
that neither the service provider, nor the customer has enough information
to issue certificates on its own. This also holds for the case of multiple RAs.
Exemplary proof details are given in Section 5.3.
One might argue that other mechanisms could also do to prevent fraud in
an outsourcing scenario. For instance, the service provider could commit to
a legally binding CP/CPS. Furthermore, the service provider could be made
the obligation to archive certificate request in a tamper-proof and verifiable
way. However, the secure long-term archival of signed data is a complex
and costly process [37]. Besides, it is not very effective against the threat
of a malicious CA as the customer has to suspect fraud and has to have the
corresponding certificate in hand before it can demand the CA to show a
valid request.
There is also not the same level of security if one tries to implement a
four-eyes principle on the software or operational level. Consider the prac-
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tical aspects of a trustcenter operator: there are typically a larger number
of roles to be matched to internal processes – for an example see e.g. [236]
where the role model of FlexiTrust is described. Among those roles are
system administrators who configure and maintain the hard- and software.
This is an obvious crunch point in the relation between customer and service
provider. At the system management level a four-eyes principle between the
two cannot be enforced when the platform is under the sole control of the
service provider’s personnel.
5.2.6 Prototype
As a proof-of-concept, a prototype for the new enrolment protocol has been
implemented. It is written in Java using the FlexiProvider2 cryptographic
library and the Fraunhofer ASN.1 Codec3. The package supports all three
enrolment variants, RSA as well as DSA, and both variants for multiple
RAs. For the latter purpose, there is a Split class in the package which
takes a key pair, computes shares of the private key, and stores them in
the Java keystore or PKCS#12 format. This class can also be used to
simulate key generation for testing. (Distributed RSA key generation is a
time-consuming task – even with our optimized algorithm, as we can see
in Section 5.4.) The various shared signature generation methods take as
input a self-signed (end entity) certificate instead of a PKCS# 10 request.
For testing purposes such certificates can easily be generated by using e.g.
OpenSSL or Java’s keytool. The content of the certificate with a shared
signature can be configured freely.
RSA The classes Sign and Countersign provide methods to locally com-
pute partial RSA signatures4 and realize the combination of two partial
signatures into a single one respectively. Similar methods are available in a
network-enabled version that can be used in the first and the second enrol-
ment variant. The real-time online protocol is realized by TCP/IP socket
communication. As a consequence all payload data can be secured by tun-
nelling the communication through SSL or SSH.
2http://www.flexiprovider.de
3http://www.semoa.org
4Remember that partialsignpriv
1
(m) = signpriv
1
(m) holds in the case of RSA.
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The computational costs for Sign and Countersign are nearly identical
as the latter differs from the former only by one modular multiplication. The
costs for each party are higher by a factor of 4 compared with the standard
RSA signature computed by one party alone. By way of experiments we
found that the signing (and hashing) of a 1 KByte message with a 2048 bit
key takes 0.636 seconds instead of 0.171 (Pentium IV processor with 1.8 GHz,
averaged over 100 measurements). The reason for this slowdown is the fact
that the parties cannot use the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) to speed
up computations as they do not know the factorization of the modulus. Up
to now, we considered standard RSA key pairs with a two-prime modulus.
In case our new shared key generation scheme is used, the outcome is a
three-prime modulus. The average time in this case is 0.240 seconds (here
CRT can be applied as each party knows two of the three factors).
DSA As the DSA shared signature scheme of MacKenzie and Reiter [159],
which we have chosen to implement, is a 4-move protocol, only the generic
enrolment variant can be supported. The time for shared signature genera-
tion over a TCP/IP link is 2.097 seconds on average. Here we used a 1024
bit key (log2(p) = 1024, log2(q) = 160).
In the current prototype we made use of the Paillier cryptosystem [180]
as a building block in the protocol. Other semantically secure cryptosystems
with a similar homomorphic property are conceivable (see Section 5.4.1.1 for
further examples). The modular structure of the code allows to exchange
them flexibly. This is a desirable feature as one often does not want to rely
on a single security assumption.
Furthermore, our package contains routines for the shared generation
of DSA key pairs (also in the MacKenzie-Reiter setting). An experimental
implementation shows that shared key generation over the network takes
less than one minute (43.1 seconds) on average for 1024 bit keys.
5.2.7 Related Work
Threshold cryptography is already used in several applications: Examples
include a “virtual SmartCard” realized by splitting a private key into two
halves, one derived from a user password and the other one stored on a cen-
tral server (see [158] and www.singlesignon.net). Such a virtual Smart-
Card allows instant key revocation similar to the online semi-trusted party
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which uses “mediated RSA” described in [31]. It has been shown in the
course of the ITTC project5 how the private key of an SSL-enabled Apache
web server can be protected with threshold cryptography. Threshold cryp-
tography was also a design criterion for the protection of the signing key
in SET (Secure Electronic Transaction, see hhtp://www.setco.org).6 Dis-
tributed RSA signing was also used in the context of a time stamping service
hosted on three or five serves [13]. During setup, the servers engage in a
distributed protocol to generate a shared RSA key.
A four-eyes principle between RA and CA could also be enforced in a
related, but slightly different way. The same security level is achieved if
all certificates that are issued carry two digital signatures from independent
parties. A similar idea can be found in fail-safe concepts (cf. page 39) where
two mathematically independent algorithms are used. Here the purpose is
to face the risk that a signature algorithm may become cryptographically
weak over time [161]. Although, double signatures are not conforming to
X.509 (and would violate the requirement (R4)), they are explicitly an op-
tion in the OpenPGP certificate format [48]. Nevertheless, there are some
drawbacks to this ad-hoc solution: Firstly, the costs for certificate validation
are doubled as two signatures have to be checked. Secondly, such a policy
saying that both signatures should be verified cannot be enforced with cur-
rent applications. Thirdly, double signatures reveal internal details of the
company’s PKI, which may not be desirable for various reasons.
5.3 Secure Multi-Party Computations
In this section the problem of distributed key generation is addressed. The
two-party setting is the most important one for our application. Neverthe-
less, we give the reader a short introduction and a survey on related work
by looking at the general case of multi-party computations and multi-party
key generation respectively.
We postpone the treatment of discrete log-based signature schemes to
Section 5.3.2 and now look at RSA, which is without doubt still the most
wide-spread digital signature algorithm in use today. There are in fact ef-
5Intrusion Tolerance via Threshold Cryptography, see [256].
6Note that SET also uses a mechanism called dual signatures [70]. This must not
be confused with threshold signatures as here the word dual refers to the simultaneous
signature (with a “standard” private key) of two messages.
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ficient algorithms to generate an RSA key pair in a distributed fashion,
namely the protocol of Boneh and Franklin which has been shown to be
efficient for practical purposes. However, this protocol cannot be trans-
ferred literally to the case of less than three parties which excludes it from
our scenario. Attempts have been made to solve the problem of two-party
RSA key generation. Proposals are due to Cocks [56, 57], Gilboa [102], and
Poupard/Stern [185]. A first prototypical implementation of Gilboa’s proto-
col and two of the proposed variants (homomorphic encryption and oblivious
transfer) therein [140] suggests that this algorithm is not very practical. The
time for key generation on a local area network (LAN) is more than three
hours for a 1024-bit RSA key using the homomorphic encryption variant.
This would be by far too slow for most applications.
We thus propose a new protocol that is asymptotically faster than all pre-
vious two-party schemes. Those schemes have in common their quadratic
complexity (in the bit length of the modulus). Our scheme removes this
structural weakness as it has only linear complexity. Performance mea-
surements have shown that key generation with our algorithm takes on the
order of half an hour for a 1536-bit RSA key. Since our methodology falls
back on techniques from several papers ([32, 34, 25, 102]), these ideas are
summarized in the following paragraphs.
5.3.1 General Setting
Before considering distributed key generation algorithms in particular, we
briefly recall the basics of general secure multi-party computations. We do
not go too much into details here but refer the reader to the literature for a
thorough treatment (e.g. [49, 108]). In the following, we mainly adopt the
terminology and notation of Goldreich’s textbooks [107, 108].
5.3.1.1 Network and Attacker Model
In a typical setting for a distributed multi-party protocol, a fixed number,
say m, of parties is pairwise connected by a (reliable, but not necessarily
private) communication channel. Each party contributes a secret local input
si and – in order to allow randomized algorithms – the content ri of its
“random tape” to the protocol. The parties exchange messages with each
other in order to execute a distributed “software application” that computes
a function F mapping an m-ary input vector s¯ := (s1, . . . , sm) to an output
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vector of the same length. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that
the message exchange is organized in a number of rounds such that in each
round, each party sends (and receives) exactly m − 1 messages (some of
them may be the empty string λ). After the last round, each party obtains
its own result (or “local output”) which equals the respective coordinate in
the result vector F (s¯).
Adversaries In this setting, an adversary may corrupt a subset of the
parties that take part in the computation. Such a subset is often called a
coalition while the respective parties are said to be “dishonest” or “corrupt”.
Loosely speaking, the protocol should provide security in that the dishonest
parties do not obtain information that is not already implicitly given by
their local inputs or the result of the computation. The idea behind this
approach is logically based on the so-called “simulation paradigm” where one
thinks of a practical protocol as an “emulation” of its “ideal” counterpart.
Such an ideal protocol relies on a trusted third party that runs the desired
algorithm, which is the same as in the real counterpart. It has a rather simple
communication model as the parties just submit their inputs to the trusted
party which does all the computations alone and then in turns sends back
the outputs, one to each party. The (real) protocol is considered secure if the
advantage of an adversary is the same as in the imaginary model. Precise
definitions are given below.
Adversaries can be characterized by
• their computational power (e.g. probabilistic polynomial time or un-
bound),
• their behaviour during the execution of the protocol (“active” or “pas-
sive”, see below),
• the (maximum) number (or ratio) of corrupt parties, and
• the information whether the set of dishonest parties is fixed for the
course of the protocol.
Throughout this section we consider coalitions that are arbitrary, but
fixed before the protocol starts. We restrict ourselves to adversaries that
behave passively. Such adversaries are also called “semi-honest” as they fol-
low the protocol to the letter, but are allowed to record all the messages they
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receive and do arbitrary extra computations on them. This is also called the
honest-but-curious scenario. Observe that there is a generic technique [108]
to turn a two-party protocol that is secure in this scenario into an equiva-
lent protocol that is secure against active adversaries. Active adversaries are
more powerful since they are not obliged to adhere to the specified protocol.
5.3.1.2 Notion of Security
In order to be able to extend the model to randomized protocols, we use the
idea of functionalities as a coarsening of the concept of a function. Anm-ary
functionality F denotes a random process that maps a vector of m inputs
to a vector of m outputs. Functionalities can be thought of a probability
distribution over a set of corresponding m-ary functions f (i) such that F
equals f (i) with a certain probability pi.
Indistinguishability of Probability Ensembles In the following we
have to deal with probability ensembles. A probability ensemble is a fam-
ily of random variables Xn indexed by a countable set (typically the set of
strings or the set of positive integers). Security is described in terms of in-
distinguishablility of probability ensembles. Two ensembles X := {Xn}n∈N
and Y := {Yn}n∈N are said to be computationally indistinguishable if for
every non-uniform family of polynomial-size circuits {Cn}n∈N (the ”‘distin-
guishing algorithm”’) the difference |prob[Cn(Xn) = 1]− prob[Cn(Yn) = 1]|
is negligible in n. Here, a function f(n) is called negligible in n if for every
positive polynomial p(n) (i.e. p(n) > 0 ∀n ∈ N) there exists an n0 such that
f(n) < 1/p(n) for all n > n0.
A stronger notion, which does not refer to a possible distinguishing al-
gorithm, is that of statistical indistinguishability. The ensembles are called
statistically indistinguishable if
∑
α |prob[Xn = α]− prob[Yn = α]| is negli-
gible in n. If the sum vanishes, we say that the ensembles are identically dis-
tributed and speak of perfect indistinguishability. We denote computational
and statistical indistinguishability by X
c≡ Y and X s≡ Y respectively.
Security for Distributed Protocols We can now give a formal defini-
tion of a secure multi-party protocol Π. We use the notion of a party’s view
to describe the values a party gets to know during the protocol with input
s¯. The view of party Pi is a tuple View
Π
i (s¯) := (si, ri,m
(i)
1 , . . . ,m
(i)
l ) where
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si is again the party’s input, ri represents the outcome of its internal coin
tosses, and the m
(i)
j are the messages received in round j of the protocol.
(When it becomes clear from the context which protocol we are talking of,
the parameter Π is ommitted.) The joint view of a coalition that consists of
the parties {Pi : i ∈ I}, I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} is the tuple ViewΠI (s¯) that contains
the index set I and ViewΠi (s¯) for each i ∈ I.
Definition 3 (Private Computations) Let f be a functionality. The
protocol Π is said to t-privately compute compute f if there exists a proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithm S (a “simulator”) such that for any coali-
tion {Pi : i ∈ I} of at most t parties the following holds
{[S(I, s¯I , fI(s¯)), f(s¯)]}s¯ c≡ {[ViewΠI (s¯),OutputΠ(s¯)]}s¯.
Here, s¯I and fI denote the projections on the coordinates in I and
OutputΠ(s¯) denotes the vector that contains the output for each party after
the protocol was run on input s¯. If the two ensembles are even identically
distributed, the simulation is called a perfect emulation. More specifically for
a fixed I, we say that the protocol preserves privacy against the particular
coalition I or party if I has only one element. We also use the adjective
I-private. In a two-party setting we call the computation private or say
that it preserves privacy if it is 1-private.
5.3.2 Threshold RSA and DSA
Let us briefly sketch how the distributed signing of certificates works. Again
m denotes the certificate body to be signed respectively its hash value plus
an appropriate padding (e.g. RSA-PSS, see [197]). Observe that the input
for the signature scheme can be prepared by one party alone, the second
party could check and reject the signature should the occasion arise. We
only describe threshold signatures for RSA in detail here as the protocol for
DSA is a bit lengthy, the interested reader is referred to [159] for details. We
sketch how distributed DSA key generation works and explain the protocol
for re-sharing of the private key
RSA The RSA encryption and signature scheme is standardized by the
document PKCS#1 [197]. Multi-prime RSA, which was formerly defined in
an amendment, is now incorporated in version 2.1 of the standard. A valid
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RSA modulus N :=
∏u
i=1 ri, u ≥ 2, is a product of distinct odd primes ri.
In case u = 2 the system is called (standard) RSA and otherwise multi-
prime RSA. Two integers 0 < e, d < ϕ(N) satisfying ed ≡ 1 mod ϕ(N)
are needed. They are called public and private exponent respectively as
pub = (N, e) and priv = d. A value m is signed by computing md mod N ,
the verification process computes the e-power to obtain m back again.
For the purpose of threshold cryptography, the private exponent has to
be shared among the parties. A straight-forward way to do so is an additive
sharing priv ≡ priv1 + priv2 mod ϕ(N) [36]. In this case, the functions
partialsign and countersign are defined as follows.
partialsignprivi(m) := m
privi mod N,
countersignprivi(σ) := m
privi · σ mod N,
Using the notion and notation of the previous section, it is easily seen
that the computation is private: Assume that party i holds privi, party 1
computes partialsign while countersign is executed by party 2. We have
s¯ = (priv1, priv2), F (s¯) = (σ2, σ2) where σ2 = signcombineshares(priv1,priv2)(m)
is the local output of each party. As RSA signing is a function (and not
a functionality), the random tapes are empty: r1 = r2 = λ. The distrib-
uted signing protocol has only two rounds, the protocol messages are m
(1)
1 =
m
(2)
2 = λ andm
(2)
1 = partialsignprivi(m) = σ,m
(1)
2 = countersignprivi(σ) =
σ2. The simulation of
View1(s¯) = (priv1, λ, λ, countersignpriv2(σ))
is trivial as the simulator gets priv1 and σ2 as inputs. The simulation of
View2(s¯) = (priv2, λ, partialsignpriv1(σ), λ)
is done by computing σ2 ·m−priv2 = mpriv−priv2 = mpriv1 . We have therefore
shown the following proposition. (A similar statement holds for DSA.)
Proposition 4 (Privacy of distributed RSA Signatures) The shared
computation of RSA signatures preserves privacy.
DSA A DSA key pair is a tuple 〈(p, q, g, x), (p, q, g, y = gx mod p)〉 where
p and q are primes such that q divides p − 1, g ∈ Z∗p is of order q. The
private key is priv = x ∈ Z∗q which is chosen uniformly at random.
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Initially, CA and RA1 construct q, p, g in an interactive protocol (in this
order): q can be defined as the smallest prime exceeding a random lower
bound which was agreed on using distributed coin-tossing (see e.g. [178]
how to implement such a protocol). The construction of p and g happens
in a similar way. CA and RA1 select secret random values w1 and x1 which
determine the private key via a multiplicative sharing x ≡ w1x1 mod p.
The values y1 ≡p gw1 and z1 ≡ gx1 mod p are then published such that
both parties can compute y ≡ yx11 ≡ zw11 mod p.
We now describe how re-sharing, i.e. the introduction of further regis-
tration authorities, works. This is done one RA after another. We assume
that RA1,CA and the new RAi are connected by secure channels. RAi, i > 1,
obtains its share xi by a technique similar to that used in proactive and
verifiable secret sharing (see e.g. [78, 96] for further information about those
topics): RA1 picks ui ∈ Z∗q at random and sends (i, ui, zu
−1
i
1 ) to CA and
(xi = x1u
−1
i mod q, g
ui) to RAi. CA and RAi can verify that the pair
(wi = w1ui mod q, xi) is indeed another multiplicative sharing of x by
exchanging the values yi = g
wi mod q and zi = g
xi mod q. It is not difficult
to prove
Proposition 5 The computation of a DSA key re-sharing is both {RA1,RAi}-
private and 1-private.
5.3.3 The Protocol of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson
The protocol of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson [24] is a nice exam-
ple for a ⌊m−12 ⌋-private multi-party computation. It is heavily used in the
Boneh-Franklin scheme (see Section 5.3.4.1). In the following, we abbre-
viate this protocol by BGW. BGW allows m parties to jointly evaluate a
function F that is realized as an arithmetic circuit composed of gates for
binary addition, multiplication, and for constant addition or multiplication.
(See [108] for a similar construction using Boolean circuits and [54] for an
overview of general constructions.) BGW makes use of Shamir’s well-known
secret sharing scheme [211], which we briefly recall before going into details
of the BGW protocol in the next but one paragraph.
Shamir Secret Sharing Shamir’s scheme is based on the fact that the
coefficients of a polynomial over a finite field E with degree less than k can
be reconstructed by knowing k different points (xi, f(xi)) on its curve. To
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share a secret s ∈ E among the share holders, an element f(X) ∈ s+Qk is
chosen uniformly at random where
Qk := {f1X + f2X2 + · · ·+ fk−1Xk−1 : f1, . . . , fk−1 ∈ E}.
is the set of polynomials of degree at most k−1 and vanisihing free coefficient.
s is thus “encoded” as the free coefficient f(0) of the polynomial. Shares
have the form (xi, yi := f(xi)) where xi 6= 0 is a fixed public value for the
i-th party, 1 ≤ i ≤ m (obviously, the cardinality |E| must exceed m, the
number of share holders). This is called a k-out-of-m secret sharing. In a
typical application of Shamir’s scheme, f is chosen by a trusted party, the
so-called dealer, which distributes the shares during a setup stage and then
leaves the protocol. For instance, the software package PGP offers such a
secret sharing for the backup of decryption keys. In this case, the dealer is
the owner of the private key and the share holders are trustworthy friends,
colleagues and the like.
It is easily seen that, given less than k points on the curve of f , each
element of E is equally likely for s [41]. Therefore, even a coalition of k− 1
parties that reveal their shares to each other does not learn anything about
s. This statement holds in an information-theoretic sense.
Distributed Private Evaluation of Arithmetic Circuits All BGW
computations are done in a finite field E where again |E| > m. The func-
tion F is realized by an arithmetic circuit. Apart from the constants, all
intermediate values, i.e. the inputs and outputs of each gate, as well as the
result of the whole computation, are distributed according to a k-out-of-m
Shamir scheme. BGW is based on the following observation: Assume that a
and b are inputs to a gate and that a and b are shared using the polynomials
f ∈ a+Qk and g ∈ b+Qk respectively. Hence (xi, f(xi) + g(xi)) are shares
of the polynomial h = f + g which determines the sum a + b by its free
coefficient. Shares of the values κ+ a and µa for publicly known constants
κ, µ ∈ E are computed in a similar way.
The first step of a BGW protocol is the input stage during which each
party makes its input si available to the other parties via a k-out-of-m se-
cret sharing. After that the parties enter the computation stage where they
simulate each gate in a distributed private computation. Each of these com-
putation preserves (k − 1)-privacy. The last gate in the network produces
a sharing of the desired result r = F (s¯). All parties broadcast their shares
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of r such that each of them is able to interpolate the polynomial that de-
termines r. It is easily seen that the evaluation of an affine linear function
F : Em → E (which can be computed with the three previously introduced
gates) can in fact happen in an (m − 1)-private way when an m-out-of-m
secret sharing is used.
Things are slightly different for the multiplication of two values a and
b. Again, we assume that a = f(0) and b = g(0) are shared based on the
polynomials f and g. In this case, an m out of m secret sharing cannot be
used since the degree of the product f · g may exceed m − 1 and therefore
interpolation may not possible any more. One has to use a (k+1)-out-of-m
sharing where k ≤ ⌊m−12 ⌋ to ensure that deg(f · g) ≤ 2k ≤ m− 1. There is
another, yet more subtle, detail one has to pay attention to: The product of
two (random) polynomials is not random any more. This prevents a straight-
forward computation of a · b. As a remedy, one can use the re-randomizing
technique outlined in [24] or the extrapolation formula used in [108]. We
briefly describe how the former method works.
As the result of the computation should be shared in the same way than
the inputs, that is, in an k + 1 out of m sharing, the first step is to map
the polynomial f · g = ∑m−1i=0 ciXi to one of smaller degree. It can be
shown (see [24]) that the function that maps this product to the partial sum
h(X) :=
∑k−1
i=0 ciX
i is basically a single matrix multiplication. As matrix
multiplication consists of affine linear functions, this computation is (m−1)-
private. In particular the matrix is publicly known as it only depends on the
xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Now, the second step consists of randomizing the polynomial
h. In order to do so, each party Pi chooses an element qi ∈ Qk at random
and distributes the shares qi(xj), 1 ≤ j ≤ m, to the respective parties. If
at least one of the qi is random, the coefficients apart from the free term of
h+
∑n
i=1 qi are random, too. This implies that the multiplication is ⌊m−12 ⌋-
privately computable. This bound is strict. Furthermore, it can be shown
that there is a perfect emulation.
5.3.4 Distributed RSA Key Generation
There are a handful of distributed RSA key generation schemes that – among
other things – differ in their security assumptions, their computational com-
plexity, the minimum number of participants required to generate a key
pair and a signature respectively, and the way the distributed computation
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is carried out. In this section, we give a brief description of each of these
schemes. The various algorithms and some of their most important proper-
ties are listed in Table 5.1. Here m denotes the number of parties involved
in key generation and k denotes the minimum number of parties required
to generate a signature with a shared key. Computational costs are given in
terms of the bit length ℓ of the RSA modulus. Our new algorithm, which
is the subject of Section 5.4, fills a gap as the other schemes either have
quadratic complexity or require the assistance of a third party which has to
be trusted.
Author(s) Parties Signers Costs† RSA Cryptosystem
Boneh-Franklin [32] m ≥ 3 k=⌈n+1
2
⌉ O(ℓ2) standard
Cocks [57] m ≥ 3 k=⌈n+1
2
⌉ O(ℓ2) standard
Cocks [56]
Gilboa [102] m = 2 k = 2 O(ℓ2) standard
Poupard-Stern [185]
Boneh-Horwitz [185] m = 3 k = 2 O(ℓ) multi-prime
Biehl-Takagi [28] m ≥ 3 k=⌈n+1
2
⌉ O(ℓ2) standard/multi-prime
Our Approach m = 2 k = 2 O(ℓ) multi-prime
† ℓ = bit length of the generated RSA modulus.
Table 5.1: Algorithms for shared RSA key generation.
5.3.4.1 Boneh-Franklin Protocol
The Boneh-Franklin scheme is an m-party protocol, m ≥ 3, which ⌊m−12 ⌋-
privately generates a standard RSA key pair. By means of this protocol we
explain the consecutive stages that are required for each distributed RSA
key generation algorithm. Constructing a (potential) RSA modulus out of
the secret inputs of the parties is more or less canonical: the most simple
way to do so is to write N = (
∑m
i=1 pi) · (
∑m
i=1 qi) where the pi and qi are
secrets of the respective party. In this respect, the Boneh-Franklin protocol
also served as a blueprint for subsequent protocols.
An outline of the protocol is shown in Figure 5.8. In the first two steps,
a candidate modulus N is computed according to the formula given above.
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Step 1: [Choosing random input] Each party picks ℓ bit random
numbers pi, qi as secret inputs to the algorithm.
Step 2: [Computation of N ] The parties jointly compute N = pq
where p :=
∑k
i=1 pi, q :=
∑k
i=1 qi using (an extension) of the
BGW protocol.
Step 3: [Trial divisions] The value of N is made public so that the
parties can apply trial divisions up to a certain bound.
Step 4: [Primality test] In a distributed Fermat test, the parties
check whether N is the product of exactly two primes. Essen-
tially, this is done by testing
g(p−1)(q−1) = gN+1−
P
i
(pi+qi) ?≡ 1 mod N
for randomly chosen bases g.
Step 5: [Generation of d] The parties agree on a public exponent
beforehand and compute the corresponding private exponent.
Figure 5.8: Outline of the Boneh-Franklin protocol.
The computation of N uses a slightly modified version of the BGW protocol
which allows to construct N with only two rounds of communication. As
this step is based on the BGW protocol, it is ⌊m−12 ⌋-private.
The values p and q have a length of approximately ℓ bit. According to
the Prime Number Theorem, the probability that an ℓ-bit number is prime
is about (ln 2 · ℓ)−1. Since the numbers p and q are independently chosen at
random, one has to expect O(ℓ2) iterations until an N is found that is the
product of exactly two primes. Otherwise N will not pass either the trial
division or the distributed Fermat step.
Biehl and Takagi [28] show how to test the factors of N for primality
separately (see below). The approach of Boneh and Horwitz [34] allows to
speed up the computation for the case of three parties. A multi-prime RSA
modulus of the form (p1+ p2+ p3)q2r3 is used where the numbers q2, r3 are
a priori prime. In the next section we show how to apply this idea to the
case of two parties.
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There is a very small fraction of numbers which passes the Fermat test of
the Boneh-Franklin protocol without being a product of two primes. There-
fore, further Fermat tests in the so-called twisted group (Zn[x]/(x
2+1))∗/Z∗n
were suggested [32], though neither of the present implementations makes
use of them yet [160, 255, 13]. Both tests are (m− 1)-private.
In the final step, the parties agree on a public exponent e, e.g. the stan-
dard value e = 216+1, and compute the private exponent without revealing
the factorisation ofN . This can be done in two ways. One of them is (m−1)-
private, but leaks ⌈log2(e)⌉ bits of information. The other method does not
leak any information, but is only ⌊m−12 ⌋-private (see [32] for details).
Practical Considerations Several independent implementations have alre-
day shown that the Boneh-Franklin scheme is indeed feasible in practice.
Malkin et al. [160] report that the generation of a 1024-bit key among three
servers takes about 1.5 or 6 minutes on a local area network or via the Inter-
net respectively. Wright and Spalding [255] give a thorough analysis of how
to tune parameters, for instance the trial division bound, for performance.
The Boneh-Franklin protocol is also part of a distributed Java-based time
stamping authority developed by NTT in cooperation with TU Darmstadt.
Details are given in [13, 89, 243]. Experimental results show that the key
generation phase for a 2048-bit key is less than half an hour when three or
five servers on a local area network are involved.
Alternative Computation of N Cocks proposes an alternative method
for the distributed computation of N given the pi, qi, both for the two-party
and multi-party setting. We refer the reader to [56, 57] for details. An
important downside of Cocks’ protocols compared to the Boneh-Franklin
method is the fact that their security only relies on a heuristic argument in
contrast to the solid BGW foundation. Some attacks and countermeasures
for Cocks’ protocols have been proposed [29, 134], but the security properties
remain unproven. A figure that is nevertheless interesting is a runtime
estimate for the two-party case. Cocks [56] reports that the generation of a
512 bit key shared between two parties takes little more than one day (using
Mathematica on a SPARC10 workstation).
Alternative Primality Test Biehl and Takagi [28] propose an alternative
to step 4 based on quadratic fields that also extends naturally to the multi-
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prime RSA case.7 The security of the protocol relies on the discrete log
problem in the class group of the quadratic order of discriminant ∆ = −8N2
and a new intractability assumption “CDC” (computation of divisors of the
conductor, see [28] for details).
An important property of the Biehl-Takagi protocol is the fact that each
factor on the candidate modulus N is tested for primality separately. (Com-
pare this to Boneh-Franklin’s Fermat, test which only tells whether at least
one of the factors is composite, but not which one.) At first sight, this
seems to be only a subtle difference, but it allows a certain optimization as
the parties may, instead of a two-factor candidate N , use a value which is the
product of ℓ would-be primes (of bit length ℓ). The probability that at least
two of these factors are in fact prime is approximately 1−2(1−(ln 2ℓ)−1)ℓ−1.
(For ℓ = 512, this probability is about 50%.) On the one hand this reduces
the number of expected iterations from O(ℓ2) to O(ℓ). But, unfortunately,
on the other hand the arguments grow in size to a bit length of ℓ2 such that
on the level of bit operations there is no efficiency gain.
5.3.4.2 Two-Party Protocols
Most parts of the Boneh-Franklin framework can be directly re-used in the
two-party setting. The sole exception is the second step, i.e. the compu-
tation of N .8 Similar to the original protocol, these algorithms have an
expected running time quadratic in the bit length of the RSA modulus to
be constructed as the factors are tested separately for primality. Several
authors have proposed solutions for this problem. These schemes rely on
the cryptographic primitive of oblivious transfer and a generalization of the
quadratic residuosity assumption.
Oblivious Transfer An oblivious transfer (OT) scheme is an interactive
two-party protocol which solves the following problem: A merchant who
offers k secrets (bit-strings) wants to sell one of them to a buyer such that
the privacy of the buyer with respect to the chosen index is kept and the
remaining secrets are kept confidential as well. The names All-or Nothing
7The way their protocol implements step 2 slightly differs from Boneh-Franklin’s pro-
posal, but is still based on the BGW idea.
8It will turn out in Section 5.4.2.2 that step 4 has to be modified in the case of
multi-prime RSA.
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Disclosure of Secrets (ANDOS) protocol or symmetrically private informa-
tion retrieval are used as synonyms for oblivious transfer schemes.
Definition 6 (Oblivious transfer/ANDOS protocol) A protocol called
1-out-of-k oblivious transfer is a two-party scheme which allows a merchant
to sell one out of k secrets s1, . . . , sk to a buyer satisfying the following
properties. Let i0 ∈ {1, . . . , s} denote the index chosen by the buyer.
(1) The merchant obtains no information about i0 during the protocol, i.e.
the views
Viewmerchant(s1, . . . , sk, j),
Viewmerchant(s1, . . . , sk, i0)
are indistinguishable for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k} .
(2) The buyer obtains no information about the secrets other than si0, i.e.
the views
Viewbuyer(s
′
1, . . . , s
′
i0−1, si0 , s
′
i0+1, . . . , s
′
k, i0),
Viewbuyer(s1, . . . , sk, i0)
are indistinguishable for all s′1, . . . , s
′
i0−1
, s′i0+1, . . . , s
′
k.
Observe that indistinguishability in this definition may mean computa-
tional, statistical or perfect indistinguishability.
Quadratic and Prime Residuosity Problem The prime residuosity
problem (PRP) is a natural generalization of the well-known quadratic resid-
uosity problem (QRP) which can be stated as follows.
Definition 7 (Quadratic Residuosity Problem) Given an odd compos-
ite integer N and an element a ∈ Z∗N with Jacobi symbol (a/N) = 1, decide
whether or not there exists b ∈ Z∗N such that a ≡ b2 mod N (i.e. a is a
quadratic residue modulo N).
For instance, the security of the Goldwasser-Micali probabilistic public-
key encryption scheme is based on the assumed intractability of QRP. This
assumptions says that every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm to com-
pute the predicate only succeeds with a probability that comes negligibly
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(in the length of N) close to 1/2, i.e. the advantage of obtaining the correct
result compared with tossing a fair coin is negligible.
Now we can state the general problem for prime exponents p greater
than 2. Both the scheme of Gilboa and the one we propose in the next
section are based on the PRP intractability assumption.
Definition 8 (Prime Residuosity Problem) Given an odd composite in-
teger N , an odd prime p and an element a ∈ Z∗N , decide whether or not there
exists b ∈ Z∗N such that a ≡ bp mod N .
Gilboa [102] has proposed three variants founded on different security
assumptions. One of them is based on a 1-out-of-k oblivious transfer proto-
col. Another one computes N with the help of a homomorphic encryption
scheme that is semantically secure under the prime residuosity assumption.
The third one (the so-called oblivious polynomial evaluation, see [170]) uses
a non-standard security assumption; we do not consider this variant any
further.
Gilboa’s OT Approach In the case of oblivious transfer,computations
are done in the ring Zr where r is a power of 2. Assume that Alice holds
a ∈ Zr and Bob holds b ∈ Zr. Then a multiplicative sharing ab can be
converted into an additive sharing in the following way:
Alice and Bob go through r executions of an 1-out-of-2 OT protocol
where Bob acts as the merchant and Alice acts as the buyer. Let (ar−1, . . . , a0)
be the binary representation of a, i.e. a =
∑r−1
i=0 2
iai. The following steps
are executed for i = 0, . . . , r − 1: Bob chooses si ∈ Zr uniformly at random
and sets t0i := si, t
1
i := 2
ib+ si. Alice buys one of these elements, namely t
ai
i
depending on the value ai of the appropriate bit in a’s binary representation.
It is easy to see that the numbers x :=
∑r−1
i=0 t
ai
i and y :=
∑r−1
i=0 si (which
can be computed by Alice and respectively Bob alone) satisfy the condition
x+ y ≡ ab mod r.
In order to compute a candidate modulus N = (p1 + p2)(q1 + q2), this
protocol is applied twice to first obtain additive sharings of the mixed terms
p1q2 = x
(1) + y(1) and p2q1 = x
(2) + y(2). Then Bob sends y(1) + y(2) + p2q2
mod r to Alice who adds x(1)+x(2)+p1q1 to obtain N mod r which equals
N if r is chosen sufficiently large. The protocol is secure as the views of
both parties can be simulated.
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Gilboa’s Homomorphic Encryption Approach This variant makes
use of an asymmetric cryptosystem (ε, δ) with a the homomorphism prop-
erty ε(m1)ε(m2) = ε(m1+m2). This allows the parties to do certain compu-
tations on the encrypted values. These so-called homomorphic encryption
schemes are explained in Section 5.4.1.1 in more detail as they are also an
important building block for our scheme.
The expression (p1+p2)(q1+q2) can be evaluated as follows: We assume
that Alice sets up the cryptosystem (ε, δ) and provides Bob with the public
key. Alice sends her encrypted inputs ε(p1), ε(q1) to Bob who answers with
ε(p1)
q2ε(q1)
p2ε(p2q2).
Due to the homomorphic property, this value equals ε(p1q2+q1p2+p2q2).
After decrypting this value and adding p1q1 to it, Alice knows the value of
(p1 + p2)(q1 + q2) without having gained information (in an information-
theoretic sense) about Bob’s inputs p2 and q2. Alice’s privacy is based on
the security of the cryptosystem. Details are given in the context of the
discussion in Section 5.4.1. In practice, this protocol is not applied for the
inputs pi, qi themselves, but for their residue classes modulo a prime for
a number of different moduli. The partial results are then recombined by
Chinese remaindering.
Poupard-Stern Method The idea of Poupard and Stern [185] is similar
to the previous method with respect to Chinese remaindering. However,
the partial results modulo the prime moduli are computed differently. For
each modulus t, the parties go through an ANDOS protocol with seller Alice
and buyer Bob and another, similar protocol with the roles reversed. The
ANDOS protocols allow to compute a generic function f(d1, d2) on secret
inputs di. In our concrete case, these inputs are pairs (pi, qi) ∈ Zt × Zt.
Let (αi, βi) ∈ Z∗t × Zt, i = 1, 2 be pairs of random numbers chosen by
the respective party. At first, Alice sells {γd := α1 · f(d1, d) + β1 : d}
where d ranges over the set of possible inputs for Bob. Bob buys the item
α1 × f(d1, d2) + β1 whose index corresponds to his secret input d2.
Alice and Bob then change their roles and Alice buys the item α2 ·
f(d1, d2) + β2. Finally, Alice and Bob simultaneously broadcast the values
αi, βi and the item they have bought and ensure that they have locally
computed the same value for f(d1, d2).
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It is easily seen that – given the security of the underlying OT scheme
– this protocol guarantees privacy in the honest-but-curious scenario. Fur-
thermore, it is shown in [185] that the protocol is also robust against a
cheating party.
5.4 New Shared RSA Key Generation Protocol
This section describes a new and efficient method for shared multi-prime
RSA key generation. Our setting is the honest-but-curious scenario as be-
fore. Throughout the whole protocol the parties have secure, i.e. private
and mutually authenticated, communication channels available (e.g. SSL).
Again we call the parties Alice (party 1) and Bob (party 2) and use indexed
variables vi, i = 1, 2, to denote secrets of the respective party unless stated
otherwise.
5.4.1 Building Blocks
5.4.1.1 Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
Our method requires a public key cryptosystem with a probabilistic en-
cryption function having a certain homomorphic property. Our notion of
a homomorphic encryption scheme is a slight generalization of that given
in [222].
Definition 9 (Homomorphic encryption scheme) A homomorphic en-
cryption scheme is a tuple (M,C,R, ε, δ) consisting of two groups (M,+)
and (C, ·), a set R, and mappings ε :M ×R→ C, δ : C →M satisfying the
following:
• ∀m ∈M ∀r ∈ R δ(ε(m, r)) = m,
• ∀m1,m2 ∈ M ∀r1, r2 ∈ R ∃r3 ∈ R such that ε(m1, r1)ε(m2, r2) =
ε(m1 +m2, r3).
M and C are sets of messages and ciphertexts respectively, whereas R is
used to randomize the encryption. Here we demand semantic security for ε.
Example 10 (Naccache-Stern cryptosystem) Let N be a standard RSA
modulus and ti, i = 1, . . . , n, small distinct prime factors of ϕ(N) such
that gcd(t, ϕ(N)/t) = 1 where t :=
∏n
i=1 ti. Choose y ∈ ZN such that
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Yi :≡ yϕ(N)/ti 6≡ 1 mod N for all i. A message m ∈ M := Zt results in a
ciphertext ε(m, r) = rtym mod N where r ∈ R := C := ZN . To decrypt, the
calculation of ci :≡ ε(m, r)ϕ(N)/ti ≡ Y mi mod N for each i is followed by a
table lookup of m mod ti in the set {(Y si , s) : s ∈ Zti}.
The security of the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem is proved in [169] under
the higher residuosity assumption. It is a generalization of the Benaloh [25]
cryptosystem (n = 1) which is semantically secure under the prime residu-
osity assumption. The Benaloh cryptosystem is in its turn a generalization
of the Goldwasser-Micali [109] scheme (t = 2 and Jacobi symbol (y/N) = 1)
which is semantically secure under the quadratic residuosity assumption. Be-
naloh cryptosystems, which we use extensively in our protocol, can be set
up efficiently [25].
5.4.1.2 Sharing Conversion
Homomorphic encryption schemes have proven to be quite helpful for shared
computations with secret inputs. We have already seen an example from [102]
in Section 5.3.4.2. We will now introduce the notion of additive and multi-
plicative secret sharings based on homorphic encryption.9
Definition 11 (Notion of secret sharing) Let M be a ring and s ∈ M
a secret value. Assume that party i (i = 1, 2) holds ai,mi ∈M such that
a1 + a2 = s = m1m2.
The pairs (a1, a2) and (m1,m2) are called an additive resp. a multiplicative
sharing of s.
Our protocol needs a subroutine to convert an additive sharing into a mul-
tiplicative one: The algorithm add2mult described in Figure 5.9 is inspired
by the trick mentioned above. We will apply add2mult to secrets in the ring
M := Zt. Therefore, we sometime write add2multt to make the modulus
explicit. For m ∈ M and c ∈ C, we write cm as a shorthand for cu where
u ∈ Z is the smallest non-negative representative of the residue class m.
Without loss of generality, we assume that it is always Alice who sets up
the homomorphic encryption scheme (M,C,R, ε, δ) needed in the protocol.
By (a1, a2) we denote an existing additive sharing of s. Messages exchanged
9From now on, we omit the second argument of ε for the sake of simplicity.
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Alice Bob
(M,C,R, ε, δ)
ε(a1)
-
m2
u←M∗
c := [ε(a1)ε(a2)]
m−1
2
ﬀ
m1 = δ(c)
Figure 5.9: add2mult sharing conversion protocol.
in the protocol are shown in Figure 5.9. The notation m2
u←M∗ means that
m2 is chosen from M
∗ uniformly at random (and independently from s). At
the end of the protocol, the parties have obtained the multiplicative sharing
(m1,m2). The following proposition states that Alice cannot learn anything
about s if s is a unit. However she will find out whether indeed s ∈ M∗.
Fortunately, this does no harm because s 6∈ M∗ is rejected in our protocol
anyway (see below).
Proposition 12 (Bob’s Privacy for add2mult) Let M be a ring and s ∈
M∗ an additively shared secret value. Then Alice gains no information about
s during the protocol add2mult.
Proof. To model the protocol we introduce M∗-valued random variables
X,Y1, Y2. Let probX denote the probability distribution of s and probYi
denote the probability distribution of mi. Then
prob(X = s ∧ Y1 = m1) = prob(X = s ∧ Y2 = sm−11 )
= probX(s) · probY2(sm−11 ) = probX(s)/|M∗|
since X and Y2 are independent and Y2 is uniformly distributed by assump-
tion. Using the same argument, we get
probY1(m1) =
∑
s∈M∗
prob(X = s ∧ Y2 = sm−11 ) =
1
|M∗| .
Substituting the second into the first equation we deduce that X and Y1 are
independent which means that their mutual information is always zero. 
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Observe that Bob’s privacy is guaranteed in an information theoretic
sense while Alice’s relies on the security of the homomorphic encryption
scheme. As a compensation, they could change roles in practice each time
add2mult is used. This may also be advisable with regard to load-balancing.
Proposition 13 (Alice’s Privacy for add2mult) Let M be a ring and
s ∈ M∗ an additively shared secret value. The transcript of the view of
an add2mult execution can be simulated for Bob, therefore Alice’s privacy
is preserved if the homomorphic encryption system used in the protocol is
semantically secure.
Bob’s view during the protocol with output Outputadd2mult(a1, a2) =
(m1,m2) is
Viewadd2multBob (a1, a2) = (a2,m2, ε(a1)).
Given Bob’s secret input a2 and his output m2, the simulator picks
x ∈ M uniformly at random. The sequence (a2,m2, ε(x)) cannot be distin-
guished from a true protocol transcript as this would contradict the semantic
security of the cryptosystem (ε, δ). 
We briefly show how to define a protocol mult2add to convert in the
reverse direction.10 Assume that again Alice sets up (M,C,R, ε, δ). The
messages exchanged are ε(m1) and c := ε(m1)
m2ε(−a2) where Bob chooses
a2
u← M . Alice obtains her share a1 by decrypting c. The following propo-
sitions, which can be proved analogously to Proposition 12 and 13, will be
used in Section 5.4.2.2:
Proposition 14 (Bob’s Privacy for mult2add) Let M be a ring and let
(m1,m2) ∈M∗ ×M be a multiplicative sharing. Then Alice gains no infor-
mation about m1m2 during the protocol mult2add.
Proposition 15 (Alice’s Privacy for mult2add) Let M be a ring and
s ∈ M∗ an additively shared secret value. The transcript of the view of
an mult2add execution can be simulated for Bob, therefore Alice’s privacy
is preserved if the homomorphic encryption system used in the protocol is
semantically secure.
10Boneh-Franklin and Gilboa use BGW and oblivious transfers respectively for the
same purpose.
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5.4.1.3 Distributed Sieving
Distributed sieving is an elegant way to combine the random choice of input
data with trial divisions (steps 1 and 2 of the Boneh-Franklin framework in
Section 5.3.4.1). Similar techniques have been used in [32, 102] to reduce
the number of iterations since the likelihood that a candidate modulus is
the product of exactly two primes is greater if one excludes small divisors.
Figure 5.10 shows a description of distSieve in pseudo-code from the
viewpoint of party i. This subroutine allows to negotiate a secret s ∈ Z
represented by an additive and a multiplicative sharing such that s is not
divisible by elements of a set P ∈ P where P is the set of prime numbers.
Usually, P is the set of all primes up to a certain bound.
distSieve(P )
1 for t ∈ P
2 m
(t)
i
u← Z∗t
3 a
(t)
i ←mult2add(m(t)i )
4 ai ←CRT((a(t)i )t∈P )
5 mi ←CRT((m(t)i )t∈P )
6 return (ai,mi)
Figure 5.10: Subroutine distSieve.
For each t ∈ P , Alice and Bob choose random inputs m(t)i ∈ Z∗t and con-
vert the multiplicative sharing (m
(t)
1 ,m
(t)
2 ) in an additive sharing (a
(t)
1 , a
(t)
2 )
using mult2add. As the inputs of both parties are units modulo t, this
guarantees that the resulting mi are units, too. At the end of distSieve,
the parties combine their shares a
(t)
i , t ∈ P and m(t)i , t ∈ P by means of the
Chinese Remainder Theorem to ai and mi respectively.
We use the notation
∏
P as a shorthand for
∏
t∈P t. Then the subroutine
distSieve returns two non-negative integers less than
∏
P . It implicitly
returns an integer 0 < s < 2
∏
P such that s ≡ a1+a2 ≡ m1+m2 mod
∏
P
and s is relatively prime to
∏
P . Here we use the term “implicitly” to
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express that the s is a secret value shared by the parties, but never computed
explicitly.
Proposition 16 (Privacy of distSieve) During the protocol distSieve,
the privacy of both parties concerning a1 + a2 ≡ m1m2 mod
∏
P is pre-
served provided the prime residuosity assumption is true.
Proof. The protocol consists of |P | interactions where a random number
m
(t)
i is picked and the secret m
(t)
1 m
(t)
2 is converted to an additive sharing
using mult2add. According to Propositions 14 and 15, the sub-protocol
mult2add preserves the privacy of both parties. Apart from the invocation
of mult2add, all steps of the protocol are local computations of only one
party. 
5.4.2 The New Protocol
The key idea of the new scheme is to use a multi-prime RSA modulus instead
of the usual two-factor RSA modulus. This may seem counter-intuitive
at first sight as each additional factor will increase the expected number
of iterations even more: We have seen that the complexity of distributed
key generation for a standard modulus of length ℓ is O(ℓ2) since the two
factors are tested simultaneously for their primality. Using a modulus of,
for instance, three factors would obviously raise the complexity to O(ℓ3).
However, this statement only holds for moduli of the form (p1+p2)(q1+
q2)(r1 + r2) where the pi, qi, and ri are secret values selected at random by
the respective party. Things can be made simpler by composing N according
to
N := pq1q2 := (p1 + p2)q1q2
where the pi are arbitrary random numbers, but the qi are primes. Now
that two of the factors are a priori prime, one can in fact find a product of
three primes in expected time O(ℓ).
A similar idea for the three party scenario is described in [34] where the
modulus is composed according to (p1+ p2+ p3)q1q2. However, in this case,
party 1 and 2 have a certain advantage over party 3 as each of them knows
a proper factor of the modulus.
In the following two sections, we describe how to compute a candidate
modulus and how to organize a secure primality test in a distributed way.
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candidate(P, P ′)
1 (pi,mi)← distSieve(P )
2 for t ∈ P ′ \ P
3 m
(t)
i ←add2mult(pi mod t)
4 if m
(t)
1 = 0 then goto 1
5 m′i ←CRT(mi, (m(t)i )t∈P ′\P )
6 qi ← randomPrime(2µ)
7 publish m′iqi mod
∏
P ′
8 return m′1q1m
′
2q2 mod
∏
P ′
Figure 5.11: Computing a candidate modulus.
5.4.2.1 Computing a Candidate Modulus
Our algorithm to generate a candidate multi-prime RSA modulus is shown
in Figure 5.11. It has two arguments P ⊂ P ′ ⊂ P subject to certain technical
conditions (see below).
At first, the parties use distSieve to implicitly generate a random in-
vertible residue class modulo
∏
P . Let p denote the smallest non-negative
representative of this residue class. The multiplicative sharing (m1,m2) of
p is then extended to a sharing (m′1,m
′
2) of p mod
∏
P ′ in lines 2–5. This
is a technique similar to that in distSieve, however the inputs pi mod t
are fixed now (and might not be invertible modulo t). As a consequence,
we have to cope with the possibility that t | p for a certain t ∈ P ′ \ P . But
this can be always detected as the party which takes on Alice’s role in the
add2mult protocol outlined in Figure 5.9 would obtain the result 0 and thus
could declare “failure”. In this case, the algorithm is completely restarted
(see [102] for possible optimizations).
Having successfully passed all tests of line 4, each party separately com-
putes an integer m′i with the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) and gen-
erates a prime number, which will become the second and third factor re-
spectively of the RSA modulus in case m′1m
′
2 is in fact prime. The CRT
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computations yield an m′i such that
m′i ≡ mi mod
∏
P
m′i ≡ m(t)i mod t ∀t ∈ P ′ \ P.
Furthermore, in lines 6 and 7 of candidate Alice and Bob generate
primes qi of bit length µ and publish the values m
′
iqi mod P
′ to the other
party. These values are a multiplicative sharing of a candidate modulus
modulo
∏
P ′. Here, the purpose of qi is to blind the secret m
′
i from the
other party in order to conceal the value of p mod P ′.
The following theorem lists the properties of the outcome of candidate
and makes the choice of P and P ′ explicit. Theorem 18 guarantees that the
privacy of both parties is preserved during the protocol.
Theorem 17 (Correctness of candidate) Let ℓ and µ be two integer con-
stants and let P ⊂ P ′ ⊂ P be two sets subject to the following conditions:
• P = {2, 3, 5 . . .} is the minimal set of all consecutive primes such that
∏
P > 2ℓ−1.
• P ′ is chosen such that
∏
(P ′ \ P ) > 22µ+1
.
Then – using candidate – the parties find a positive integer pq1q2 of bit
length at most 2µ + ℓ + 1 where the qi are prime and p is not divisible by
any number in P ′.
Proof. After the distributed sieving step, the parties have agreed on a value
p ≡ p1 + p2 ≡ m1m2 mod
∏
P where 0 ≤ p1, p2,m1,m2 <
∏
P . The
parties know the additive sharing (p1 mod t, p2 mod t) of p mod t for each
t ∈ P ′ \ P . These additive sharings are converted to multiplicative sharings
(m
(t)
1 ,m
(t)
2 ) which satisfy m
(t)
1 m
(t)
2 ≡ p mod t for all t ∈ P ′ \ P . Conse-
quently, we have m′1m
′
2 ≡ p mod P ′.
Finally, let N denote the smallest non-negative representative of the
residue class m′1q1m
′
2q2 modulo P
′. Then obviously N ≡ pq1q2 mod
∏
P ′
as m′1m
′
2 ≡ p mod P ′, but due to the size constraints on the factors
0 ≤ pq1q2 = (p1 + p2)q1q2 < 2
∏
P · 22µ <
∏
P ′,
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we even have equality N = pq1q2. The bit length of the modulusN is at
most 2µ+ ℓ+ 1. 
Theorem 18 (Privacy of candidate) During the execution of the proto-
col candidate, Alice (Bob) learns nothing about q2 mod t (q1 mod t) for an
arbitrary t ∈ P ′.
Proof. Alice surely knows m
(t)
2 q2 mod t. Although q2 mod t is not uniformly
distributed in Z∗t , the product in fact is since m
(t)
2 was chosen accordingly.
A similar argument shows that Bob’s view during the protocol can be sim-
ulated. Therefore, Alice’s privacy is also assured. 
5.4.2.2 Primality Test
The idea of the primality test for a three-factor modulus is similar to the one
described in Section 5.3.4.1. We set ψ3(N) := (p1+p2−1)(q1−1)(q2−1) and
use the criterion gψ3(N) ≡ 1 mod N to check whether N is of the desired
form. In case p is prime, ψ3(N) equals ϕ(N) and the condition is fulfilled.
We have seen that – in the standard RSA case – the exponent ψ2(N) =
(p1 + p2− 1)(q1 + q2 − 1) is shared additively between the parties according
to ψ2(N) = (N + 1− p1 − q1)− (p2 + q2). Things are not so easy any more
for a three-factor modulus since expanding the expression ψ3(N) yields two
mixed terms, namely the multiplicatively shared secrets q1p2 and (p1+q1)q2.
Fortunately these can be converted to additive sharings (a1, a2) and (b1, b2)
respectively as we will show below.
The Fermat Criterion Loosely spoken, during the Fermat test random
bases g ∈ Z∗N are picked and the following condition is checked. The left
resp. right hand side of the expression can be computed solely by the first
resp. second party.
gN−p1q1+p1+q1−1−a1−b1
?≡ gp2q2−p2−q2+a2+b2 mod N.
This test amounts to checking whether gψ3(N) ≡ 1 mod N .
If p is prime, the Fermat test obviously succeeds for all g ∈ Z∗N since
ψ(N) equals ϕ(N). The probability that an element chosen at random from
ZN is a unit is overwhelming (on the order of 1− 4−ℓµ), so we do not have
to treat the case g ∈ ZN \Z∗N separately as it is very unlikely that a correct
N is rejected due to the choice of g.
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Theorem 19 (Security of Fermat Test) An easy simulation argument
shows that Fermat tests do not leak information apart from their result if N
is the product of exactly three different primes.
Preparing the Input Data We briefly explain how to treat the multi-
plicatively shared inputs. Consider for instance (q1, p2). Let P
′′ be a set of
odd primes such that
∏
P ′′ > (
∏
P + 2µ)2µ.
Combining the results of mult2add over Zt, t ∈ P ′′, the parties obtain an
additive sharing (a1, a2) over ZQP ′′ without leaking information. The sub-
routine that calls mult2add for all t ∈ P ′′ and finally combines the results by
CRT is abbreviated by mult2addQP ′′ in Figure 5.12. Due to the size of the
shares, one has q1p2 = a1+a2−γ
∏
P ′′. Here, γ ∈ {0, 1} can be easily calcu-
lated by revealing the values ai mod 2 (we can assume without loss of gener-
alisation that p2 is always even). Similarly let (p1+q1)q2 = b1+b2−η
∏
P ′′.
The parties first compute their respective exponents and then test bases
chosen at random. Depending on the desired confidence level, the number
Γ of bases, which must satisfy the condition, can be chosen flexibly. Theo-
rem 20 guarantees that the probability to err is at most 4−Γ. The parties
select bases at random until they have found and checked Γ bases g for which
(g/N) = (g/q1) = (g/q2) = 1 holds. This is the main loop in Figure 5.12
Success Probability The following theorem states that the Fermat test
will fail with a probability at least 3/4 if N is not of the desired form.
Therefore the probability that a p which is not prime sustains Γ successive
Fermat tests is at most 4−Γ. In practice, the value of Γ should be chosen
according to the confidence parameter used for the probabilistic test for the
generation of qi. A typical confidence level is 1 − 2−80, which is used for
instance by the FlexiProvider as a default for prime number generation, i.e.
Γ = 40.
For technical reasons which are due to our proof, the set of candidate
bases is restricted to the subgroup
G := {x ∈ Z∗N : (x/p) = (x/q1) = (x/q2) = 1}
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primalityTestP(pi, qi, N)
1 if gcd(qi − 1, N) 6= 1 return ‘‘reject’’
2 ai ←mult2addQP ′′(q1, p2)
3 bi ←mult2addQP ′′(p1 + q1, q2)
4 xi ←


N − p1q1 + p1 + q1 − 1− a1 − b1 + γ
∏
P ′′ : i = 1
p2q2 − p2 − q2 + a2 + b2 − η
∏
P ′′ : i = 2
5 for j = 1 . . .Γ
6 g ← randomNumber(N)
7 if (g/N) 6= 1 goto 6
8 publish (g/qi)
9 if (g/q1) 6= 1 or (g/q2) 6= 1 goto 6
10 publish yi := g
⌊xi/8⌋ mod N
11 if y1 6= y2 return ‘‘reject’’
12 return ‘‘p probably prime’’
Figure 5.12: Primality test for factor p.
of Z∗N . The elements of G are squares modulo q1q2, but not necessarily mod-
ulo p (only in case p is prime). Membership in G can be checked efficiently:
Given g ∈ ZN , each party checks that (g/qi) = 1 and that (g/N) = 1, too.
As an additional requirement, we restrict the set of generated moduli to
numbers where the factors p, q1, and q2 are congruent 3 modulo 4. The qi
are chosen appropriately by the parties. The constraint p ≡ 3 mod 4 can be
enforced in two ways. The first one is simple, yet inefficient as it discards all
moduli N where N ≡ 1 mod 4. As an alternative the parties may exclude
2 from the set P and fix their values modulo 4. This requires only a slight
modification of distSieve. We use the following notation: For a positive
integer n and a finite Abelian group A, QR(n) denotes the subgroup of
quadratic residues in Z∗n, J
+(n) denotes the subgroup of elements having
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Jacobi symbol 1, and Rn(A) denotes the subgroup {h ∈ A : hn = 1} of
n-th roots of unity. Consequently, G is isomorphic to QR(q1q2)×J+(p). We
write p = 2p′ + 1, qi = 2q
′
i + 1 (the p
′ and the q′i are odd). From now on, we
abbreviate ψ3(N) by ψ(N).
Theorem 20 (Subgroup Index) Let N = pq1q2 where the qi are prime
and all of the three factors are congruent 3 modulo 4. Let G := {x ∈ Z∗N :
(x/p) = (x/q1) = (x/q2) = 1} and H = Re(G) where e := ψ(N)/8.
If p is prime, then H = G, otherwise H is a proper subgroup of G and
the index [G : H] is at least 4.
The Fermat test in the group G works as follows: In each iteration,
g ∈ G is selected uniformly at random. If ge mod N equals 1, “success” is
declared. Otherwise the test stops indicating “failure”. Since the index of
H in G is at least 4, this happens with probability at least 3/4.
Proof. We first treat the case where p is prime (1.) and then consider a
composite p which is and is not squarefree (2b. and 2a.).
1. Assume that p is prime. Then ge mod p ≡ (g(p−1)/2)q′1q′2 ≡ (g/p)q′1q′2 ≡
(g/p) ≡ 1 mod p using the property of the Legendre symbol and the
fact that q′1q
′
2 is odd. Similarly, g
e ≡ 1 mod qi for i = 1, 2. Therefore,
g ∈ G implies g ∈ H.
Now assume that p is composite, say p =
∏k
i=1 p
di
i for distinct primes pi and
k ≥ 2 or ∑ki=1 di ≥ 2. We will show that G \H is non-empty.
2a. We first treat the case where one exponent di is greater than 1. With-
out loss of generality, we may assume that d1 ≥ 2. This implies that
p1 divides ϕ(N) = (q1 − 1)(q2 − 1)
∏k
i=1 p
di−1
i (pi − 1). However, p1
does not divide q′i (i = 1, 2) as the parties have checked beforehand
that gcd(N, q′i) = 1 which in turn implies gcd(q
′
i, p1) = 1 (i = 1, 2).
The subgroup of Z∗N which is isomorphic to Z
∗
p
d1
1
is cyclic of order
pd1−11 (p1 − 1). In particular, Z∗N contains an element g of order p1
which is congruent to 1 modulo q1q2
∏k
i=2 p
di
i . Since (g/p) = (g/p
d1
1 ) =
(g/p1)
d1 = (g/p1)
p1d1 = (gp1/p1)
d1 = (1/p1)
d1 = 1, we have g ∈ G.
Assume that ge ≡ 1 mod N . This implies that p1 divides 2e =
2p′q′1q
′
2. However, p1 does neither divide 2p
′ = pd11
∏k
i=2 p
di
i − 1, nor
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one of the q′i (since gcd(N, q
′
i) = 1). This yields a contradiction and
actually proves g 6∈ H.
One can show that [G : H] ≥ pd1−11 as follows. Let x be a generator
of Z∗
p
d1
1
and set y ≡ x2 mod pd11 and y ≡ 1 mod q1q2
∏k
i=2 p
di
i . Since
y is a square, it is an element of G. We consider the subgroup 〈y〉
generated by y. We have shown that H does not contain elements of
order p1, so 〈y〉 ∩H is trivial. From elementary group theory, we have
the isomorphism (〈y〉H)/H ∼= 〈y〉/(〈y〉 ∩ H) ∼= 〈y〉. The inclusions
H < 〈y〉H ≤ G imply [G : H] ≥ ord(y) = p1 > 4.
A number p that has been constructed according to the algorithm, is
not divisible by small primes, say up to a bound of 105 for example. As
a consequence, candidates which are divisible by a square are sorted
out with a fairly high probability (≥ 1− 105).
2b. We are left with the case where p is squarefree and k ≥ 2. We use the
Chinese remainder theorem to find an element g which is congruent to
1 modulo q1q2 and modulo all pi for i ≥ 3. Furthermore, let g ≡ −1
mod p1, and g ≡ a mod p2 where a ∈ Z∗p2 is an arbitrary element such
that (a/p2) = (−1/p1). This guarantees that (g/p) =
∏k
i=1(g/pi) =
1. Obviously, g ∈ G. But since e is odd and ge ≡ −1 mod p2 by
construction, ge 6≡ 1 mod N and thus g 6∈ H.
We note that in this case, the index of H in G is at least [G : QR(N)]
as H ≤ QR(N) < G. (H ≤ QR(N) because 1 = (1/s) = (ge/s) =
(g/s)e = (g/s) for all divisors s of N .) The index [G : QR(N)] equals
[J+(p) : QR(p)] which is 2k−1.
This estimate can be improved for k = 2. As p = p1p2 ≡ 3 mod 4,
one of the prime factors is congruent 1 modulo 4, say p1. We have
H = Re(G) ∼= Re(J+(p))× Re(QR(q1q2)) = Re(J+(p))×QR(q1q2)
since ge ≡ 1 mod N for all g ∈ QR(q1q2). Consider the Hasse diagram
of J+(p) which is depicted in Figure 5.13. Observe that Re(J
+(p)) =
Re(QR(p)) since g
e ≡ 1 mod pi implies (g/pi) = 1 (see the argument
above).
We show that Re(J
+(p))  QR(p1)×Re(QR(p2)): Let x be a generator
of Z∗p1 . Chose g ∈ Z∗p such that g ≡ x2 mod p1 and g ≡ 1 mod p2.
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Then g ∈ QR(p1)×Re(QR(p2)), but g 6∈ Re(J+(p)) since the order of
g, which is the even number (p1−1)/2, does not divide e, which is odd.
Therefore, [G : H] = [J+(p) : Re(J
+(p))] ≥ [J+(p) : QR(p)][QR(p) :
QR(p1)× Re(QR(p2))] ≥ 4 for k = 2, too. 
Figure 5.13: Hasse diagram of J+(p) (proof case 2b. with k = 2).
Estimating the Number of Iterations Let us briefly estimate the ex-
pected number of iterations until a suitable 3-prime modulus is found. Our
algorithm proceeds in three stages. The first stage is distSieve after which
the parties have ensured that p is not divisible by a prime in P . During the
second stage, the sharings mod
∏
P are “lifted” to sharings mod
∏
P ′
simultaneously checking whether p is divisible by a factor in P ′ \P . If this is
true the parties have to start over again. Otherwise they locally subject p to
trial divisions up to a certain bound (in our experiments we chose 50,000).
If no “small” divisors are found, the parties enter stage three, i.e. the Fermat
primalityTestP test.
One can use a result due to DeBruijn (see [32]) to estimate the probability
of p being prime under the condition that it has no divisors less than B. This
probability is approximately 2.57 · ln(B)/ℓ where ℓ is again the bit length of
p. Having withstand the trial divisions, this value is about 1/14, 1/19, and
1/28 for ℓ = 384, 512, and 768 respectively. The reciprocal is an estimate for
the number of executions of candidate plus subsequent local trial divisions.
For further illustration, we provide some sample values for the variables
P, P ′, P ′′ when chosen according to the above formulae. We restrict ourselves
to the case ℓ = µ. Table 5.2 shows some typical parameters for ℓ between
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384 and 768. Note that the actual length of the modulus may be a few
bits longer than 3ℓ. With our prototype the average time measured for
one run of candidate including local trial divisions is about 25 seconds for
ℓ = µ = 384 and 35 seconds for ℓ = µ = 512. The time for checking one
base in the Fermat test is about 2 seconds. In an experiment we created
1,500 moduli of bit length 1548. Of those 36% failed the trial division step
and the rest entered the Fermat test. We found that approximately 3% of
the moduli consisted of three primes (Γ = 10). Choosing a higher value
does not significantly change computation time. In order to find a suitable
base for the Fermat test on average one has to reject one of two candidates
as (g/pi) = −1 may occur with probability 1/2. A rough estimate shows
that generating a suitable 1548 bit modulus takes less than half an hour.
And note, that our implementation is a prototype which can be optimized in
many respects, e.g. by using pre-computed values or applying a stronger form
of parallelism (at the moment, the processes loose time for synchronisation
as only the mult2add and add2mult operations for one candidate are carried
out in parallel.
ℓ = µ |P | maxP ⌈lg2(
∏
P )⌉ |P ′| maxP ′ |P ′′| maxP ′′
384 60 281 385 145 839 104 571
512 76 383 519 184 1103 132 751
768 105 571 777 258 1637 183 1103
Table 5.2: Typical parameters for candidate.
5.4.3 Summary
We have just presented our new RSA key generation scheme for the two-
party setting and shown its security in the honest-but-curious model. A
general discussion about the security of multi-prime RSA follows below. As
a security assumption we postulated that the homomorphic cryptosystem we
used should be semantically secure. The necessary instances of the Benaloh
cryptosystem (or another) can be easily set up in advance and can be re-
used in different passes of the protocol. Since breaking a single cryptosystem
would only leak a value in Zt, we consider 1024 bit to be sufficient for the
Benaloh moduli. Strictly speaking, we have omitted the last step in the
private generation, namely the computation of a shared private exponent.
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Known techniques can be used for this task. They are efficient and preserve
privacy also in the two-party setting (under the same assumptions as they
only require sharing conversions). We refer the reader to [32, 102].
Various attacks on (standard) RSA have been looked for and studied
for quite a long time (see e.g. [30] for a survey). However, no methods
are known which exploit the special structure of a 3-prime modulus. Some
known attacks can be generalized to multi-prime RSA, but become even less
effective [125]. As of this writing, 3-prime moduli of at least 1024 bit are
considered as secure as 2-prime moduli of the same length [152]. Even if one
does not agree and one wants to make a very defensive and careful choice,
one may set ℓ := µ := n/2 in situations where one would accept a 2-prime
RSA modulus of length n bit.
A general advantage of multi-prime moduli N is the fact that private
key computations modulo N can be further accelerated using the CRT while
parties that only know the public key do not notice the special structure of
the modulus. Compared to the Boneh-Franklin setting where a single party
cannot do computations modulo a factor of N , in our case an (asymptotic)
speedup of 3 is possible as each party knows factors of length n/3 bit and
2n/3 bit (see [35] for details).
5.5 Further Applications
In this section we show two more applications of threshold cryptography. We
consider an email scenario where RSA (or ElGamal) is used as an encryption
scheme. The basic ideas and the mathematics of RSA threshold signatures
and threshold decryption are quite similar. The first application is a vaca-
tion replacement scenario, the second one devotes itself to the protection of
enterprise gateways for secure email. For both applications prototypes are
available as a proof of concept.
5.5.1 Delegating Decryption Keys for Secure Email
This section addresses the problem outlined in Section 3.2.5, namely the
question of how to cope with encrypted email which should be temporar-
ily forwarded to another person (or another mailbox of the same person).
Currently, there are only two alternatives which are both disadvantageous
for the private key holder: Storing the key pair on an online system allows
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Figure 5.14: Threshold cryptography solution for vacation replacement
problem.
seamless decryption and the revocation of capabilites when necessary, but
makes the key vulnerable to online attacks (e.g. password-guessing is possi-
ble for webmail systems). On the other hand, releasing the private key from
the sole control of the owner and the safe place it is stored is risky as such a
step cannot be easily revoked. Plus, it is virtually impossible to track what
the key is used for (think of keys that are also used for authentication or
digital signatures).
Figure 5.14 shows our solution to this problem. Here Alice is the one who
wants to delegate the ability of accessing her encrypted email temporarily
to Bob. Let 〈priv, pub〉 denote her key pair. During setup, Alice uses the
Split class of our software package to generate two shares of her private
key priv. These shares are denoted by priv1 and priv2 in the drawing. Alice
stores priv1 on a server under her control (e.g. her work station that runs a
daemon process while she is absent) and gives priv2 away to Bob. Observe
that for this scenario, a distributed key generation is not necessary.
Incoming mail encrypted with pub is processed as follows. After having
reached the server, the email is partially decrypted with priv1 and forwarded
to Bob (possibly after having checked some constraints such as sender or the
current date). Partial decryption means that its content is still completely
unintelligible to third parties, but may be decrypted by Bob. This is similar
to a partial signature, which is no valid signature with respect to the public
key, but can be made one with the aid of the second party.
As a PSE, Bob is given a standard PKCS#12 file by Alice at setup, which
he can install in his MUA. This is the only thing he has to do, in particular
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there is no additional software necessary on Bob’s machine. At any point
in time, Alice has the situation well in hand as she can always deactivate
the forwarding entry on the server (or delete the share priv1 completely) and
Bob will learn nothing about future encrypted messages.
We briefly sketch the cryptographic details. Note that hybrid encryption
is used in this setting. Threshold cryptography computations are only done
on the encrypted ephemeral session key, not the symmetrically encrypted
message itself. This means that m in Figure 5.14 and the following has to
be interpreted as the session key. For RSA, where 〈priv, pub〉 = 〈d, (N, e)〉,
we use a multiplicative sharing priv1 · priv2 ≡ priv mod ϕ(N) as this allows
seamless integration on Bob’s side. Here the partial decrypt functions are
identical to standard RSA decryption: partialdecrypt
(i)
privi
= x 7→ xprivi
mod N .
Threshold decryption with seamless integration at the proxy’s side also
works with the ElGamal cryptosystem. ElGamal can be realized in any
finite cyclic group G = 〈g〉 (written multiplicatively) where computing dis-
crete logarithms to the base g is difficult (e.g. the multiplicative group
of a prime field). Here priv is a secret exponent, which we share addi-
tively modulo the order of g: priv ≡ priv1 + priv2. The public key pub
consists of the description of the group G, its generator g, and gpriv. En-
cryption of a message m ∈ G is done via picking a random integer k and
computing the tuple c := (gk, (gpriv)km). Here, partialdecrypt
(1)
priv1
(c) =
(gk, (gkpriv1)−1m) and partialdecrypt
(2)
priv2
((gk, µ1)) = (g
kpriv2)−1µ1 = m.
Note that partialdecrypt
(2)
priv2
is the standard ElGamal decryption func-
tion.
5.5.2 Securing an Enterprise Gateway for Secure Email
Having recognized the need for usable secure email solutions, some software
makers and open-source initiatives have come up with so-called enterprise
gateways for secure email. These systems shift the burden for cryptographic
operations from the end user’s MUA to a centralized system connected to
the mail server in the enterprise network or even directly integrated with
it. The idea of crypto email gateways is described in detail in [209, 183];
Gerling and Kelm [101] give an overview over existing products.
These solutions all have in common that cryptographic operations are
delegated to a central authority. For technical reasons, such an authority
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requires a direct connection to the Internet and has to store all decryption
and signing keys. This makes it vulnerable and attractive both to internal or
external attacks. From the users’ viewpoint, the gateway has to be trusted
to a large extent since it has the capability to impersonate them or steal
their decryption keys. As a practical consequence, the administrator of the
corresponding computer has to be fully trusted or the system has to be
made robust against tampering. The former is a quite unsatisfactory and
often unrealistic condition whereas the latter is a complicated task since
administrators (must) usually have extensive capabilities on the operating
system level. To prevent unauthorized access to the central key store, either
by a fraudulent administrator or an intruder, we propose to again enforce a
four-eyes principle with the help of threshold cryptography. We have shown
the feasibility of this approach by our prototype SecMGW (Secure Mail
GateWay) which is described in [234] in more detail.
Figure 5.15 illustrates how threshold cryptography may works in the
email gateway setting: An encrypted message is delivered to the company’s
mail server connected to the Internet. This server uses the share priv1 (of the
corresponding recipient’s private key) to compute partialdecrypt
(1)
priv1
(c)
and forwards it to its counterpart. Note that this partially decrypted mes-
sage is unintelligible to a potential eavesdropper on the internal network.
When the recipient connects to her mailbox to download the message, the
respective server applies partialdecrypt
(2)
priv2
and returns the plaintext (via
a secure channel). The partial decryption functions for RSA as well and
ElGamal are realized in the same way as in the previous section.
Figure 5.15: Decrypting email using threshold cryptography.
It has be shown above that a single share does not provide any infor-
mation about the private key or any advantage in order to decrypt the
ciphertext. If all end user keys are shared between two computers (that
are administered by different persons) according to Figure 5.15, even com-
promising one subsystem would not harm overall security. The extra costs
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for implementing this four-eyes principle are tolerable since both systems
operate in nearly the same way. Initial key generation may take place on
the client at the moment when a new user registers or even in a distributed
manner with the two subsystems involved.
We emphasize that the four-eyes principle can be generalized to a k-
out-of-n secret sharing. This means that each private key is split into n
pieces requiring the cooperation of an arbitrary subset of k shareholders for
each private key operation. For instance, 2-out-of-n schemes can be used for
load-balancing since cryptographic computations are time-consuming.
5.6 Conclusions
An important way to manage the complexity of security in general and PKI
in particular is to outsource critical and complex tasks. In this chapter we
looked at the problem of PKI outsourcing and investigated a common cer-
tificate enrolment scheme. An important weakness was found, which can be
exploited by a malicious service provider to impersonate its customer. We
consider this an intolerable risk, especially as one concrete incident already
has become public and has underlined the severity of the issue. Fortunately,
threshold cryptography provides an elegant, yet provably secure way to solve
the problem. We argued that shared digital signatures also require a distrib-
uted generation of the certification key. This led us to an open cryptographic
problem, namely the efficient generation of a distributed RSA key by two
parties. One main part of this chapter copes with this problem. Fortunately,
we could design such a distributed protocol for two parties with the help of
multi-prime RSA. Its complexity is only linear in the bit length of the mod-
ulus compared to the quadratic complexity of previously known schemes,
while its security can be shown under the same standard assumptions. We
provide a software package for distributed certificate signatures and DSA
key generation as well as a prototype for RSA key generation. Our experi-
ments have shown that the costs for two-party shared RSA key generation
with the new algorithm are no more prohibitive.
Our proposal for a new enrolment protocol is flexible in many respects.
First of all, there are up to three integration variants of the new scheme.
One of them allows to transparently retrofit the mechanism into an existing
trustcenter without changing anything at the CA. Furthermore our protocol
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works well with every signature scheme that permits a shared generation
of a digital signature. Examples include ElGamal, DSA, and RSA. We
saw that discrete log-based signatures schemes are superior to RSA with
respect to the costs of key generation, but they do not allow retrofitting our
new enrolment scheme so easily to an existing process. Another degree of
freedom is the treatment of multiple RAs, which can be integrated in a flat
or two-stage hierarchy. The idea of shared signatures can also be used for the
signing of CRLs and OCSP responses, although it is not so security-critical
to shift this task completely to the service provider.
As an outlook we presented two more applications of threshold crypto-
graphy to email scenarios. One deals with the security of private keys on an
enterprise-wide crypto gateway. The other solves the problem of how to give
a vacation replacement the power to temporarily read one’s encrypted mail
without handing over the private key. We expect to see more applications
using threshold cryptography in the future.
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Chapter 6
Opportunistic Security for
Email
The vast majority of users detest anything they must configure
and tweak. Any really mass-appeal tool must allow an essentially
transparent functionality as default behaviour; anything else will
necessarily have limited adoption.
– Bo Leuf
We’re not designing a system to handle nuclear weapons launch
codes.
– Peter Gutmann
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a novel approach to secure email which is based on
the idea of opportunistic, i.e. best effort, security. The poor user acceptance
of secure email led us to the conclusion that a trade-off between security
and usability must be made in favour of usability. This may imply a level
of security that is less than perfect, but which is still “good enough” with
respect to a plausible threat model (cf. the discussion in Section 2.3.2).
It is common knowledge that the amount of secure messages is only a
negligible fraction of the total amount of email. Obviously, there are two
reasonable explanations for the lack of sufficient incentives for securing mail:
First, the anticipated benefits of secure mail are too low, or second, the costs
of applying the existing security technology are too high.
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The benefits appear to be low if the threat perception is weak, which
is generally the case as we argued in Section 4.2.1. Consequently, the costs
of security must be low as well for security to be attractive. The costs can
be measured in monetary terms or in terms of the overhead users have due
to security technology. Monetary costs can be discounted since numerous
PKI-enabled email clients are available and certificates can be obtained for
free or at affordable prices (see Sections 3.4.3 and 3.2.4). The costs are thus
determined primarily by the cognitive effort required to operate electronic
mail security. This implies that users install the necessary software and ob-
taining key pairs and certificates. As we stated in Chapter 3, the difficulty
lies in exchanging keys, building trust in the received keys, authorizing cryp-
tographic operations, and in diligently and competently reacting to prompts
and warnings of the security software.
The research question then becomes what the optimum trade-off should
be and how the security benefits are maximized with minimum damage to
usability. Based on our analysis in Section 3.2, we argue that public key
certificates signed by intermediaries (i.e. CAs or PGP peers) and digital
signatures account for a considerable cognitive or operational overhead, but
they contribute marginally to the practical level of security. By eliminating
these primitives, the costs versus benefits ratio can be improved. Towards
more user-friendly secure mail, we explore a non-intrusive approach that
works without either of these primitives, and rather focuses on transparent
message encryption and integrity protection. In our approach, we separate
key exchange from binding keys to identities.
This chapter is based on our paper [193]. It starts with a summary of the
threat model and an analysis of what suitable trade-offs between usability
and security might be. The conclusions we draw from our analysis guides the
design choices we make in subsequent sections. In Section 6.3 we describe
the processes of key management and key rollover, before we briefly explain
the technical aspects of protecting mail. The new user interface design and
new interaction mechanisms for the verification of keys are the subjects of
Section 6.5. We conducted two user studies to assess the usability of new
metaphors and the complementary visualizations of the security state. The
results are given in Sections 6.5 and 6.6. The latter one provides evidence
that pairwise manual key fingerprint verification can be feasible in everyday
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usage. This chapter ends with a discussion of related work and a conclusion
and outlook to further work.
6.2 Background
6.2.1 Email Threat Model
We focus on (non-commercial) individual users of email who communicate
by mail from their homes. We call them again Alice and Bob. Both connect
to the Internet through a telecommunications provider (“Telco”) and an
ISP. Alice sends her mail by transacting with a mail exchanger (MX), for
instance a sendmail daemon run by her mail provider. En route to Bob,
her mail may be forwarded several times from one MX to another until it is
delivered to Bob’s mail drop. The mail drop stores messages for Bob until
he retrieves them with his email client by means of the POP3 or IMAP
protocols or a web front end. Figure 6.1 illustrates that model. Here the
physical and logical channels (dotted lines) of the email are depicted in a
single graph (cf. Section 2.1.1). We assume that attacks can occur at any
entity or connection channel except at the PCs of Alice and Bob.
Figure 6.1: Physical and logical path of an email.
We distinguish between three classic categories of threats as suggested
by Anderson [9]. Those threats correspond to the security goals of confiden-
tiality, integrity/authenticity, and availability.
Unauthorized information release: The adversary, Mallory, intercepts
and reads mail sent by Alice to Bob. We do not address the threat of
traffic analysis, that is beyond our scope.
Unauthorized information modification: Mallory modifies email sent
from Alice to Bob while it is in transit or in storage, or she sends mail
to Bob that is forged in the name of Alice.
Unauthorized denial of use: Mallory can prevent Alice from sending mail
to Bob, or can prevent Bob from receiving mail from Alice. Note that
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a powerful adversary can always deny service by saturating or severing
the communication channels. We limit ourselves to denial of service
through regular interaction with Alice’s and Bob’s mail system, e.g.
by sending them forged or unsolicited mail.
Mallory may or may not collaborate with any of the entities involved in
forwarding or storing mail with their consent (e.g. implied by search warrant)
or without their consent (e.g. because Mallory compromised a MX). Mallory
may launch passive attacks (eavesdropping only) or active attacks, which
involve the modification or generation of messages. Although we discuss
threats and countermeasures in terms of Alice and Bob, which is a particular
pair or users, our intention is to address large scale attacks. In other words,
Mallory attacks multiple mail “sinks” for a mail “source,” multiple mail
sources for a mail sink, or multiple sources and sinks.
6.2.2 Potential Tradeoffs
Let us briefly recall a few prudent engineering rules for designing protec-
tion mechanisms due to Saltzer and Schroeder [199], which we have already
introduced in Section 2.3.4.
Economy of mechanism: The design should be as simple and small as
possible.
Fail-safe defaults: The mechanism should have fail-safe defaults.
Psychological acceptability: The mechanism should be easy to under-
stand and use.
From an economic or rational perspective, public key certificates are
worthwhile if their benefits outweigh their costs. The primary benefit of
certificates is the prevention of impersonation attacks by active adversaries
who substitute their keys for the keys of legitimate users. For compari-
son, public key cryptography without certificates foils passive eavesdroppers
completely [74], and it uncovers active adversaries unless the adversary in-
tercepts and re-encodes all mail at all times, particularly at the time when
the communicants first exchange their keys.
In order to fulfil their objective, certificates require a complicated PKI.
We argued that certificate validation and key management accounts for
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the majority of the interactions and decisions that interfere with the goal-
oriented tasks of a user, and which the user has difficulties to understand.
Since a PKI seems to be neither simple (first rule) nor particularly easy to
understand and use (third rule), we decided to investigate what it would
take to achieve adequate security without that primitive. Our objective is
not to attain 100% security but to attain significantly improved security at
a high degree of usability.
Separating Concerns Our first measure was to separate concerns that
would be uniquely addressed by a PKI, which is the process of binding a
key to an identity. Once that was determined, other separations of concerns
followed suit. (These issues are addressed in the four following sections.)
1. exchanging keys and maintaining current keys
2. protecting mail
3. communicating and responding to potential security breaches
4. optionally binding keys to an identity
Here, “binding” implies verification of an ad-hoc association between a
key and an alleged identity. For as long as the user is not concerned about
active attacks, she may disregard the binding and trust the ad-hoc associa-
tion. This does not necessarily mean that the association is not trustworthy,
each concern has elements that attempt to detect security breaches based
on certain coherence principles that we define along with our mechanisms.
For instance, if Alice uses public key k in her communication with Bob then
she may not use public key k′ 6= k unless she introduced k′ and proved
that she knows the private keys that belong both to k and k′. A variety of
more general coherence principles have been summarized nicely by Arkko
and Nikander [14] under the notion of weak authentication.
Design Objectives In summary, our approach is to make key exchange
and encryption a largely transparent default behavior and to design protocols
that make it difficult for Mallory:
1. to initially compromise a communication channel,
2. to maintain continuous control over the channel,
3. to leave the compromised channel undetected,
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even if no binding between keys and identities is provided through a PKI.
Thereby, we aim to reduce the overhead (costs) associated with the operation
of mail security to a degree where mail security becomes ubiquitous. At the
same time, we raise the risks and costs of successful attacks so that a rational
adversary must concentrate her resources on a small number of targets with
a high overall yield – and thus does not invade the privacy of individual
users on a large scale.
6.3 Exchanging and Maintaining Current Keys
6.3.1 Key Exchange Process
Our first concern is to distribute public keys that can be used to prevent
unauthorized information release or modification. At this point, we are not
concerned about the binding of a key to an identity, we cover that aspect
further below in Section 6.6. That enables us to design the exchange of
public keys in a fashion that is entirely transparent to users, unless of course
there is evidence of a potential attack. The (fully automatic) key exchange
process of Alice (“Kex”) has three duties:
1. maintain the “security state” of Alice, which is the known set of keys,
peers, and their relationships;
2. decide which keys must be used and which keys must be exchanged at
any given point in time;
3. update the security state based upon the keys that are received.
6.3.2 Transformations of the Security State
The principal idea is to design Kex such that updates of the security state,
in other words a “transition” in the state space, occur only if the new state
is at least as secure as the previous state. A transition is triggered if, as part
of a mail, a new key is “introduced,” which requires a message from Bob to
Alice of the following form:1
Bob→ Alice : {“Bob”, “Alice”, t, h(kold), knew} signed with k−1old, k−1new
1For simplicity, we assume that the same key pair is used for signing and encryption, as
is common practice in S/MIME-based applications. The approach can readily be extended
to support dual key pairs.
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Figure 6.2: Schematic view of key structure.
Figure 6.3: Data structure Alice keeps for each of her peers.
Here, t is the current time, h denotes a cryptographic hash function and
〈k−1, k〉 is Bob’s key pair. In practice, “Alice” and “Bob” would denote
Alice’s and Bob’s canonical email addresses. The data structure carries a
double signature (cf. Section 5.2.7) produced by the new and the old private
key.
The semantics is that Bob tells Alice that he wishes to replace his older
public key kold with the more recent public key knew. As a shorthand, we
write kold ≻ knew, provided that both signatures are valid. The first key is
introduced self-signed, i.e. kold is empty. Old keys and the order in which
they were introduced are kept (see Figure 6.2) until they are not referenced
any longer in a peer structure and are garbage collected (for instance based
on expiry time and storage quotas). Key structures are kept in linked lists.
Each successor key knew is introduced by its predecessor kold.
2 A trusted flag
indicates that the key has been successfully bound to an identity. The flag
carries forward, which means that a successor key with no flag set inherits
the flag settings from its predecessor.
2With respect to the signature of public keys, key structures are comparable to a
certificate chain where each certificate contains a proof-of-possession for the corresponding
private key.
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Data Representation Kex intercepts incoming mail and processes any
valid key introductions contained therein using three types of data that
together comprise the security state (see Figure 6.3):
1. The list of Alice’s key pairs ordered by recency.
2. For each peer (e.g. Bob) his associated public keys ordered by recency.
3. A peer structure for each peer that references current keys.
Peer structures are persistent and created on demand when the first email
of a peer is received. For instance, the peer structure that Kex keeps on
Bob stores the following information:
self key: the most recent key of Alice that Bob used to protect his mail to
Alice;
sent key: the most recent key of Alice the Kex introduced (sent) to Bob;
peer key: the most recent key of Bob known to Kex;
Processing Rules When Kex receives k ≻ k′ it enforces a simple rule. If
no key is known for Bob then a self-signed key is accepted as Bob’s initial
key and an association with Bob’s identity is formed. Otherwise, if k is the
known key of Bob then that key introduces k′ which becomes the new most
recent key of Bob. Of course, the introduced key k′ must not already exist in
Alice’s security state or else an error occurs (that prevents the inadvertent or
adverse introduction of loops in the history of keys). If an error occurs then
Kex tags the mail that contained the key introduction with a descriptive
error code.
Kex also intercepts outbound mail and determines for each recipient
whether a key must be introduced (e.g., if Bob has not yet used any of
Alice’s keys or uses a key that is outdated). Once Kex selected a key for
introduction, it keeps introducing that key with the most recent key of
Alice that Bob knows until Bob begins using the introduced key. At this
point, Kex either stops adding key introductions to outbound mail or starts
introducing a more recent key of Alice (if such a key has been generated
meanwhile).
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 give a more precise and formal presentation of how
Kex processes incoming and outgoing key introductions. Note that in a
self-signed key introduction the old key k is nil (“not in list”). If no peer
key is known then peer is also nil (compare Figure 6.3). This allows a very
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Figure 6.4: Decision graph for incoming key introductions k ≻ k′.
Figure 6.5: Decision graph for outgoing mails.
compact presentation of the graph. The peer , self , and sent variables in
Figure 6.5 refer to the peer data structure that we introduced in Figure 6.3.
As an invariant, the sent key must always be at least as recent as the self
key.
The processes are designed to keep Alice’s and Bob’s security states
synchronized even if an active adversary drops legitimate emails with key
introductions, or reorders such mail.
6.3.3 Security Considerations
Obviously, a valid key introduction can be computed only by someone who
knows the private keys that correspond to both public keys, the old and
the new one. Alice does not really know whether Bob or Mallory sent the
key introduction, Mallory could have generated both the old and the new
key. However, by simple induction we can then reason that Alice must have
received the first self-signed key with Bob’s name on it from Mallory (we
disregard the possibility that Bob adversely or inadvertently disclosed his
private key to Mallory or that Mallory has broken Bob’s key pair). On the
other hand, if Alice received the initial key introduction actually from Bob
(whether or not Alice is certain about it) then Mallory cannot send valid
key introductions in Bob’s name unless she breaks Bob’s key pair.
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Assume now that Mallory sent the initial key introduction. Alice at-
tempts to send mail to Bob in Mallory’s key which triggers alarms on Bob’s
side unless Mallory performs a MITM attack and transcodes all such mail.
A single missed mail reveals Mallory’s presence. Once Mallory starts her
attack he cannot leave the communication channel between Alice and Bob
without his presence being noticed. In order to do so, she would have to
introduce Bob’s public key to Alice which requires forgery of Bob’s signa-
ture. Alice’s advantage is that Murphy’s Law is in her favour – eventually
Mallory will make a mistake, perhaps due to a configuration error, a route
change, a computer failure, or because Alice and Bob followed procedures
we outline in Section 6.6.
Finally, assume that Mallory broke Bob’s key. That means she can
read Bob’s mail to Alice – until Bob introduces a new key. At this point,
security is either restored or Mallory must launch an active attack with all
the implications discussed above.
In summary, we presented a secure key exchange and key maintenance
scheme that operates continuously and transparently on Alice’s inbound and
outbound mail. No user interaction is required unless evidence of an attack
is found. Powerful active adversaries may still attack but their chances of
evading eventual detection are limited.
6.4 Protecting Mail
Email consists of headers and the mail body (RFC 822, see [58]). Both
elements need protection, which is achieved by transforming them into a
separate envelope for each intended recipient. The envelope consists of a
minimal set of headers and a protected body, and is sent to the recipient
(e.g. Bob) via the simple mail transport protocol (SMTP). Note that the
confidentiality or authenticity of email header fields like the sender or subject
is not protected by S/MIME. How exactly the envelope is represented is
largely a matter of implementation choice. On an abstract level, the process
is quite simple. If Bob requires a key introduction then it is added to the
mail. Key introductions, headers, and mail body are jointly signed with the
introduced key (the sent key) or otherwise with the most recent key of Alice
that is available to Bob (the self key).
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6.4.1 Outgoing Email
Finally, if a public key of Bob is known (peer 6= nil) then the signed infor-
mation including signature is encrypted with that key and the cipher text is
placed in the body of the envelope. The information necessary for decryp-
tion (e.g. key identifiers and encrypted content encryption keys) is added
where appropriate as per implementation choice. Necessary and sufficient
information to fulfil mail transport requirements are copied to the envelope’s
header section.
If no suitable key of Bob is known then the augmented email (and not
the envelope) is sent (unencrypted) or not sent at all based on a prior policy
decision that we explain in greater detail in Section 6.5 along with user
interaction principles.
6.4.2 Incoming Email
Inbound mail is processed in reverse order, which is a more involved process
due to the various error conditions that may arise. For simplicity, let “Kin”
be a shorthand for that process. If all applicable verification operations turn
out correctly and the encryption key is more recent than the key previously
used by Bob, then Kin updates the self key in Alice’s view of Bob accord-
ingly. In case of errors, Kin signals them by adding appropriate headers
to the email, which must then be interpreted by the MUA. In addition to
rather obvious error conditions such as invalid signatures and missing keys,
there are some subtle conditions that Kin must verify. For instance, if Bob
once sent mail to Alice which was signed or encrypted, then any subsequent
mail without that protection is flagged with an error. Otherwise, adver-
saries could simply bypass the security mechanisms by sending plain text
mail, which is easily forged.
6.5 Key Introduction and User Interaction
Up to this point, our discussion focused on the key exchange and mail protec-
tion processes that underpin our engineering approach. Most importantly,
we separated the key exchange from binding keys to identities (in a strong
sense) and we made transparent signatures and encryption the default mode
of operation. In this section, we discuss how that approach enables us to
simplify the interaction with users.
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The usability of contemporary mail security software is limited primarily
by two factors:
1. required interactions with security functions are perceived as an ob-
stacle to accomplishing goal-oriented tasks (see e.g. [204]);
2. users have limited understanding of the concepts that underpin trust
models and cryptographic primitives (compare e.g. [60, 252]).
We illustrate these limitations with two examples. First, warning messages
and confirmation boxes frequently appear and must be “clicked away” when
no suitable keys are available even though the user may be well aware of
the risks of sending mail in the clear and is willing to accept them. Second,
users are presented unintelligible information, for instance, certificate con-
tents which are easily set to arbitrary and superficially convincing values by
adversaries who generate self-signed certificates.
In contrast, our user interface design concepts require fewer interactions
than contemporary approaches. We let users interact with concepts they
know (“mail” rather than “keys”). Our objective is to provide a familiar
context and mental representation [179]. All decisions that a user must
make are related to a purpose (e.g. confidentiality) rather than unfamiliar
concepts (e.g. certificates as the means to an end). Furthermore, users
are not forced to make decisions immediately, they are at leisure to invoke
security functions when deemed appropriate, which is influenced by users’
curiosity or risk perception. We cover two user interaction aspects in this
section: output (i.e. alerts and visualizing status information such as the
availability of a particular key) and input (i.e. making policy decisions).
6.5.1 Alerts and Status Display
Alice must be alerted if the key exchange and maintenance processes de-
tected incoherent key usage, invalid signatures, or other error conditions.
Such alerts are associated with a particular mail that has been received.
A simple and non-intrusive method to alert Alice to such an event is to
highlight the suspicious mail prominently, e.g. in reverse, in the mail display
(see Figure 6.6). For example, assume that Bob introduced his key to Alice
in one mail and Mallory subsequently sends a key introduction of her own
forged key in Bob’s name. However, Kex would flag Mallory’s mail with an
error and the mail would be highlighted to bring the fact to Alice’s atten-
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tion. On the other hand, if Mallory sent her mail before Bob then Bob’s
mail – the genuine one – would be flagged. In either case would Alice be
alerted to the fact that some sort of attack is ongoing. Which key is which
– and consequently which email is genuine – can be determined by appro-
priate subsequent verification. However, it is upon Alice to decide whether
or not to investigate the alert, and she may do so at a time of her choice.
Her regular tasks remain largely uninterrupted.
Figure 6.6: Context menu of a mail flagged with an error.
Alice may investigate the reason for the alert and the conclusions that
can be drawn from it by invoking a context menu with a right click. The
context menu allows to inquire about the reason of the error, to verify the
association of a key and an identity, or to define the underlying key as trusted
(which binds the key to the identity of the sender). These alternatives are
shown in Figure 6.6. Subsequently, she may wish to invoke a verification
procedure (see Section 6.6) which allows her to confirm the authenticity of
the mail. It is worth noting that technically the authenticity of the key
would be verified that the sender of the highlighted mail used. However,
Alice would have the illusion that the verification refers to the mail rather
than the keys. Based on the outcome of the verification procedure, Alice
may define the mail (or rather the underlying key) as trusted. Once a key of
Bob is trusted to be authentic (and marked appropriately in Alice’s security
state) that trust extends to all keys that Bob introduces with the trusted
key (see Figure 6.2 again).
6.5.2 Input of Policy Decisions
If Bob’s key is unavailable to Alice at the time when Alice wishes to send
him mail then current MUAs typically alert Alice by raising an alert panel.
The dialoge then requires that Alice confirms or cancels the send operation
by a mouse click. That forces Alice to divert her attention to handling
the interruption before she can proceed with her original work process. If
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Alice is an inexperienced user, then she may even be forced to switch input
modalities (e.g., from keyboard to mouse) in order to handle the event. It is
less intrusive to communicate the alert by highlighting Bob’s mail address
appropriately while Alice enters it. For illustration, see Figure 6.7: Bob’s
address bob@brown.net is displayed in an emphasized way (e.g. in colour
and/or reverse video) to indicate that his key is unavailable. The entry of
the second address is still in progress, so no highlighting has taken place yet.
After entering multiple recipient’s addresses and the email body, Alice may
still decide what to do with Bob’s address (or to ignore the event) without
a major interruption of her task. She may chose to keep it or delete it from
the recipient’s list.
Figure 6.7: Feedback on key status and policy options while typing.
Use of Metaphors for Secure/Insecure Email Additionally, we con-
sider analogies to the physical world when requiring input of policy decisions,
i.e. which alternative action is to be taken when no key is available for a
mail’s intended recipients. In the physical world, we send postcards or let-
ters. Postcards are readable by anyone involved in the delivery process and
consequently the expectation of confidentiality is low when sending them.
Letters have been opened regularly (and re-sealed imperceptibly) for reasons
of espionage during the Second World War [135], and there is no reason to
believe that letters are not intercepted and read today. However, for all
practical purposes, letters offer a much higher degree of confidentiality, and
consequently the users’ expectations of confidentiality are higher as well.
Electronic mail sent in clear text resembles postcards whereas encrypted
mail resembles letters.
Consequentially, we substitute the common “Send” button by two but-
tons: a “Send as postcard” and a “Send as letter” button (see also Fig-
ure 6.7). The former encrypts mail for all recipients whose keys are known
and sends clear text to all other recipients, whereas the latter sends en-
crypted mail to those recipients whose keys are known and no mail to all
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other recipients. In either case, mail is encrypted automatically whenever
a key is available. In order to prevent users from inadvertently not sending
mail to a particular recipient whose key is unknown, the “Send as letter”
button is highlighted if the key of one or more recipients is unknown. As in
the case of handling alerts, this approach conveys all necessary information
to Alice without necessarily demanding additional user interactions. Send-
ing an email still only requires one click and no alert boxes interrupt Alice’s
work task subsequent to sending a mail – all security policy decisions are
made beforehand.
6.5.3 Evaluation of Metaphors
We ran a preliminary user study to determine how well subjects intuitively
understand our letter and postcard metaphors. Towards that end, we con-
ducted a sequentially structured interview with 5 female and 14 male sub-
jects of age between 20 and 49 years (average age: 29 years). They were
given a colour printout of two mock-up user interfaces (based on the Mozilla
Thunderbird client), one with labels and the other without them. The ver-
sion with labels is shown in Figure 6.8. The captions are given in German,
their meaning is “send as letter” and “send as postcard”. The interview was
structured as follows:
• Subjects were shown the mock-up UI without button labels and were
asked to guess the functionality of the icons.
• If subjects did not correctly guess the functionality, then they were
shown the same mock-up UI with labels and asked again.
• If subjects did not correctly guess the functionality, then they were
told that the UI belonged to a new mail client with improved security
functions. Subsequently, the subjects were again asked to guess the
functionality of the icons.
Subsequent to six test runs, we also began to collect demographic infor-
mation, and assessed subjects’ mail handling expertise, threat perception
in general and with respect to the risk of eavesdropping, and willingness to
accept higher personal efforts to secure their mail communication (so only
13 results are available for these questions). The corresponding results are
shown in Figure 6.9.
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Figure 6.8: Paper mock-up used to evaluate letter/postcard metaphors.
All subjects recognized the icons as what they were. All but two sub-
jects understood the metaphors, six without labels, three after icon labels
were shown, and eight after the context hint was given. The metaphors
chosen were rated as “good” even though some participants mentioned that
the symbols could be enhanced by “common security metaphors” such as
a padlock or a seal on the letter. Incorrect interpretations concentrated
on the postcard. Subjects interpreted that icon as “send summary” or
“send multimedia”. We found no correlation between correct recognition
and demographics or experience. However, we found a trend in the corre-
lation between understanding the metaphors and a high threat awareness
(r = 0.43, p < 0.07), as well as between understanding of the metaphors and
willingness to accept a larger effort for securing mail (r = 0.36, p < 0.09).
The results of our study give us reason to believe that our metaphors
can be adopted without significant learning effort. The “fine print” of the
security policies conveyed by our metaphors can be explained to the user
by means of a pop-up hint that should be shown for instance upon first
invocation of the new functionality (perhaps with a “don’t show again”
check mark). Note that the policy is “implicit” in the metaphor – users do
not define a custom policy to be associated with the metaphors. Additional
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Figure 6.9: Interview results metaphor evaluation.
feedback mechanisms are conceivable in the “send letter” case if the keys
of some intended recipients are not available. For instance, an idea might
be to offer the sender the possibility to split the email in two messages, one
addressed to the recipients who are able to receive confidential email and
the other one for the remaining peers. If the email contains sensitive pieces
of information, the sender has now the possibility to exclude all or some of
them in the insecure mail.
6.6 Binding Keys to Identities
Above, we described how mail can be protected against unauthorized in-
formation release and modification in a fashion that is largely transparent
and non-intrusive. Although, we have not obtained absolute security – a
determined adversary who manages to intercept the first key exchange be-
tween Alice and Bob may launch a MITM attack against them, and may
even evade detection for an unspecified period of time. The reason is that
our approach does not, in a strong sense comparable to a public key cer-
tificate, bind a key to the identity of its legitimate owner. We expect that
Alice and Bob achieve such a strong binding by verifying their keys over an
authenticated channel.
A legitimate question one may ask is whether that approach is a scalable
and what burden is placed upon users by it. Below, we present results of an
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analysis of users’ mail behavior that we conducted to find an answer to said
question. More precisely, we analyzed the setup costs and the continuous
costs of pair-wise key verification:
1. the setup costs are measured by the size of the peer group that a
subject has when the system is introduced;
2. the continuous costs are measured by the rate at which the subject
encounters new peers.
Our results, which we summarize and interpret below, led us to believe that
pair-wise key verification may indeed be scalable. Furthermore, the analysis
leads to a greedy algorithm which maximizes the security benefit per key
verification so that users can determine an optimal trade-off between their
desired level of security and interaction overhead.
6.6.1 Materials and Methods
We developed a set of tools (using Java, Perl, MatLab, gnuplot, and Bourne
Shell) to analyse mail stored in IMAP or POP3 folders, and file system-based
mail drops in the mbox or related formats (allowing us to access mails stored
in Mozilla, Thunderbird, Opera Mail, Pegaus, and – via an additional con-
verter – Outlook Express). Our scanner extracts the To, Cc, Bcc, Reply-To,
Date, References, and In-Reply-To headers of all mails. Electronic mail ad-
dresses are anonymized by substituting them with a running identity number
(“ID”) that is the same for equal addresses. Equality of email addresses is
determined by a lower-case comparison of their local part and domain [58].
Each ID stands for a potential peer of the mail owner (for ease of descrip-
tion we refer to the mail owner as Alice). A peer of Alice is a communicant
with whom Alice has a bidirectional communication, i.e. Alice sent mail to
her peer and the peer sent mail to Alice (or vice versa). Our tools determine
the set of Alice’s peers according to the following rules:
1. Alice provides her own addresses (one or many)
2. A mail is an answer if it has a References or In-Reply-To header
3. A sender is a communicant who sent mail to Alice
(sender ∈ From ∪ Reply-To and Alice ∈ To ∪ Cc ∪ Bcc)
4. A strong sender is a communicant who replied to Alice
(sender ∈ From∪Reply-To and Alice ∈ To and the mail is an answer)
6.6. BINDING KEYS TO IDENTITIES 217
5. A receiver is a communicant to whom Alice sent mail
(Alice ∈ From ∪ Reply-To and receiver ∈ To ∪ Cc ∪ Bcc)
6. A strong receiver is a communicant to whom Alice replied
(Alice ∈ From∪Reply-To and receiver ∈ To and the mail is an answer)
7. A peer is a strong sender, a strong receiver, or in sender ∩ receiver
8. A peer is not a mailing list e.g., an address that includes:
majordomo@, listserv@, -request@, -list@, etc.
For each mail and each sender and receiver referenced therein, our tool
generates a sample which consists of the communicant’s ID and the time
stamp of the mail that is extracted from its Date header. Next, double
entries are removed which may occur e.g., if mail is filed multiple times.
Finally, we eliminate all samples that are not peers and all samples with an
age of more than two years measured from the most recent sample.
Three cumulative distribution functions (CDF) are computed from the
remaining set of samples:
1. percentage of mail exchanged with n ≤ x peers;
2. percentage of weeks where mail was exchanged with n ≤ x peers;
3. percentage of weeks where n ≤ x new peers were observed.
Multiple sets of samples (one set per mailbox owner) are combined by av-
eraging the values of the distributions. The output are the mean y¯ for
each position x and the standard deviations for samples above (sa) and be-
low (sb) the mean. In the Figures 6.11 to 6.13 the results are plotted as:
fa(x) = y¯(x) + sa(x), f(x) = y¯(x), and fb(x) = y¯(x)− sb(x).
6.6.2 Description of Study
We generated a Web page from which our mail drop scanning tool and
instructions for its installation and configuration (both in English and in
German) could be downloaded. The start window of the statistics tool is
shown in Figure 6.10. Here, participants could provide the location of their
local and remote email folders. The subjects we invited to participate in our
study were colleagues, fellow researchers, and students at Technical Univer-
sity Darmstadt, Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Graphics (Darmstadt),
and the Peter Kiewit Institute at the University of Nebraska at Omaha.
Overall 34 individuals responded by sending us their anonymized mailbox ex-
tracts. The sizes of the sample sets varied considerably as some participants
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Figure 6.10: Start window of mailbox analysing tool.
were communicating significantly more by mail than others. For instance,
the participant who provided the largest dataset is a system administra-
tor responsible for an IT infrastructure that serves about 200 researchers,
students, and IT personnel at spin-off companies. Other participants are
actively engaged in collaborative research and project work.
We sorted the datasets by the number of samples our tool extracted
from each set and chose the 17 sets with the largest numbers of samples,
expecting to obtain more reliable results than would probably have been the
case if the smaller datasets were included. All retained datasets had more
than 750 samples after applying our filter procedure. Table 6.1 lists the sizes
of the extracted samples (“all”) and the samples that were retained after
samples of non-peers were removed (“filtered”). The third column shows
their quotient. The results of our analysis are displayed in Figures 6.11
to 6.13. The graphs show the CDF listed above, they answer the question,
whether in y percent of all cases a given condition held for x or fewer peers.
Each graph is plotted twice with different scales. On the left, the ordinate
ranges from 0 to 1 and from 0 to 0.8 on the right. We found the following:
• On average 50% of all mail was exchanged with 10 or fewer peers
(min(x ∈ N | f(x) ≥ 0.5) = 10 in Figure 6.11), and with 21 or fewer
peers in our “worst case” scenario (min(x ∈ N | fb(x) ≥ 0.5) = 21 in
Figure 6.11).
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filtered all ratio
2651 3624 0.73
18650 29695 0.63
2473 3926 0.63
2463 3225 0.76
874 1265 0.69
filtered all ratio
2072 3184 0.65
2766 3453 0.80
3359 3785 0.89
4031 4521 0.89
1604 2073 0.77
8349 14484 0.58
filtered all ratio
7657 13007 0.59
783 1727 0.45
5076 9721 0.52
1204 2259 0.53
8194 11431 0.72
2465 7171 0.34
Table 6.1: Numbers of extracted mailbox samples (attributed to bidirec-
tional communication and total number).
• In 50% of all weeks, the number of peers with whom subjects ex-
changed mail was 10 or fewer on average and 22 or fewer in the worst
case (fb(22) ≈ 0.545 in Figure 6.12).
• In 50% of all weeks, subjects encountered at most two peers on average
(f(1) ≈ 0.47 in Figure 6.13) and 3 or fewer in the worst case scenario
(fb(3) ≈ 0.54 in Figure 6.13).
6.6.3 Interpretation of Results
Our analysis is based on subjects’ saved mailboxes, which necessarily cap-
tures a limited view on their actual communication since they almost cer-
tainly have stored sent and received mail selectively. On the other hand, the
type of subjects whose mail communication we analysed uses email more pro-
fessionally and likely more extensively than private non-commercial users.
It is probably fair to say that the results we obtained are an upper bound
of what we could expect to see when analysing the mail communication of
private non-commercial users, a view that has been confirmed by occasional
informal interviews we conducted with such users. Judging by our results,
it appears that:
1. a reasonably small number of key verifications would be required to
achieve an “ideal” level of security for the majority of all exchanged
mail;
2. a fairly small number of key verifications would be required on an
ongoing basis to achieve an “ideal” level of security with new peers.
Also, our results must be interpreted in the light of the actual threat level.
Users may not feel – nor have – the need to verify their keys with all of their
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peers, which further reduces the costs of obtaining a level of security that is
comparable to (or even exceeds that of) certificates issued by a certification
authority.
6.6.4 Greedy Binding
The analysis we conducted based on subjects’ saved mail can be implemented
as an ongoing process e.g., in a MUA or in a mail security proxy. That
process may then display on demand a ranked list of Alice’s peers for whom
a key verification would provide the maximum “utility”. In other words,
the process would suggest the peers with whom the largest amount of mail
is being exchanged and with whom no key verification has yet taken place.
The MUA may additionally visualize a security “score” (e.g. the percentage
of mail that is exchanged securely) which may spur a special effort of the
user to increase one’s security so that the “high score” is reached (in analogy
to playing a computer game).
Human-computer interaction support for key verification opens several
avenues for further research and a wealth of alternatives can be explored.
It is not our objective to give a complete solution in this paper, we rather
wish to stimulate further research in this direction below.
Online real-time communication protocols [10, 139, 225] allow to reduce
the amount of data for key fingerprint verification that has to be exchanged
out of band. A reasonable level of security can be achieved, even when a
short sequence of letters (comparable to a password) instead of the 20 or
more letters a hash value consists of are transferred by the phone. Such
protocols have been investigated primarily from the perspective of crypto-
graphic strength. We argue that an investigation of usability issues of such
protocols has merit. Clearly the security against MITM attacks is reduced,
but not too much as we believe. Having an uncertainty level or “residual
risk” between 2−32 and 2−16 – which is on the order of the annual probabil-
ity of being struck by lightning or the likelihood of a processor bug during
the computation – should be sufficient for everyday email of most users. In
cases where the parties do suspect fraud, they may still chose to exchange
the whole fingerprint.
Last but not least, the relative rate at which users exchange mail is not
the only conceivable metric to optimize the ratio of interaction and security
– other behavioural or information-theoretic metrics may be applicable.
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6.7 Related Work
The idea of implicit security where user actions trigger security policy deci-
sions based on the assumption that user intention conveys policy choices to-
wards achieving a particular goal has already been presented in Section 2.3.4.
We are in favour of this approach although it is of limited expressiveness in
the email context where sending or not sending mail are the primary choices.
In this sense, we already stretched the limits of implicit authorization by sug-
gesting two alternative send buttons (metaphors of email transport) which
both convey different security policies.
With respect to communicating a system’s security state to users, Dour-
ish and Redmiles [69] follow an approach that increases the amount of con-
textual information a user must cope with, in the expectation that this
improves his intuitive understanding of the system. We, on the other hand,
seek to minimize the distraction a user faces due to security overhead. Our
approach bears some similarity to Whitten’s staging approach (see Sec-
tion 2.3.6). Both approaches give the user the freedom of choice when to
improve her security, either by verifying the authenticity of keys or by pro-
gressing to the next stage. However, Whitten expects that through training
the user eventually masters the concept of certificates, something that we
avoid entirely. Garfinkel and Miller [93] conducted a user test based on a
scenario similar to the one of Whitten [253]. They applied a simple colour-
code scheme to indicate whether an email is signed by a key that is new,
has been used before, or is different from the previous one. The results are
promising as users of opportunistic email security were shown to be signifi-
cantly less vulnerable to impersonation where a new key pair is used by the
attacker.
The approach of Levien et al. [153] towards transparent Internet mail
security requires a formalization of trust by certificates and explicit policies
which is the opposite of what we aim to achieve. Our approach also differs
from the one in [207], which accounts for public keys with a limited lifetime,
but limits its discussion of key management to password disciplines. Arkko
and Nikander [14] formalize the notion of weak authentication and discuss
the economic impacts from the attacker’s point of view. SSH is a typical
example which follows the leap-of-faith method in that it alerts users of
key changes. However, SSH does not support transparent rollover of keys.
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Applications of weak authentication are discussed in for ad-hoc wireless
networks [218] and by the IPv6 community [50].
Bentley et al. [26] developed a security patch for sendmail which op-
portunistically encrypts SMTP sessions between mail transfer agents, yet
does not provide end-to-end security. Stream [91] uses SMTP and POP
proxies that transparently handle encryption on behalf of the MUA. It thus
provides end-to-end security with a zero user interface. However, Stream
does not support digital signatures nor key updates. The Enigma system of
Brown and Snow [40] has a similar proxy architecture. Enigma adheres to
the PGP format in contrast to Stream and our system which both encode
all cryptographic information in proprietary email headers.
6.8 Conclusions
It has been widely acknowledged that security is as much a human fac-
tors problem as it is a technical one, and some authors even suggest that
retrofitting usability to existing security mechanisms is no more likely to be
successful than retrofitting security mechanisms to existing applications (see
Section 2.3.3). In this chapter, we presented an innovative design approach
towards non-intrusive secure email by adopting the common threat model.
Our system prevents passive eavesdropping attacks completely and limits
the impact of active attacks to cases where the adversary launches a MITM
attack prior to the first email exchange. Even in the case of a successful
attack, it is infeasible for the adversary to leave the communication channel
undetected, because of the double signatures in key rollover messages.
As a guideline we used the prudent engineering rules for designing pro-
tection mechanisms stated in Section 6.2.2.
• In order to reduce PKI’s complexity which originates from the process-
ing of certificates, we separated key exchange (which is performed
transparently) from binding keys to identities (which becomes a trade-
off between usability and security that the user can make at his own
discretion).
• As a fail-safe default, email is encrypted transparently and automati-
cally whenever possible. The user must only decide how mail is han-
dled for recipients for whom no suitable key is known.
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• The need for user interaction is kept at a minimum and is non-intrusive
as the user has the choice to continue her work task uninterrupted.
All interaction metaphors are based on familiar concepts and mental
representations.
Our main thesis, the low comparative benefit/cost ratio of certification in-
frastructures for private non-commercial users, and the potential scalability
of pair-wise key verification, is supported by the reduction in user interac-
tions that our approach achieves as well as by the results of a study of users’
mail communication. We conclude that security and usability of email is
not necessarily mutually exclusive if best practices in the design of secure
and usable systems are adhered to diligently.
We regard three directions for future research as particularly promis-
ing: first, innovative human-computer interaction support for usable key
verification; second, finding alternative and improved metrics to maximize
users’ security per interaction in a customized and adaptive fashion; third,
innovative approaches to provide user interface “incentives” which promote
ubiquitous “best effort” security as a base level of (mail) protection.
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Figure 6.11: Cumulated percentage of exchanged mails (ordinate) plotted
against number of peers (abscissa) with whom the mails were exchanged.
Figure 6.12: Cumulated percentage of weeks (ordinate) plotted against num-
ber of unique peers per week (abscissa).
Figure 6.13: Cumulated number of weeks (ordinate) plotted against number
of new peers encountered per week (abscissa).
Chapter 7
A Multipurpose Delegation
Proxy for WWW Credentials
Put all your eggs in one basket, and then watch that basket very
carefully.
– N.N.
Any problem in computer science can be solved with another layer
of indirection.
– David J. Wheeler
The need for the delegation of private keys (PSE) has been identified as a
PKI challenge in Section 3.2.5. In this chapter we present an architecture for
the WWW that treats the delegation of credentials – or more precisely the
ability to use them. Credentials may take on the form of a private key and a
certificate or a user name/password pair. Both types are supported by our
prototype in a uniform way. It supports all common authentication methods
used with standard HTTP as well as with SSL. SSL connections in general
and X.509 client certificate credentials in particular posed implementation
challenges. The solution only requires minor changes on the client side
and does not require any changes on the server side as it is completely
transparent for the Web server. In addition, it provides a tool for credential
management helping users to keep track of which services they have signed
in on the Internet and what credentials they have used for.
This chapter is structured as follows: In the next section, we motivate
the topic and highlight characteristic problems by means of a small scenario.
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A short survey of the most common authentication methods on the WWW
is given in Section 7.2, readers familiar with the subject may skip it. Four
different system architectures are presented and compared according to our
PKI evaluation tool of Section 3.3 in the following section. A prototype
was developed as part of [235, 104], its realization is sketched in Section 7.4
(see [103] for a comprehensive description). Finally, related work is reviewed
in Section 7.5.
Note that in this chapter we use the term proxy in two different ways.
One the one hand, a proxy describes a person like a secretary or vacation
replacement. On the other hand, a proxy is an intermediate component in
electronic communications (like for instance an HTTP proxy). The meaning
becomes clear from the context.
7.1 Problem Description
According to Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, credentials are “docu-
ments showing that a person is what he claims to be, is trustworthy, etc.”
Similarly, the purpose of a credential in the digital world is to prove the
identity of its owner towards another party, typically a server. The server
itself or a dedicated back-end system subsequently assigns access rights to
this identity such that the client is able to use the corresponding services.
Basically, credentials can be grouped into three classes: Authentication
may be based on the knowledge of a secret, usually a password, a PIN, or
a passphrase, which have to be provided to the system in conjunction with
a user name that serves as a (public) unique identifier. Another class is
authentication based on the possession of a token. A typical realization
is a challenge-response protocol using a cryptographic key pair. In this
scheme, the user proves that she possess the secret (the private key) to the
server without revealing it. Biometrics give rise to a third class of user
authentication methods, but have little importance on the WWW at the
moment. Moreover, physical characteristics effectively tie a credential to its
owner and prevent delegation of any kind, so we do not consider this class
further.
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7.1.1 Basic Scenario
The employees of ACME Inc., a medium-size IT company, periodically ac-
cess a couple of web sites protected by different user authentication schemes.
For instance, the company’s manager, Alice, handles the corporate bank ac-
count via the Internet. The bank’s web server is accessed through an SSL
channel. It requires strong client authentication using a key pair and the
corresponding X.509 certificate the bank had initially distributed in the form
of a PKCS#12 softtoken. Alice wants her proxy Bob to manage the com-
pany’s bank transactions during her summer vacation. Since she considers
trust to be good, but control to be better, she also wants a way to monitor
when Bob actually logged in on her behalf while she is absent.
Carl has subscribed to a commercial web portal on behalf of ACME.
The services are charged on a per-request basis and require a logon with a
user name and a password. The management wants to keep track of how
often members of the research department use the portal and restrict access
to office hours. Another requirement is a possibility to easily withdraw the
authorization of engineers leaving the company. Unfortunately, ACME has
only a single company-wide account . . .
7.1.2 Technical and Usability Requirements
The previous scenario highlights problems with credentials that are delegated
or jointly used by a group of people – these issues are independent of the
concrete type of credential. By delegating a credential, its owner permits
another person to temporarily impersonate her toward the target server, i.e.
to adopt the virtual identity of the owner. Group usage can be regarded as a
generalization of this concept. Both applications require that the capability
to impersonate the credential owner can be controlled and revoked when
needed. Following the naive approach of handing out the credential to the
proxy or sharing it with the group members is insecure. “Revoking” a cre-
dential based on knowledge can be achieved by altering the secret, although
this is awkward and is only possible if the server permits it. In general, this
possibility is ruled out for authentication schemes based on the possession
of a token, since it is issued by the server’s operator or a third party. In
both cases, there is no way to prevent proliferation of the credential, nor a
guarantee that it has been deleted. There is no possibility to control when
and which protected resources are accessed and by whom.
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Consider again the case where a credential consisting of an X.509 cer-
tificate should be delegated. The key pair might be used for a number of
purposes including secure email, file encryption, document signing etc. In
this situation, it is intolerable that the proxy gets to know the private key,
which is a valuable secret used over a rather long time (the certificate’s life-
time may be in the order of years). We seek for a secure way to solve these
problems. To sum up, a solution should meet the following requirements:
• Perform user authentication for an authorized person on behalf of the
credential owner without revealing the secret to the former.
• Protect the credentials from unauthorized access.
• Support common WWW authentication mechanisms, namely Basic
and Digest Authentication, NTLM HTTP Authentication, and form-
based variants as well as SSL with client certificates (see Section 7.2
for details).
• Operate transparently without additional software, both on the server
and the client side.
• Require no reconfiguration on the server and only minimal reconfigu-
ration on the client side. Provide an easy-to-use interface to manage
users, credentials and access rights.
The first requirement suggests to introduce a level of indirection between
credentials and users that are allowed to dispose of some of them. To ful-
fil the second one, credentials have to be stored in a trusted environment
and revealed (or applied in case the credential is a key pair) during the
communication with the server.
7.2 User Authentication Methods on the WWW
Authentication on a TCP/IP network should take place on the transport or
application layer such that a particular user (and not only her machine) is
identified [70]. We outline the most common authentication methods cur-
rently used on the WWW (see [189], [86], [105], and [165] for a thorough
treatment). Solutions based on Java applets or ActiveX controls are de-
liberately omitted as they are of minor practical importance. Apart from
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NTLM HTTP Authentication (which is likely to fall in this category, too),
all methods described in the following are supported by the current proto-
type.
7.2.1 Basic Authentication and Digest Authentication
HTTP offers two built-in authentication mechanisms, namely Basic Authen-
tication and Digest Authentication. Both work in the following way: Each
time the browser requests a protected resource, the web server returns a
message with the status code 401 Unauthorized indicating the need for
user authentication and the corresponding method to be used. After having
once prompted for a user name and password assigned to a certain realm,
the browser has to include the same authentication information over and
over again in each subsequent request of a protected resource. When using
Basic Authentication, this information is transferred in the clear as part of
the HTTP header – possibly multiple times. This makes the method ex-
tremely vulnerable to eavesdropping. In comparison, Digest Authentication
is resistant to passive attacks since the password is concealed by a challenge-
response protocol. The challenge consists of a server-created nonce, which
has to be incorporated in the argument of a hash function (besides the user
name and password) to obtain the response. Digest Authentication thus
provides significantly more security concerning the authentication although
it cannot withstand active attacks, nor does it provide confidentiality.
7.2.2 NTLM HTTP Authentication
NTLM HTTP Authentication is a proprietary authentication scheme work-
ing analogously to Digest Authentication, but requires an additional round
of communication between client and server. Depending on the server set-
tings, a client may answer the challenge with one or more responses us-
ing different algorithms [105]. The protocol is based on Microsoft’s NTLM
(NT LAN Manager), but platform-independent implementations of NTLM
HTTP Authentication are available1. NTLM differs from the previous meth-
ods in that it does not authenticate single HTTP requests, but merely a
whole session conveying session authentication information via the HTTP
headers. Server and client are both required to support persistent con-
1e.g. by Mozilla, see http://www.mozillazine.org/talkback.html?article=3990.
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nections either with HTTP/1.0 and the keep-alive feature or HTTP/1.1
(common web browsers do).
7.2.3 Authentication based on HTML Forms
Using HTML forms [186] for user authentication is another method on the
application layer and certainly the most popular nowadays. From an aes-
thetic and usability viewpoint, this is the method of choice since the authen-
tication dialogue can be embedded directly into the web page, thus avoiding
extra windows popping up.
There are two transport methods for information that was entered into
the form. While the GET method appends the data to the URL, the POST
method transfers it in the body of the HTTP request. A disadvantage of
the former method is that information may be unintentionally cached (e.g.,
in the browser’s history or in log files on the web server or an HTTP proxy).
Like all aforementioned methods, form-based authentication does not pro-
vide message confidentiality or authenticity by itself. Due to the stateless
nature of HTTP, form-based authentication has to be used in conjunction
with techniques for session management to convey authentication informa-
tion in subsequent requests. HTTP cookies [149] or URL re-writing are
typical such methods.
7.2.4 Public Key Methods
The methods considered so far are all knowledge-based. In order to use
a stronger authentication mechanism based on the possession of a private
key, SSL/TLS is the protocol of choice for the Internet. Here we do not
distinguish between SSL [124, 87] and TLS [66], but simply speak of SSL
instead as TLS v1.0 is closely related to SSL v3.0. SSL is already widely
deployed, although mostly in a setting where only the server has a certificate,
but users are authenticated by other means (those described in the previous
sections). Let us assume that the user possesses a key pair for signing and
a corresponding certificate issued by a certification authority (CA) that is
trusted by the server.
Before the actual data transmission takes place, client and server engage
in a handshake protocol to mutually authenticate and agree upon a common
secret. During the protocol, the client, which holds an RSA or DSA key
pair, sends an X.509 certificate and proves its identity by signing a hash code
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based on the preceding messages exchanged with the server (see e.g. [219, 70]
for details). As a result of the handshake, client and server have agreed upon
a so-called pre-master secret. A key for a MAC scheme is derived from this
value. The MAC key is used to authenticate subsequent messages.
7.3 A Comparison of System Architectures
In this section, we present four different architectures that fulfil the require-
ments stated in Section 7.1.2. One of these architectures is a client-side
solution while the others require a server acting as a man-in-the-middle,
which is shown in Figure 7.1. The application server, the HTTP gateway,
and the HTTP proxy architecture come under this category. The illustration
shows the communication between the client and server via an intermediate
MITM component. The segments between client and MITM as well as be-
tween MITM and server can be secured to prevent eavesdropping and ensure
data integrity (depicted by the tunnel with the padlock symbol).
Credential Store
ServerClient Man-in-the-Middle
Host
Figure 7.1: Generic man-in-the-middle architecture.
In the following, we use the terms middleware for the MITM component
and target host to indicate the actual connection endpoint, i.e. the machine
that serves the requested web pages. Requests from the client to the target
host go through the middleware where they are augmented with authenti-
cation credentials. In particular, credentials never leave the MITM server’s
protected environment. In order to allow a fine-grained access control, the
middleware needs to authenticate each user before permitting access to its
services. The adopted authentication mechanism largely depends on the
actual implementation and can range from plain-text passwords to crypto-
graphically strong public key mechanisms.
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7.3.1 Application Server
The application server concept is based on a machine that provides remote
login facilities. Possible realizations range from a full-screen remote desktop
(such as VNC2) to the forwarding of single browser windows (as it is the
case with X11 forwarding). A person, who wants to make use of a certain
credential, has to login to the application server first. After the session has
been established, the person connects to the target server with a standard
web browser running remotely on the application server. Most modern op-
erating systems are shipped with tools for application server access, so this
variant can be easily implemented. On the other hand, popular browsers
such as Microsoft Internet Explorer or Mozilla provide certain functionality
for credential management.
However, handling delegations properly or enforcing a consistent policy
is difficult. Special precautions are necessary to ensure that a user cannot
gain unauthorized access to credentials stored on the application server (and
for instance export key pairs). Additionally, users need to work remotely,
adding latency to the interaction and exposing them to an environment that
possibly differs significantly from the one they usually work with.
7.3.2 HTTP Gateway
In the HTTP gateway approach, the middleware acts like a web server where
connections to protected resources are initiated by calling a particular URL
on the gateway. The gateway then retrieves the necessary credential and
opens a channel to the target host. The target server’s response is returned
to the client to which it appears as coming from the gateway. As the URL
requested by the client differs from the actual URL, the gateway needs to
modify content coming from the target host in order to redirect hyperlinks
contained in HTML or JavaScript documents to the gateway’s host name.
Otherwise, subsequent requests would directly address the target server,
skip the gateway’s proxy authentication, and thereby leading to an error.
A major advantage of this approach are the low deployment costs. There
is no need to modify the client-side configuration and SSL can be handled
as well (by equipping the gateway with a single X.509 certificate issued by a
trusted CA). However, there are downsides: Binary data such as Macrome-
2http://www.realvnc.com/
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dia Flash or Java bytecode makes content re-writing very difficult. Addition-
ally, a Java applet that runs in a sandbox may only communicate with the
server it was retrieved from by the client, so the applet’s backward channel
to the original server is cut.
7.3.3 HTTP Proxy
A natural idea is to use an HTTP proxy and enhance it with certain func-
tionality to handle authentication information (using the terminology of
RFC 2616 [80], such proxies are called “non-transparent”). HTTP proxies
are a well-known concept. They are typically used as so-called caching prox-
ies in order to reduce network traffic or as an application level gateway in
conjunction with a firewall. When processing standard HTTP requests, a
proxy works as forwarding agent in between the requesting client and the
responding host, itself acting both as a server and client. This allows the
proxy to modify requests and add authentication credentials if necessary.
All HTTP-based schemes listed in the requirements (Section 7.1.2) can be
handled that way.
Things get a bit more complicated with HTTPS requests. To initiate an
SSL session through a proxy, there is a special command (the CONNECT
method, see [157] for details). However, after a secure, i.e. encrypted and
authenticated, tunnel between client and server has been established, the
HTTP proxy is unable to change or eavesdrop on the data in transmission.
The only way to work around this restriction is to loosen the principle of
end-to-end security. This can be done by letting the proxy pretend toward
the client that it is the target host. In practice, such a man-in-the-middle
attack is effectively prevented through the use of a certificate that identifies
the server. However, if the proxy is given a replica certificate that
(a) binds the proxy’s public key to the identity of the target site and
(b) is issued by a CA which is trusted by the client,
the proxy can successfully impersonate the target host toward the client. If
the proxy furthermore has access to an authentication credential (a key pair
and the respective certificate), it can also impersonate the credential owner
toward the target host.
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7.3.4 Client-Side Architecture
The idea behind the client-side approach is to equip an HTTP user agent
with additional functionality to access a credential store, e.g. via a PKCS#11
interface. After retrieving the appropriate credential from the central reposi-
tory, authentication can take place as usual, even without the need to prompt
for user input. This variant does not need a machine sitting in between client
and target host, but only an adaptation of the web browser. For open-source
browsers like Mozilla or its Firefox branch, the extension can be integrated
directly in the code. It should be possible to also implement the same
functionality for Internet Explorer using its plug-in and extension COM in-
terface. However, as we have not implemented any of these extensions, it is
difficult to give cost estimates. Another alternative, which is independent
of a particular user agent, is to fit up the client’s TCP/IP stack or socket
library with support for user authentication via the credential store. For
instance, on the Microsoft Windows platform, this can be accomplished by
a wrapper around the Winsock or WinInet DLL. Such a wrapper has to
detect connections requiring authentication, retrieve the suitable credential
from the credential store and transparently perform the authentication.
The major advantage of this client-side concept is the seamless integra-
tion with the user’s web browsing environment for the price of writing new
code. While credential use can and should be tracked by the central cre-
dential store, the actual communication between client and server is kept
private when SSL is used. Unfortunately, this comes for the price that cre-
dentials need to be revealed to the client. Therefore, a malicious client could
learn the secret information.
7.3.5 Evaluation
In the following, we sum up the pros and cons of each architecture. For
the comparison we use a subset of the categories of our general evalua-
tion framework (see Section 3.3). Some of them emphasize single aspects
as it is indicated below. The selection of categories includes technical re-
quirements (stressing standard compliance and compatibility with existing
software), transparency of the security features, menus and dialogues, secret
key handling (comprising the handling of other types of credentials), and
installation and configuration (especially with respect to deployment costs).
A quantitative score is given in Table 7.1.
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Appl.
Server
HTTP
Gateway
HTTP
Proxy
Client-Side
Tech. Requirements ◦ ◦ + ◦/−∗
Transparency +/−−∗ ◦ + ++ /◦∗
Menus&Dialogues ◦ ◦ ++ +
Secret Handling − + + −
Installation&Config. +/−−∗ ++ /◦∗ ◦ −−
∗Rating depends on the actual system environment and implementation variant,
see text for details.
Table 7.1: Comparison of the four architectures.
We use the same notation for the rating as in Chapter 3. (◦ denotes an
average, + and − denote slightly positive and negative results respectively.
Excellent respectively insufficient grades are abbreviated by ++ and −−.)
Please observe that in some cases the rating may vary according to the actual
system environment and the implementation variant. Details are given in
the following text.
Technical Requirements As the application server uses a standard web
browser, it supports a variety of protocols and formats, with the possible
exception of plug-ins or ActiveX controls that require root privileges the
end user is not granted on the application server. Access to credential man-
agement facilities is generally restricted to software running directly on the
application server. The limiting factor of the HTTP gateway is its need
for URL rewriting as outlined in Section 7.3.2. In this regard, the HTTP
proxy is superior as it only requires a user agent supporting HTTP proxies
(which can be taken for granted). Besides, other applications can use the
proxy’s services through a standardized protocol, too. The latter statement
also applies to the client-side approach with a modified TCP/IP stack or
socket library (which are nevertheless no platform-independent solutions).
A customized web browser gets a lower compatibility rating since it only
supports a restricted set of applications.
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Transparency of the Security Features Here transparency refers to
the question to what extent the user gets in touch with the credential del-
egation infrastructure. Obviously, each of the MITM architectures requires
an additional step of authentication toward the middleware. The rating for
the application server approach varies significantly depending on the actual
realization (see Section 7.3.1). A solution implementing a seamless integra-
tion into the user’s work environment, such as X11 forwarding, receives a
better rating than a classic remote-desktop solution like VNC. While HTTP
gateway users can still work with their usual environment, accessing authen-
ticated WWW resources is not seamless as it requires an additional step to
point the web browser to the gateway page. In comparison, the HTTP
proxy operates transparently after an initial configuration. The client-side
approach is optimal if the user’s favorite browser is supported, but may
cause some inconvenience otherwise.
Menus and Dialogues The general usability of the application server
approach heavily depends on the actual realization (e.g. if the look & feel
is the same) and on network latency. While the latter concern is a minor
issue for the HTTP gateway, it nevertheless confronts the user with a non-
standard way of accessing protected WWW resources: Instead of using the
browser’s controls such as the location bar to navigate to the target address,
the user has to use an HTML form provided by the gateway to navigate to
the desired page. The HTTP proxy is favourable from a usability point of
view as it does not require any uncommon actions. So is the client-side
approach as long as the user can work with her favourite browser.
Secret Key (and Password) Handling All approaches have in common
that they use a central credential repository, which is an attractive target for
attackers. However, protecting a single system is still easier than caring for
a lot of decentralized credential stores on the client systems, possibly having
to deal with heterogeneous operating systems and user agents. A downside
of the MITM architectures is the fact that payload data is available in the
clear on the middleware – even if the target host is accessed via SSL. These
architectures are thus vulnerable to insider attacks (e.g. by the system oper-
ator), but on the other hand offer the possibility to audit transactions. The
communication between application server and client should be analogously
protected against wiretapping (e.g. by SSH port forwarding). It is question-
7.4. TLS AUTHENTICATION PROXY PROTOTYPE 237
able whether the application server environment can be sufficiently hardened
to prevent attempts to read out stored credentials. Credential protection is
a major weakness of the client-side approach. However, it is in fact the only
solution to provide real end-to-end security for the communication between
client and the target host.
Installation and Configuration On a Windows XP or an X11-based
client system, deployment costs for the application server approach are low
since the necessary software is already pre-installed. For all MITM architec-
tures, the middleware’s public key has to be trusted by the clients. If this
key is certified by a CA that is unknown to the clients, the appropriate trust
anchor has to be installed on all systems. This step can be combined with
the rollout of end user certificates if such are used for authentication with
the middleware. In the HTTP proxy realization, one has to have a key pair
to issue replica certificates. This requires in turn a certificate with the Basic
Constraints extension set to “CA”. Commercial CAs charge a lot of money
for certificates of this kind, so the HTTP proxy will probably rather rely on
its own CA. A minor problem is the single change in the browser’s proxy
settings, which can be automated for some browsers (see Section 7.4.4).
A client-side implementation comes with the highest deployment costs of
all architectures as it requires software installation and configuration on all
client systems.
7.4 TLS Authentication Proxy Prototype
We have implemented a prototype of the HTTP proxy variant, since we
consider it superior to the other MITM architectures from a technical view-
point and estimated its development costs lower than those of a client-side
variant. After giving an overview of the proxy’s modular architecture, we
go into technical details in Section 7.4.2. The user interface is described in
the following section, deployment issues are then discussed in Section 7.4.4.
7.4.1 Overview
An overview of the modules of the prototype, which we called TLS Authen-
tication Proxy, is shown in Figure 7.2. The components can be grouped
largely into two categories: A back-end and a front-end, which are shown on
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Figure 7.2: Module structure of the TLS Authentication Proxy.
the left-hand and the right-hand side of the figure, respectively. The back-
end is built around the underlying database management system (DBMS)
and contains modules for the management of proxy users, credentials, and
access control policies. Further components are a tiny certification author-
ity, a servlet-based web administration interface, and a logging module. The
front-end comprises the networking and HTTP engines.
Our proxy is written in Java 2 SE 1.4 and uses the FlexiProvider JCE
implementation as cryptographic service provider. ASN.1 support is pro-
vided by the Fraunhofer Codec package, which is relevant for parsing and
issuing X.509 certificates. PostgreSQL3 is used as database back-end. All
3http://www.postgresql.org
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administrative tasks can be handled through a web interface, which has been
implemented using the jetty:// HTTP servlet container4.
7.4.2 Technical Details
Upon receiving a request from the network, the proxy parses it in order
to extract the target host and request method. Our implementation sup-
ports all request methods (GET, POST, CONNECT etc.) defined in RFC
2616 [80]. If the resource on the target host is known to require a credential,
the proxy first authenticates the requesting client, looks up its permissions,
and starts the authentication with the target host if applicable. Otherwise,
TLS Authentication Proxy acts as a usual non-caching HTTP proxy. In or-
der to identify the user, the proxy may use SSL with client authentication –
which we chose to implement for the current prototype as it is the strongest
mechanism – or Basic/Digest Authentication. The situation where a user
requests a resource that is accessible via standard HTTP is somewhat spe-
cial since it requires a redirection to an SSL page in our implementation.
This case is therefore discussed later (see Figure 7.4).
Target web site accessed via SSL The necessary steps for target web
sites that use SSL are shown in Figure 7.3. By means of the standard
CONNECT method, a user agent indicates to the proxy that it wants to
access an SSL-protected website. As a first step, TLS Authentication Proxy
and the server start an SSL handshake with a premature end after the
server has sent its certificate. The CA module then produces a replica of
the server’s just retrieved X.509 certificate. This replica is then presented to
the client in a subsequent SSL handshake where the proxy impersonates the
original server. During this handshake, the proxy demands certificate-based
authentication from the client. Having successfully established a crypto-
graphic channel between client and proxy, the proxy selects the credential
and goes through a complete SSL handshake with the server this time. If
the credential is a key pair, the proxy is already authenticated during the
handshake. Otherwise, the last messages exchanged between proxy and
server in Figure 7.3 look slightly different (like in Figure 7.4 for the case of
Basic/Digest Authentication).
4http://jetty.mortbay.org/jetty/
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Target web site accessed via standard HTTP Figure 7.4 illustrates
how the proxy identifies a user who requests a protected resource via HTTP.
Instead of passing through the request to http://server/ (as a usual HTTP
proxy would do), TLS Authentication Proxy redirects the web browser to
the URL https://server:9443/ forcing it to CONNECT to the SSL site.
Here, the reserved port number of 9443 indicates to the proxy not to act
as in the situation of Figure 7.3. When the proxy gets a subsequent re-
quest tagged with this port number, it connects to the target server using
HTTP as originally intended – even though the connection between client
and proxy has been secured by SSL. (The actual target port if different
from the default value 80 is picked from the internal database.) A future
extension might use the connection upgrade mechanism specified in RFC
2817 [143] to dynamically change an HTTP connection to HTTPS. This
would allow an even more seamless user experience. However, current web
browsers do not support this protocol extension yet.
Session Management To speed up successive Basic Authentication re-
quests, the proxy maintains an authentication realm cache. Instead of having
to wait for the server to return a 401 Unauthorized status code, the proxy
immediately sends the authentication headers with the request itself. This
optimization is not applicable to Digest Authentication or other challenge-
response schemes. In contrast, form-based authentication schemes usually
do not require to re-authenticate each single request, but apply some form of
session management instead. Schemes that embed session identifiers into the
URL can be grouped into two categories: After successful client authentica-
tion, either an HTTP redirect (Status code 302 Found in conjunction with
a Location header) sends the browser to a new URL containing the session
ID or the browser receives personalized web pages with the ID embedded
into each hyperlink.
Our prototype comes with full support for cookie-based session manage-
ment and works with the redirection-based mechanism. New sessions are
established either automatically when a web site is accessed for the first
time (or the previous session has expired) or manually. This comprises a so-
called trigger URL, which is an arbitrary URL on the target web site the user
calls to initiate authentication. URL-based sessions cannot be established
automatically, but require the use of a trigger URL. TLS Authentication
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Figure 7.3: Data flow for an SSL target web site.
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CONNECT server:9443 HTTP/1.1
401 Unauthorized
GET / HTTP/1.1
WWW-Authenticate: [...]
Figure 7.4: Data flow for an HTTP target web site.
Proxy keeps track of cookie-based sessions and transparently transmits the
HTML authentication form data when needed. The server’s login URL as
well as the authentication parameters – which are usually entered into the
HTML form – is stored along with the other credential information. As
sessions often expire after a certain period of inactivity, form-based creden-
242 7.4. TLS AUTHENTICATION PROXY PROTOTYPE
tials have a configurable maximum session lifetime after which the proxy
automatically re-authenticates.
Logging The task of the logging module is twofold. On the one hand, it
audits all access to the web interface (which is described in the following
section). On the other hand, every use of a credential stored on the proxy is
recorded from the back-end. Both log files adhere to the de-facto standard
NCSA Extended/Combined Log Format5, which is used for instance by the
Apache web server. A number of tools is available to parse and evaluate
such files. Among other pieces of data, the time and date of access, the
name of the authenticated user, and the requested resource and credential
is kept. In the current version of the prototype, this information is not yet
available to end users, but only to an administrator.
7.4.3 User Interface
TLS Authentication Proxy offers a web-based user interface, which is ac-
cessible via the reserved URL https://proxyadmin/. Logins to this site
always require a user certificate issued by the proxy’s CA. The authentica-
tion process is similar to the way how other protected resources are accessed.
End users can browse this site to learn which credentials they are allowed to
use and delegate. Assume that Alice delegates a credential to Bob. Along
with this information, Alice may define a time frame in which Bob has ac-
cess to the service assigned to this particular credential. This is the only
constraint that is currently available, but others are conceivable, e.g. a max-
imum number of total/daily logins or a restriction to a subset of web pages.
Due to the modular implementation, custom constraints can be added eas-
ily. If necessary, the right to use a credential can be revoked on a per-user
basis. Credential usage rights are modelled by a list of capabilities each
supplemented with a constraint. Assigned to a credential is the person that
has the right to delegate it.
Administration Interface Whether a person may also access the proxy’s
administration functionality is determined by a predefined AdminCredential,
which can be added to a capabilities list like any other credential. Only per-
sons who have been granted the right to use this special credential may access
5http://hoohoo.ncsa.uiuc.edu/docs/setup/httpd/LogOptions.html
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the administration GUI. Apart from general network and proxy settings (for
instance the address ranges that are allowed to connect), the administration
interface provides functionality for user and credential management. Cre-
ating a new user goes along with the instant generation of a key pair and
the issuance of a certificate for that person. Both objects are contained
in a PKCS#12 file that the administrator can download together with the
corresponding transport PIN. In the current implementation, certificates are
renewed manually via the administration interface. Instead of implementing
certificate revocation lists, we chose to give the administrator the ability to
disable users temporarily or permanently, which is more flexible.6 Figure 7.5
shows an example of an X.509 credential for the SAP Service Marketplace7
imported into the proxy. The setup of form-based authentication is a bit
more complicated since the parameter names and values still have to be
extracted manually from the HTML source code. However, this could be
automated with some effort.
7.4.4 Deployment
There are two deployment problems with the HTTP proxy approach. One is
the distribution of keys and certificates, the other is web browser configura-
tion. Key pairs and certificates are delivered within a PKCS#12 container
file, which also contains the certificate of the proxy’s CA. When importing a
personal key pair using Internet Explorer and the Windows CryptoAPI, the
CA certificate is automatically installed, too. In contrast, Mozilla requires
an additional step of explicitly introducing a new trust anchor to the system.
In order to further minimize deployment costs, our prototype supports
theWeb Proxy Auto-Discovery (WPAD) Protocol [95], which can be used to
automatically obtain a Proxy Auto-Configuration (PAC, see [172]) file from
the network. The PAC file contains JavaScript code, which dynamically
tells the browser the URLs to use a proxy server for and what the address
of that server is. WPAD is directly supported by Internet Explorer, a patch
for Mozilla is available. JavaScript is sometimes seen as a security risk and
therefore deactivated. As an alternative, either the proxy server’s address
or the URL of the PAC file can be configured manually in the browser.
6For security reasons, certificates issued by the proxy’s CA carry a critical extension
restricting their usage to the purpose of client authentication.
7This portal is located at the URL https://www010.sap-ag.de/.
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Figure 7.5: Details for the SAP Service Marketplace credential.
To counter privacy concerns, the PAC file can be adjusted to only route
traffic through the proxy if the target host requires a credential. Due to
the way PAC works, the configuration files can be obtained anywhere in the
local network and allow an adversary to learn which credentials are kept in
the proxy’s repository. As a countermeasure, the proxy is able to apply a
cryptographic hash algorithm as a one-way function in order to obscure the
host names. The prototype uses Paul Johnston’s JavaScript implementation
of MD58. At runtime, the PAC file’s code is executed to compute the hash
of the current server name. If and only if the result matches one of the
stored values, the proxy is used.
7.5 Related Work
The problem of credential management typically leads to identity manage-
ment or Single sign-on (SSO) technologies. SSO provides a means to reduce
8http://pajhome.org.uk/crypt/md5/
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the number of authentications a user has to go through. After an initial
authentication with an authentication service provider (ASP), protected re-
sources can be accessed without further authentication. Surveys on SSO
architectures can be found in [182, 61, 21]. SSO solutions can be categorized
depending on whether the target host is aware of the ASP’s involvement or
not. In the notion of [182], true SSO services like Microsoft’s Passport9 re-
quire an established trust relationship between the ASP and the target web
server, as well as the implementation of the appropriate protocol. Opposed
to this are pseudo-SSO services.
SSO infrastructures form an ideal basis to implement a delegation mech-
anism. For instance, Kerberos supports this feature, but of course Kerberos
was originally not designed as an authentication mechanism for the Web.
However, there is in fact an Apache module10 for the so-called HTTP Nego-
tiate authentication method. Microsoft Internet Explorer and the Mozilla
browsers support this method, too.11 Kornievskaia et al. [148] propose a
system to access “kerberized” services through a web browser in order to
leverage the credential delegation functionality natively provided by Ker-
beros for WWW resources.
SPKI/SDSI certificates [72, 73] are designed to support delegation orig-
inally. Greenpass is an application that uses SPKI/SDSI certificates in an
X.509 certificate environment to express the delegation of wireless network
access rights. A description is found in the paper of Goffee et al. [106].
Greenpass is compatible with standard clients, but nevertheless required
a re-implementation of the authentication protocol on the server side. The
current version only supports X.509 certificates as credentials, but no password-
based schemes.
Credential delegation is a natural requirement in Grid Computing as
programmes should be able to run autonomously on a user’s behalf with
a subset of her rights. The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) uses X.509
credentials in combination with the SSL protocol to mutually authenticate
Grid users and resources [46]. An entity can delegate rights to a third party
with the help of X.509 proxy certificates [242] that have their own key pair
as well as a particular X.509 extension and a rather short validity period.
9http://www.microsoft.com/net/services/passport/
10http://modauthkerb.sourceforge.net/
11Kerberos authentication is already supported natively by Mozilla and Firefox on
UNIX platforms, a Windows plug-in is available at http://negotiateauth.mozdev.org/.
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MyProxy12 is a credential repository designed to work with a Grid portal
that provides services for delegation management [21]. Weaker mechanisms
like Basic or Digest Authentication are not supported. An advantage of
this approach is the fact that users do not have to reveal their long-term
credentials for delegation. However, the fact that this framework requires
(heavy-weight) server-side support is an important downside that excludes
this framework for our scenario. The same restrictions apply to the attribute
certificate framework defined in the X.509 standard [52]. This approach
requires a sophisticated Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) and
limits the capability of delegation to so-called attribute authorities (AA)
which are typically not end entities. Plus, the attribute certificate profile [77]
explicitly discourages from the use of attribute certificate for delegation due
to the high complexity of the verification process.
Impostor13 follows a similar approach as TLS Authentication Proxy in
that it performs a MITM attack on SSL. Working as an SSO proxy, it also
provides content filtering, but does not issue its own replica certificates (see
below).
7.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented different architectures to implement a
revocable delegation of WWW credentials for today’s most common au-
thentication methods on the Internet. Our work was especially motivated
by the difficulty of delegating X.509 credentials, which we consider an im-
portant requirement in the near future. We have implemented an HTTP
proxy with enhanced functionality, the TLS Authentication Proxy. It al-
lows an efficient delegation and secure group usage of credentials. A major
benefit of our approach is that only minimal configuration changes and no
changes at all on the server side are required. TLS Authentication Proxy is
a zero footprint solution as no additional software is required neither on the
client nor the server side.
Credentials are stored in a central, well-protected database rather than
spread over many heterogeneous client systems. Delegation of credentials
can happen in a secure and revocable manner as client systems never gain
12http://grid.ncsa.uiuc.edu/myproxy/
13http://impostor.sourceforge.net/
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knowledge of them. Auditing facilities log who actually delegates or uses
a credential, when and for what purpose. In our opinion, the light-weight
TLS Authentication Proxy represents a good compromise between usability
and security.
Additionally, our prototype is a pseudo-SSO tool and facilitates the de-
ployment of new credentials via a centralized roll-out. TLS Authentication
Proxy also supports roaming scenarios where users move around among
different machines. Surely, in this use case the current X.509 user authenti-
cation is not optimal, but the implementation of a one-time password mech-
anism is conceivable.
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Chapter 8
Summary and Outlook
Wo aber Gefahr ist,
wa¨chst das Rettende auch.
– Friedrich Ho¨lderlin
In this thesis we proceeded along the lines of our four-stage research
agenda stated in the introduction.
Stage 1: Description of Usability Problems At first, we showed nu-
merous examples of usability problems with secure applications in Chap-
ter 2. We then provided a fine-grained typification and distinction between
user-caused violations and application-caused vulnerabilities, shaded by the
degree of intent and impossibility respectively. The main contribution of
this chapter is a multi-layer model of methods to promote usable security.
We also reviewed previous work and classified it according to our scheme.
Stage 2: Particularities of PKI In Chapter 3 we delved into the details
of cryptography and PKI. This lead us to the identification of five major tech-
nical challenges with PKI, namely certificate validation, the management of
trust anchors, certificate policies, information and service access, and PSE
management. For some of the challenges we proposed heuristics that could
right now alleviate users’ problems without changing the technology itself.
Our generic PKI evaluation tool was also introduced. We showed its flexi-
bility and practicability by specifying it for and applying it to a large variety
of PKI use cases. We used heuristic evaluation and a cognitive walkthrough
249
250
as informal and a laboratory user test as an empirical usability evaluation
method based on our framework.
Stage 3: Analysis of Generic Strategies Our multi-layer model repre-
sents an integral and systematic view on usable security. Having the various
layers in mind helps to find the right, i.e. effective and practical, approach
when designing for better usability in a security context. Solutions on the
lower layers are in general more likely to allow farther-reaching improve-
ments than solutions on the upper layers (take our concept of opportunistic
email security as an example). However, this may come for the price of
a radical change of technology and lead to non-standard and incompatible
mechanisms, which will not be adopted in the short term. For the meantime,
retrofitting usability to secure applications may be an option as we showed
in Chapter 7.
Stage 4: Sample Solutions Among the other solutions is the proposal
of a new concept for security awareness campaigns. In order to initiate
a change in users’ behaviour we resort to a concept called pentest@work
to let users experience potential dangers first hand. We expect that such
campaigns, which put concrete experience at the first place and combine
different learning methods, achieve a higher and longer-lasting effect than
previous approaches. This conjecture is backed by findings from learning
psychology, a method to validate its soundness is also outlined.
We believe that, for the medium term of PKI development, especially
rethinking the threat model merits careful attention. With PKI outsourcing
(Chapter 5) and opportunistic email security (Chapter 6), we proposed two
solutions in this direction. We recognized the potential of opportunistic se-
curity for email, where it could bring a great improvement and dramatically
raise the ratio of encrypted and signed email with a transparent and non-
intrusive mechanism. The current discussion in the European Union about
the possible data retention of email traffic information may spur users to
care for their online privacy. Opportunistic security separates key exchange
from binding keys to identities. In case where the communicants require
such a binding, they may engage in bilateral key fingerprint verification. A
quantitative measurement in an experimental analysis of users’ mailboxes
suggests that this is indeed feasible. On the user interface level, we proposed
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new interaction mechanisms and metaphors, which were successfully tested
in a paper-based user study.
We argue that the concept of opportunistic security could also be ex-
tended to SSL as this comes close to the way people cope today with SSL
server certificates that cannot be validated. The integration of the corre-
sponding opportunistic mechanism into one of the current open-source web
browsers combined with a field test would be an interesting direction of fur-
ther research. We also showed how to cope with another shortcoming of
SSL. Web portals that require user authentication via a certificate or other
means do usually not support secure credential delegation. Practical needs,
however, may dictate that users give another person the right to impersonate
them temporarily, but without handing out the secret. This is impossible
without an appropriate server-side support. Our solution, TLS Authentica-
tion Proxy, shows how to seamlessly retrofit the missing functionality at the
price of loosen the principle of end-to-end security.
Gateway-based secure email is another application where end-to-end se-
curity is abandoned for the sake of better usability. We proposed a new
method to secure, with the help of threshold cryptography, the central
server, which otherwise becomes a single point of attack. The possibility
to enforce a four-eyes principle also turned out to be useful for the case
of delegating access to encrypted mail. Our main application for threshold
cryptography was the PKI outsourcing scenario. Using distributed signa-
tures we fixed a weakness in the common enrolment protocol by giving back
full control to the customers. We proposed several flexible combinations
of signature algorithms, certificate hierarchies, and integration variants. In
order to not require the customer to rely on a third party, we also needed a
distributed key generation algorithm. As a theoretical “by-product” we de-
vised a new algorithm for the two-party case of RSA, which is asymptotically
faster than previous schemes and in fact turned out to be practical.
Concluding Remarks It is unlikely that the adoption of usable PKI-
enabled applications will happen quickly along a wide front without sig-
nificant technological improvements. On the contrary many small steps are
needed towards that goal. As first measures application designers should aim
at ruling out sloppiness and apply heuristics to simplify otherwise difficult
tasks of PKI-enabled software. Especially they must avoid asking questions
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the user cannot answer. This is neither useful from a security perspective,
nor does it strengthen users’ confidence in the mechanisms themselves.
In the medium or long term, new PKI security paradigms should be
looked for and standardized. We mentioned threshold cryptography and
opportunistic security as two promising examples. The secure mode of op-
eration should become the default mode and threat awareness should be
raised. This would probably lead to a stronger usage of PKI-enabled ap-
plications and, due to the growing market, software quality would improve.
Eventually this would result in an overall reduction of security risks.
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